DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 147 218 SO 010 455

AUTHOR	Shaver, James P., Ed.
TITLE	Building Rationales for Citizenship Education. Bulletin 52.
INSTITUTION	National Council for the Social Studies, Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	77
NOTE	128p.
AVAILABLE FROM	National Council for the Social Studies, 2030 M Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036 ($4.95 paperbound)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Change Strategies; Changing Attitudes; Citizen Participation; *Citizenship; Citizenship Responsibility; Community Involvement; Curriculum Development; Curriculum Evaluation; Democratic Values; Educational Change; *Educational Needs; Educational Objectives; *Educational Philosophy; Educational Problems; Educational Responsibility; Educational Trends; Elementary Secondary Education; Essays; *Relevance (Education); Slow Learners; *Social Studies

ABSTRACT

The intent of this bulletin is to involve social studies educators, as implementers of citizenship education, in re-examining the assumptions underlying their curricular choices and teaching methods. This subject is addressed because presently little evidence exists to indicate that the schools' efforts have affected the quantity or quality of adult citizen participation. Separate chapters were written by invitation by persons who have been working on potentially productive elements of citizenship education. Chapter one raises questions and issues concerning the reconceptualization of citizenship education. Chapters two through four examine a radical critique of the purpose of citizenship education in a democratic society, reasons for and forms of social participation as a part of schooling, and involvement of slow learners in controversial community problems. Chapter five returns to the subject of the importance and legitimacy of educators creating a rationale for citizenship education. The major objective of this chapter is to clarify the dimensions of the problem so that social studies programs will be more responsive to the needs of a democratic society and more beneficial to the young people who inhabit it. (KC)

****
* Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished *
* materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort *
* to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal *
* reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality *
* of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available *
* via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not *
* responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions *
* supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original. *
****

ED147218

NOV 30 1977

Building Rationales for Citizenship Education

James P. Shaver, Editor

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

BULLETIN 52

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

NCSS

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM."

SO 010 455

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

President
Howard D. Mehlinger
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

President-Elect
Anna Ochoa
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

Vice-President
George G. Watson, Jr.
Winchester High School
Winchester, Massachusetts

Executive Director
Brian J. Larkin
Washington, D.C.

Editor
Daniel Roselle
Washington, D.C.

Executive Secretary Emeritus
Merrill F. Hartshorn
Washington, D.C.

Directors
Todd Clark
Albert J. George
Carole Hahn
Florence Jackson
Savannah Jones
Theodore Kaltsounis
Jack Linden
Marilyn Moody Garavaglia
Jack P. Risher
Geraldine Rosenthal
James P. Shaver
Ambrose A. Clegg, Jr., *Ex Officio*

Publications Board
Charles L. Mitsakos, *Chairperson*
Barry K. Beyer
Geneva Gay
Carole Hahn
Gaylord Lasher
Mario D. Rabozzi
Karen B. Wiley
Celeste P. Woodley
Mary Turner Lane, *Ex Officio*
George G. Watson, Jr., *Ex Officio*

ABOUT THE EDITOR

James P. Shaver is Professor and Chairperson of the Bureau of Research Services in the College of Education at Utah State University. He served as President of the National Council for the Social Studies in 1976.

Gaylord C. Lasher was Coordinator for
Building Rationales for Citizenship Education

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-88480
ISBN 0-87986-013-8

Copyright © 1977 by the

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES
1515 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 101, Arlington, Virginia 22209

Foreword

When did the status of citizen fall from grace? At what point in our history did people cease to be proud of being a citizen? It was not always so. At one time people believed that to be a citizen of a republic was a special blessing. In contrast, subjects were to be pitied because they had no opportunity to govern themselves or to determine the rules by which they lived. Who debased the concept of citizenship? What events led many Americans to conclude that being a citizen was no longer an honor and a privilege?

For Thomas Jefferson and his peers, to be citizens of a republic was one of the rarest privileges available to human beings. The right to rule oneself was worth risking life and property. Moreover, they believed that the challenge of citizenship, appealing to the noblest instincts of mankind, would draw from the populace hidden and hitherto unsuspected qualities of altruism and intellectual talent. However, citizenship was not merely a right to be enjoyed; it also carried responsibility. Citizens must educate themselves; they must be aware of public issues; they must avoid petty, personal interests and seek the common good; and, above all, they must participate.

Do we take citizenship too much for granted today, and has our general economic prosperity made us lazy and complacent? Or have we become disillusioned with political life? Have political scandals bred apathy and alienation? Or have nationalistic, chauvinistic interpretations of citizenship by some individuals turned others away from its practice?

However one answers these questions, it seems clear that a majority of Americans no longer feel the degree of pride and responsibility in being citizens. Thus, we must wonder, as our nation's founders did: Can the republic survive unless citizens are willing to shoulder willingly and responsibly the tasks of government?

The founders were under no illusion that the cultivation of citizenship would be easy. People would have to be educated for citizenship. In a letter to Edward Everett, Jefferson wrote: "The qualifications for self-government are not innate. They are the result of habit and long training."

In 1918 the Report on the Reorganization of Secondary Education proclaimed citizenship education to be one of the "seven cardinal principles" of education. Subsequent studies, reports, commissions, and proclamations have reconfirmed the primacy of citizenship education in schooling. It is not that the task of citizenship education is exclusively that of the schools; other agencies—the family, church, voluntary associations, etc.—also contribute importantly; but citizenship is a central purpose of formal education, although recently we may have forgotten it.

Within schools, social studies has a major role to play. Social studies has no monopoly over citizenship education; other subjects, the extracurricular program, and the structure of school governance itself also play their parts. Nor are social studies teachers interested exclusively in citizenship education. Nevertheless, a social studies program without citizenship education at its core is like yards of thread without a spool—all tangle and confusion.

Just as the need for alert, committed, and capable citizens will continue so long as there is a republic, so too citizenship education must persist so long as new generations must be taught the knowledge, skills, and values of effective citizenship. But the nature of citizenship education changes over time, just as the demands upon citizens alter under the press of new circumstances. Each generation must redefine for itself what it means to be a citizen, and what education is required to play the role of citizen successfully.

Through the leadership of recent NCSS officers, Boards of Directors, the Advisory Committee on Citizenship, and the Executive Director, the National Council for the Social Studies has attempted to rekindle an interest in citizenship education. In 1976, NCSS sponsored a conference in Indianapolis to explore the obstacles which lay in the path of promoting more effective citizenship education. Constructing a new and more powerful rationale for citizenship education was identified as one of the most important tasks before us. In August, 1977, NCSS co-sponsored a conference at Chautauqua, New York on the theme "Education for National Citizenship Through a Global Lens." This conference, attended by approximately 200 educators from all parts of the nation, devoted a full week to exploring elements of a new rationale for citizenship education. The theme for the 1977 Annual Meeting in Cincinnati is "The Citizen in Society: The Role of the Social Studies Teacher." This conference will focus on the needs and priorities of citizenship education today and for the future. NCSS committees—especially the Citizenship Committee, the International Relations Committee, and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Democratization of Schools—have concentrated their efforts on strengthening citizenship education. NCSS publications and speeches by officers, Board members, and the Executive Director have further articulated the importance of citizenship education.

This bulletin contributes substantially to the NCSS effort to foster discussion and debate on the priorities and needs of citizenship education. Its principal focus is the search for an appropriate rationale for citizenship education today. The bulletin will not bring an end to the debate on what must be done in this field, but it should help clarify the arguments.

We can be grateful that James Shaver agreed to accept the task of editing this bulletin. He is not only known to NCSS members as our most recent Past-President, but he is also widely recognized as one of our leading citizenship educators. He has spoken and written eloquently in the past about the need to clarify our purposes and to recognize the central place of citizenship education in the social studies. I also wish to thank the authors for their contributions and to congratulate the Publications Board, the Director of Publications, Dan Roselle, and all those who assist him for another splendid job.

Howard Mehlinger, *President*
National Council for the Social Studies

Preface

This bulletin on citizenship education, as its title suggests, does not propose a philosophy for citizenship education nor a set of prescriptions for a citizenship education program. Instead, the intent has been to involve social studies educators, teachers and supervisors in particular, in re-examining the assumptions underlying their curricular and teaching decisions, and in looking at the citizenship implications of what actually happens in their classrooms and schools.

Obviously, teachers in curriculum areas other than social studies are concerned with citizenship, and the total school curriculum could be considered citizenship education in the broadest sense of the term as preparation for life. Obviously, too, the "hidden curriculum" of the classroom and the school—the innumerable interactions that educate students in often unintended ways—is part of citizenship education. And so are the many nonschool educational influences, such as the media, that may or may not be utilized in the school's formal citizenship education efforts.

The examination of assumptions, a basic rationale-building activity, is important for persons in these other areas as well. For example, Silberman's call to eradicate "mindlessness"—lack of thought about purpose and how content and methods affect purpose—in education was directed not only at teachers and administrators but at "journalists, filmmakers, TV directors, et al."[1] The French teacher, the coach, the principal, the policeman or policewoman, the storeowner, the television producer, the newspaper reporter—all tend to act too frequently without recognizing how their unreflected biases and whims may impact the citizens-in-process (young people) with whom they contact.

However, this bulletin is addressed to social studies educators, because social studies is the one curricular area for which the stated central focus is citizenship. Addressing this more limited audience does not imply an unimportant task. Increased thoughtfulness among those whose consciously accepted role is citizenship education could have highly significant consequences.

This bulletin reflects a concern that, despite the conscientious efforts of many educators, citizenship education is in disarray. There is little evidence to indicate that the school's citizenship education efforts have affected generally the quantity or quality of adult citizen participation, and social studies programs and school environments often appear to be inconsistent with the demands of "adult citizenship."

---

[1] Charles E. Silberman. *Crisis in the classroom*. New York: Random House, 1970, pp. 379–80.

One outcome of an NCSS-sponsored Conference on Citizenship Education in March of 1976 was the conclusion that the reconceptualization of citizenship education is a major need.[2] Fred Newmann was commissioned to prepare a paper delineating the issues that should be addressed by persons developing definitions or philosophies of citizenship education. That paper was revised for this bulletin, and it is presented as Chapter 1.[3] The questions raised by Newmann set the tone for the rest of the bulletin.

There is no pretense that this bulletin treats all of the issues raised in Chapter 1. Invitations to write Chapters 2, 3, and 4 were extended to persons who have been working on often overlooked, but potentially productive elements of citizenship education. Those chapters illustrate the kinds of questions that need to be raised and dealt with. Each chapter examines some assumptions relevant to an aspect of rationale-building and deals with practical implications for practice.

In Chapter 2, Harold Berlak provides a radical critique of the purposes of citizenship education in a democratic society. He proposes the raising of human consciousness, the basis for social criticism, as the primary aim of citizenship education; and elementary school curriculum materials to achieve that aim are described.

Despite the call by social studies theorists for the extension of citizenship education efforts beyond the classroom and the school, many social studies programs are still bound by the schoolhouse walls. In Chapter 3, Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin explore the objections to and the reasons for social participation as a part of schooling. They also discuss the forms that participatory education might take, and throughout propose practical suggestions for implementing worthwhile and manageable programs.

Then, in Chapter 4, Charles Curtis examines assumptions about the so-called "slow learners" and citizenship that impact programs for them. And, he proposes the study of controversial community problems as a practicable and viable approach to citizenship education for an often neglected segment of the school population.

---

[2] See Helen Roberts and Brian Larkin. Toward a reconceptualization of citizenship education: Preliminary report of a conference on citizenship education. Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1976.

[3] Newmann uses the term "civic education" in his chapter title. Some would argue that that term is narrower than "citizenship education." See, e.g., Conrad and Hedin's comments in Chapter 2.

Chapter 5 returns to the subject of rationale-building itself. The importance and the legitimacy of teachers and supervisors "doing philosophy" about citizenship education are discussed, and some conditions for fruitful involvement in rationale-building are explored. Some current central issues in rationale-building for citizenship education are raised, too.

Obviously, the bulletin was not conceived nor prepared as a source of final answers as to the rationale for or the content of social studies education. It is meant as a preliminary step toward the reconceptualization of citizenship education identified as the major need during the 1976 Conference on Citizenship Education. A primary purpose has been to make more clear the dimensions of the problem that the profession faces in providing the sound intellectual justifications to make social studies programs more responsive to the needs of a democratic society and more interesting and beneficial to the young citizens who inhabit it. If we have failed to deal with an issue you deem important, we can only restate the impossibility of confronting all of the pertinent issues in a bulletin. If we have failed to impress (or re-impress) you with the importance of rationale-building and to stimulate your thinking about the assumptions underlying what is happening in social studies education, then the central objective has not been met.

The authors and the editor are grateful to the National Council for the Social Studies and the NCSS Publications Board for the opportunity to prepare this bulletin. We appreciate the many critiques of the manuscript; but, of course, we must take responsibility for any inadequacies that remain.

James P. Shaver
Utah State University

Contents

Foreword by *Howard Mehlinger* iii
Preface by *James P. Shaver* vi

1. Building a Rationale for Civic Education 1
Fred M. Newmann

2. Human Consciousness, Social Criticism, and Civic Education 34
Harold Berlak

3. Learning and Earning Citizenship Through Participation . . 48
Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin

4. Citizenship Education and the Slow Learner 74
Charles K. Curtis

5. The Task of Rationale-building for Citizenship Education . . 96
James P. Shaver

General Index 117

Chapter One

Building a Rationale for Civic Education

Fred M. Newmann

The Need for Comprehensive Rationales

What is wrong with civic education? Our troubles might be traced to any or all of three kinds of failures: technical incompetence (not knowing how to teach what we wish to teach), lack of consensus on goals (so many approaches and such disagreement over the proper aim of civic education that no clear purpose emerges), or inadequate rationales (assumptions underlying goals and methods which have not been clarified or justified—even to their proponents—in ways that provide thorough conceptual bases for civic education). The problems of technical competence, social consensus, and conceptual adequacy are related, and civic education probably suffers from all three. The aim of this chapter is not to offer technical advice on pedagogical matters, nor to present a new unifying philosophy, but to focus on the conceptual problem by outlining major questions to which any rationale ought to speak if it is to be considered intellectually adequate or complete.[1] The need for more systematic rationales should become evident as we consider the social disillusionment which plagues education, the nature of current approaches, and the process through which civic education programs are devised.

Social Disillusionment

In spite of heated disagreement on many issues, diverse sectors in the United States share something in common—a profound social dis-

---

FRED M. NEWMANN is Professor of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Wisconsin (Madison), where he teaches courses in curriculum and social studies education. His experience includes social studies teaching at the secondary level, development of curriculum in public controversy, citizen action, the formation of an alternative school, and directing of an experimental Ph.D. program emphasizing action for institutional change.

[1] A rationale for civic education is defined here as a statement that attempts to articulate and to justify a particular approach to civic education.

illusionment. For many persons at all points on the political spectrum, the Bicentennial gave no occasion to celebrate, but pointed with depressing clarity to abysmal gaps between textbook ideals and the actual historical record of constitutional democracy in this society. Consider a few of the ways in which the faith has been shaken.

A key objective of this country's founding political philosophy was to prevent centralization of power. Such mechanisms as a constitutional system of checks and balances, separation of powers, a Bill of Rights and a judicial system based on due process were designed, in part, to restrain the influence of centralized national government in citizens' lives. Today, however, centralized institutions, national and international, public and private, depend for their existence on influencing the masses—they dominate our lives.

The electoral system, based on equal representation, majority rule, freedom of speech and assembly, and a system of mass public education should encourage widespread citizen participation in public affairs and should thereby assure a measure of trust by the governed in their government. The record, however, shows pervasive citizen mistrust and apathy, based often on flagrant abuse of the public trust by public officials.

The bountiful resources of the country, along with an economic system that originally respected individual initiative and property rights, should lead, presumably, to equitable (though perhaps not equal) distribution of wealth. Instead, we have seen how free enterprise can itself destroy the opportunity for free enterprise; and that in spite of a myth of economic mobility, certain groups have remained in the economic cellar for generations.

The goal of abundance, prosperity, and an enhanced standard of living has been pursued with such vigor that the economy depends on continually increasing consumption. But we have recently learned that the planet's resources will soon be exhausted and that our intervention disrupts biological and geological processes crucial to life itself. Must the dream of abundance and prosperity for all be abandoned?

The country was founded allegedly on the principle of universal human rights, not only political-legal rights to self-government and due process, but the more fundamental right to equal respect, which implies toleration of differences in religion, life styles, and ideologies—in short, a commitment to cultural pluralism. United States history at home and abroad, however, reveals dramatic violations of this principle in the pursuit of "Americanization" or "national interest."

The point is not to flagellate the nation or to dismiss the "experiment in democracy" as a proven failure. The extent to which democratic ideals have been or can be achieved should be continuously investigated. Our purpose here is only to note possible sources of painful disillusionment for large numbers of citizens across all categories of age, sex, race, ethnicity, income, social class, and political affiliation, as they perceive huge gaps between democratic ideals and reality. Their perceptions are evident in complaints about outrageous behavior by citizens (they are too apathetic, they don't obey the law, they don't show respect for each other); outrageous behavior by public officials (they are corrupt, they don't enforce the law, they discriminate, they are ignorant); outrageous public policies (they hurt the farmer, the businessman, the welfare recipient, the consumer, the innocent Vietnamese or African); outrageous systemic characteristics (big government dehumanizes people, capitalism exploits people, technology rapes the environment).

Among nations, America has distinguished itself in the expectations it places on a system of compulsory formal education to solve problems of social disillusionment. Recently several nationally visible organizations have expressed renewed concern, a sense of urgency over civic education: the American Bar Association through its Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship, the Danforth and Kettering Foundations sponsoring the National Task Force on Citizenship, the U.S. Office of Education's recent conferences on citizenship, and the National Council for the Social Studies, whose special meeting called for the writing of this paper. We may be at one of those points characterized by Butts (1977):

> . . . in general it may be said that the urge to promote civic education through the schools accelerates in times of crisis or rapid social change. It takes on special urgency in two quite different kinds of social situations in which the need for social cohesion and unity are seen to be particularly acute: (a) when liberal reformers see the need to mobilize disparate groups to achieve (in Robert Wiebe's words) "a new social integration, a higher form of social harmony," as in the Revolutionary era, the Progressive era, the New Deal, and the Great Society; or (b) when conservative forces see the need for social cohesion to rally round their version of the American way of life and to stave off threats to it from alien sources, as in periods of massive immigration, militant radical movements, world war, or cold war. . . .

Apparently both "liberal reformers" and "conservative forces" now see a need for action in civic education. We should ask whether alternative proposals might be inspired by potentially contradictory political forces, and might, therefore, be destined only for destructive collision, or whether concerns for change and cohesion can be harnessed to deal constructively with common sources of disillusionment.

Before rushing headlong into educational reform, however, we must examine the very assumption that improved civic education could help, for the faith in formal education itself has, in some circles, been weakened. In spite of this society's massive investment in public education, considerable evidence suggests that achievement in school makes relatively little contribution to economic mobility, that compulsory racial integration in education does not necessarily lead to inter-racial harmony, that major white-collar crimes and serious violations of the law are committed by the most "educated" of citizens, and that schools themselves are, in many places, sanctuaries for delinquency and crime. It is, therefore, altogether appropriate to question whether our efforts to solve social ills through education have had the effect of reducing or increasing the ills themselves. It has been persuasively argued (Oliver, 1976) that the expansion and professionalization of schooling creates a whole new range of social problems. These are, in turn, attacked by further expansion and professionalization which generate even more novel social problems, and so the process continues in a downward spiral.

This chapter does not develop a full position on the extent to which civic education should be pursued through formal public education; but under a heading, "Schools and Other Social Agencies," (p. 24), it urges that each specific rationale address this problem. For the moment, it is assumed that what occurs in schools is important and that proposed programs for civic education in schools must be carefully examined rather than summarily dismissed because of their association with allegedly dysfunctional institutions.

Alternative Approaches[2]

There are at least eight generally distinguishable approaches to civic education: the academic disciplines of history and the social sciences, law-related education, social problems, critical thinking, values clarification, moral development, community involvement, and institutional school reform. Instructional programs or curriculum projects may manifest more than one of the general approaches, so in practice they are not mutually exclusive. But it is usually possible to identify one or a few of these themes as most salient in a teacher's philosophy or in a particular curriculum.

1. ***Academic Disciplines (History and the Social Sciences).*** This approach tries to teach facts, concepts, and generalizations about social phenomena, past and present and across cultures, as such knowledge has been generated through university-based scholarship in the academic disciplines, especially history and the social sciences. In the last fifteen years special attempts have been made to teach not only the findings and generalizations of these disciplines, but also the methods of inquiry used by the practicing scholar. Rather than focusing on specific problems that the citizen might face, the approach assumes that mastery of developed scholarly material will help the citizen understand unforeseeable civic problems as they arise.

---

[2] Material in this section is taken from Newmann, 1977.

Teaching of the disciplines is not usually advocated for its direct relevance to the exercise of active citizenship. Instead, it is argued that disciplined scholarship reveals the best thinking we have to offer in the human search for truth, and this has its own intrinsic value. In spite of a plethora of proposals to alter the dominance of history and social science in citizenship education, the disciplines remain the staple, prevailing approach in secondary curriculum and in the preparation of teachers.[3]

2. ***Law-Related Education.*** The earliest forms of law-related education emphasized the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the structure of Federal, state and local government—often in a ninth-grade civics course or a later course in American government. (Magruder's *American Government* has exemplified this orientation.) More recently a major national effort has been made by such groups as the American Bar Association and the Constitutional Rights Foundation to revitalize and expand the teaching of fundamentals of legal process.[4] The movement offers diverse projects on legal concepts, particular controversies arising out of the Bill of Rights, the system of juvenile justice, techniques of legislative lobbying, judicial reasoning in case law, laws that apply particularly to youth, problems of law enforcement agencies, and other topics. The projects produce materials that can be inserted into existing courses as well as curricula for separate courses in legal process. In contrast to the disciplines approach, the goal of law-related education would be characterized not as the general search for truth and understanding, but to preserve and make more just the rule of law in a democratic society.

3. ***Social Problems.*** This approach concentrates on particular social issues of current or predicted importance in the students' lives: war, crime, discrimination, poverty, pollution, drugs, energy, etc. Knowledge from the disciplines and about legal-process may be used to study the problems, but understanding the problem, not the discipline or the legal material, is the main goal. The assumption here is

---

[3] The case for discipline-oriented citizenship education is made by Lewenstein (1963) and Schwab (1964). The rationale is based largely in a conception of "liberal" education as articulated, for example, in the Report of the Harvard Committee (1946) and reactions thereto (Hirst, 1965). The influence of the disciplines in the training and certification of teachers is overwhelming. At the college and university level, one majors in one of the disciplines in order to be certified to teach that discipline in secondary schools. In the university preparation of secondary teachers, typically 80–85% of the course work is in the disciplines, with only 15–20% in education (including student teaching). When asked what one ought to teach, it is not surprising that beginning secondary teachers have virtually no alternative to teaching the disciplines, for they have experienced no other approach.

[4] For further information, contact Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, and the Constitutional Rights Foundation, 6310 San Vicente Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90048.

that to deliberate adequately on social problems, the citizen needs practice in grappling with the specifics of actual social issues. (How should consumers be protected? What alternatives to welfare are available? What are the effects of racial bussing?) The approach has been adopted in "problems of democracy courses," and more recently in separate courses with issue-oriented titles. We would include in the social problems approach general efforts at "consciousness raising," as in the anti-racism, anti-sexism, global education, or futurology movements.[5]

4. ***Critical Thinking.*** Like democracy and motherhood, critical thinking is endorsed by almost everyone as fundamental to civic competence. The ideal citizen is portrayed as someone who cannot be deceived or manipulated by leaders and the media, but who reaches informed, autonomous conclusions and can rationally justify them to others. He or she is aware of basic assumptions, the possibility of bias or selective perception, and incomplete information. To arrive at this point, the citizen needs to learn a thinking process that helps to distinguish among different types of issues, that offers a method for testing and evaluating empirical claims, logical inferences, definitional statements, value judgments, and so on.[6]

Separate courses on critical thinking are rare, for the skills, if taught at all, are usually taught in connection with a particular subject such as history, economics, or social problems. The teaching of inquiry skills in the social sciences is often equated with critical thinking, but some scholars have suggested that specific intellectual operations required for critical thinking about civic problems differ in important ways from other kinds of critical thinking.[7] Like other approaches, the critical thinking approach itself embraces diverse schools.

5. ***Values Clarification.*** To the extent that civic problems result from confusion over values, we might relieve personal and social stress by helping individuals clarify their own values. The goal of values clarification is to help people become "purposeful, enthusiastic, and positive," and to direct their lives autonomously through a process of deliberate "choosing, prizing, and acting."[8] Students try to discover what they value by making their own decisions on various dilemmas and by trying to determine whether their decisions were ac-

---

[5] Often the case for social problems is made in conjunction with an argument for critical thinking, as in Hunt and Metcalf (1968) or Oliver and Shaver (1974). Groups concerned with specific social issues such as the environment, world peace, or racial discrimination tend to develop special curricula on those topics.

[6] Conceptions of critical thinking for citizenship are provided in Fair and Shaftel (1967), Hunt and Metcalf (1968), Oliver and Shaver (1974), Phillips (1974).

[7] For illustrative typologies of various thinking skills, see Berlak (1965), Coleman (1972), Oliver & Shaver (1974), Newmann (1975).

[8] The major spokesmen are Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1966). See also Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum (1972) and Simon and Clark (1975).

tually freely chosen, with due consideration of alternatives, whether they prize their decisions, whether they would proclaim them publicly and act on them consistently. The issues called up for scrutiny in this approach can include, but do not concentrate upon, problems of civic responsibility. Rather than teaching any particular subject matter, the point is to help the student, through non-judgmental questioning, search for the central values he or she supports. Values clarification exercises may be added to existing courses or taught in special courses on values.

6. ***Moral Development.*** Kohlberg and his associates see moral development as progress along a naturally occurring psychological path, leading from lower "preconventional," to "conventional," to higher "principled" forms of moral reasoning. It is alleged, for example, that the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights can be understood only by people who have attained the higher stages in cognitive development. Kohlberg argues that the higher, principled types of reasoning are ethically and epistemologically more adequate than the lower stages. The higher stages signify a concern for social contract, equal liberty, and more generally the principles of justice that a democracy aspires to attain.[9] In contrast to values clarification, which suggests a relativistic, non-judgmental philosophy where all student responses are supported by the teacher, moral development recognizes certain types of reasoning as universally better or more preferable than others. The approach seeks to advance students from the lower to the higher levels by helping them resolve conflicts and ambiguities in their reasoning on moral dilemmas.

7. ***Community Involvement***. The above six approaches all call for instruction in the school and a style of learning based largely on abstract analysis and verbal communication. Concerned with the isolation of students from experience in the "real world," advocates of community involvement try to move students into the community to observe social process, to make surveys on community needs and problems, to render volunteer service to social agencies, to create new youth-operated programs, to participate in electoral politics, community organization and other forms of direct citizen action. Involvement and participation are emphasized not as substitutes for study and reflection, but as insurance that study and reflection will be directed toward social realities and the building of participation skills.

Community involvement curricula can reflect different ideologies. Volunteer service in social agencies might be promoted, for example, as an attempt to build altruistic behavior, as a way to give students a sense of worth and enhance self-esteem, as a technique for raising student consciousness about contradictions and injustice in society, or as a method for pacifying and co-opting youth rebellion. What all the ideologies have in common is a belief in "learning by doing," "experiential learning," or dealing with concrete "here and now" realities.[10]

---

[9] A broad collection of writings on the moral development approach is found in Kohlberg (1973) and Kohlberg (1975a). For summary presentations see Kohlberg (1975b), and Fenton (1976).

8. ***Institutional School Reform.*** The general structure and quality of life in school may have more impact on citizen education than does official curriculum or course content. Critics who agree that civic education can be improved only through changes in the "hidden curriculum" differ as to the appropriate direction for institutional reform. "Liberal" critics claim that you cannot teach democracy in an autocratic institution, and that the school should, therefore, be reformed to give students full rights of citizenship. This would include a meaningful role (not necessarily unilateral power) in the governance of the institution and the right to the constitutional protections afforded adult citizens. In exercising responsibility for their own education and for resolving the inevitable conflicts in governing a public institution, they would learn better how to function responsibly in the society.[11]

"Conservative" critics, on the other hand, claim that formal education necessarily implies an authoritarian structure. Students are required to attend school precisely because they are judged incompetent to perform the role of responsible adult citizens. One should not mislead students into believing they have full rights of citizenship, but teach them to obey and to respect the authority that legitimately governs them until they gain citizenship rights, either by earning a diploma or by reaching the age at which the society judges them "mature" enough to participate. Both liberal and conservative critiques call our attention to the prospect that approaches to citizenship education dare not limit their efforts to the design of new courses of instruction, but must also take into account the more general institutional environment in which instruction occurs.

Summary Images of Citizenship. As a montage of the above approaches, the ideal American citizen would appear to be a scientist, a jurist, an objective, introspective social critic, a moral philosopher, an activist. Another, perhaps more popular, image also comes to mind: the civic-minded, socially responsible, good Samaritan or good Scout. For many adults, the goal of civic education is to produce youth who, male or female embody virtues such as those listed in the Boy Scout Law: "A Scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent." Phrased negatively, the good citizen does not take drugs, vandalize, insult, fight, lie, or litter. While the approaches summarized above often avoid stating their goals in these terms, much of the public at large probably equates good citizenship with these qualities, suggesting a general conformity to prevailing social norms, rather than assertiveness to question or depart from them.

---

[10] The National Commission on Resources for Youth (36 W. 44th Street, New York, NY 10036) is a national clearinghouse for youth participation and community involvement projects. Its book, *New Roles for Youth in the School and the Community* (New York: Citation, 1974), offers illustrations of different projects. See also Newmann (1975), Appendix A, for a list of organizations supporting community involvement curriculum.

[11] Perhaps the most sophisticated statement of this philosophy is found in Dewey (1916). For a more recent interpretation, see Apple (1975).

Obstacles to Rationale Building

Our tour through alternative approaches reveals conflicting priorities in civic education, and, as previously indicated, one might view the lack of consensus itself as the basic problem. Our task here, however, is not necessarily to eliminate conflict among alternatives. Instead, we are concerned that *none* of the approaches has yet offered a complete rationale. If we are to choose among conflicting alternatives, let each of them at least present an intellectually comprehensive case.

This is not to accuse all of total neglect in justifying their work. Each alternative has articulate advocates, and, thanks to their explanations, each approach may seem good or reasonable. Their positive arguments even lead to the familiar suggestion that all approaches be included in the curriculum. This would be advisable only if (a) the approaches contained among themselves no self-defeating contradictions and (b) schools vastly expanded the resources and student time devoted to civic education. Since (a) does not seem to hold, and since (b) is unlikely, it is necessary to make choices, to set priorities as to which approaches are preferable to others, or to propose a new, internally consistent synthesis responsive to the constraints of school resources and student time.

A hierarchy of priorities or an integration of many approaches cannot be defended without a comprehensive rationale. Unfortunately, separate approaches have not argued their cases in this form. Instead, each has made narrow arguments for its particular cause, and this has had the effect of defining the central issue as critical thinking, moral development, or community involvement, rather than as civic education. A preview of a few items from the next section will illustrate the sense in which existing rationales are lacking.

The most general problem is the absence of comparative justification. Each approach (e.g., the disciplines) should try to explain why it makes a more fundamental contribution to civic education than another (e.g., social problems). In doing so, the rationale should reveal positions on the nature of social reality, the nature of values, the nature of knowledge, the nature of learning. To be sure, advocates for separate approaches have taken a stand on some of these matters, and these positions can contribute to a comprehensive rationale. The social problems approach, for example, gives careful attention to the nature of social reality, but tends to ignore the role of systematic knowledge and theories of learning. The moral development school offers scholarship on the nature of values and nature of learning, but neglects other areas, such as the nature of knowledge or social reality. Why have individual approaches addressed only some of the issues required in a complete rationale?

We could answer the question with the incisive, though hopelessly depressing, observation that the public schooling process must remain an essentially mindless, nonsensical enterprise; for some of its central assumptions require that most students, teachers and administrators be subjected to absurd expectations. In such a context, complicated, systematic thought about goals only makes trouble. Searching for a defensible philosophy can be stressful, by disclosing inadequacies in one's own thought and identifying (often exacerbating) conflicts between groups tied to opposing views. In the short run, it is more comfortable to avoid facing one's sense of intellectual inadequacy and to escape stress arising from intergroup conflict.

One way to work on curriculum without confronting these problems is to develop increasingly isolated specialties. Mehlinger (1977) describes how this happened in the social studies reform movement of the late 1960s. Funding guidelines, for example, often demand evidence of *unique* focus. That is, to avoid "duplication," projects must demonstrate that they differ from previous and currently funded efforts. To demonstrate visible impact, organizations (public and private) and individuals thus aim toward special and narrow, rather than holistic and comprehensive, approaches to education. In this way they reinforce such distinctions as social sciences versus humanities, career education versus college preparatory, moral development versus basic literacy. Specialization is not always undesirable, but, as applied to education, it has had the effect of distracting us from the challenge of building comprehensive rationales.

As noted by Oliver (1976), the lack of a coherent ideology in public schools can also be explained by the modern value of individual choice. According to the rhetoric, individuals in a pluralistic democracy must be able to choose for themselves what ideologies they wish to support and what styles of citizenship they wish to exercise. This requires that the school function as a neutral supermarket, stocked with a continuously expanding range of diverse offerings. To support any given products as "good for all people" would run contrary to the ethic of tolerance and respect for autonomous choice. This position has been interpreted to mean that the school must remain politically neutral and cannot, therefore, promote any comprehensive conception of citizenship prescribed as good for all students.

The lack of comprehensive rationales can also be attributed to particular roles in the educational enterprise. Virtually no one is expected as part of his or her daily work to articulate and defend a broad conception of civic education. Teachers must teach particular subjects they learned (from academicians specializing in academic disciplines, not citizenship). Curriculum developers must invent new packages to fit into a fragmented network of existing school courses; and publishers must sell those products, regardless of their relevance to a general philosophy of citizenship. School administrators (especially principals and superintendents) are expected perhaps more than anyone else to consider the entire schooling process. Yet they must demonstrate their competence to the public not by building educational rationales, but by managing personnel and budgets to avoid institutional difficulties. In short, the particular roles required of teachers, academicians, curriculum developers, publishers, and administrators tend to divert attention away from the task of creating a general integrated philosophy of civic education.

In recognizing these obstacles, we must not underestimate the enormous intellectual challenge that confronts even the most serious efforts in rationale building. Those who have struggled with these problems know that our troubles cannot be blamed exclusively on mindless school personnel, outdated approaches to teacher education, profit-hungry publishers, opportunistic administrators, narrow-minded parents, or broad social forces. We must acknowledge and communicate the nature of an *intellectual challenge* which may well be as difficult as explaining the evolution of the universe. The first step in facing that challenge is to develop guidelines or a sketch of what a comprehensive rationale would look like. The next section does that by posing central questions that a rationale ought to answer. The problems posed will, of course, expose my own values with regard to the task of rationale building. These may be disputed, but at least the articulation offers a starting point.

Elements of a Comprehensive Rationale

We recommend that any proposal for civic education have a rationale that states its position with regard to seven problem areas: curriculum goals, nature of learning, definition of community, citizenship and other goals of schooling, schools and other social agencies, authenticity, and diversity. The areas sometimes include overlapping issues, and it would be unreasonable to expect every rationale to answer each of the problems with convincing, conclusive finality. Nevertheless, the more these elements are addressed in a rationale, the more intellectually complete it is. The elements can serve as a set of questions for curriculum producers to answer and as a checklist by which consumers might compare alternative rationales.

Curriculum Goals

A. Articulation

"What do you propose to teach and why?" is the main question of this element. Goals for civic education usually fall into four areas of student learning: attitudes (e.g., respect for law or commitment to rational thinking); substantive knowledge (e.g., understanding United States history or legal-political decision-making); intellectual skills (e.g., knowing how to challenge and verify factual generalizations or to engage in principled ethical reasoning); participation skills (e.g., knowing how to work in groups or to lobby in a legislature).[12] Statements of educational goals, however, are often inadequate in at least three ways. They are stated in such general language that they fail to give a specific indication of what is to be taught. They usually include more or fewer goals than are actually pursued in the applied curriculum. Finally, once goals are translated into precise objectives and once the goals actually pursued in practice are discovered, we usually find contradictions and inconsistencies that are not resolved in a rationale statement.

The overarching goal of "responsible citizenship" illustrates the first problem—that of ambiguity. This might be defined as "understanding the American heritage," but this is equally vague, for American history can be understood through several conflicting interpretations. One curriculum might emphasize the theme of conflict among groups or exploitation by the powerful; another might focus on individual initiative, invention, and mobility; and still another approach might introduce students to several conflicting interpretations to show that no single view seems adequate. To know what a curriculum is about, we need to learn the specific types of "understandings" that would differentiate it from others.

In stating objectives, it is helpful to ask, "What are all the different ways in which our general statements might be translated into specific learning outcomes? Which of those outcomes do we intend and do we not intend?" After taking inventory of the conceivably different interpretations of goals, one can select those that are most preferred.

Even precise statements of goals often fail to acknowledge all the intended objectives. It is common, for example, to emphasize skills of critical thinking. Imagine that we were successful enough to teach all citizens to perceive profound complexities in most social issues and to analyze fallacies in arguments, but suppose they remained ignorant in participation skills such as how to challenge a parking ticket or how to obtain an absentee ballot. Or, imagine that students learned participation skills and mastered vast information related to a few local problems, but learned nothing about the United States Constitution or national legislative process. In a self-conscious effort to articulate *all* the goals in a preferred approach to civic education, we must realize that because of limited resources, we can't do everything, and we must, therefore, assign relative priority to different goals. We must be willing, however unhappily, to exclude or place at low priority some objectives in contrast to others. Educators are notoriously reluctant to state that among several worthy objectives, some of the good ones must be sacrificed in order to serve others (considered "better").

---

[12] This four-part taxonomy is used by Patrick (1975).

The need to set priorities is most apparent when inconsistent objectives are proposed. Some educators claim, for example, that students should not be taught to believe in any particular values, but only to examine alternatives and to reach their own conclusions. That position contradicts itself, because it implicitly advocates the teaching of a value: that examining alternatives and reaching one's own conclusions is good. In the teaching of international affairs, the value of national self-determination is often asserted, but we are also urged with increasing frequency to respect the fact of international interdependence and to resist the tendency to view any problem solely as the concern of a single nation. Finally, consider the goal "knowledge of and respect for the American Constitutional system." Perhaps a thorough knowledge will breed disillusionment and disrespect, or a high level of respect may so bias the student that a thorough knowledge cannot be attained.

It may be impossible to eliminate all inconsistencies among goals for civic education. Some may be resolved by refining key definitions, others by making a choice to eliminate one of the contradictory goals; still others may be recognized as unavoidable or perhaps even fruitful to maintain. Because inconsistent goals will confuse observers and students, they must be recognized and explicitly addressed.

B. *Justification*

It is not sufficient to state goals in a precise, complete, and relatively consistent manner. In addition, they must be justified through explanations or reasons as to why proposed goals are considered good, why they ought to be pursued. The justification for certain educational goals (e.g., understanding the Constitution) is often taken as self-evident, but a complete rationale takes no such matters for granted. Instead, it probes deeply into conventional, unquestioned assumptions about the purposes of education. In justifying a set of goals, the rationale will reveal commitments and beliefs in three controversial areas: the nature of values, the nature of social reality, and the nature of knowledge itself. Rarely, however, do we find a rationale that has actually discussed such problems in detail.

- *Nature of Values.* Every approach is grounded in some value(s), even the preference for a "value-free" approach. A rationale should explain what particular values its approach is intended to serve. Among the more frequently mentioned values are democracy, freedom, equality, justice, peace, happiness, survival, rationality, efficiency, truth, self-determination, human dignity. Each rationale should attempt to justify its values, and to indicate which of its most fundamental commitments must ultimately be accepted on "faith."[13]

In taking a position on values, it is essential to face the question of ethical relativism versus universally valid ethical principles: Are all value judgments merely the result of subjective personal opinion determined by arbitrary cultural factors, or can some values be objectively and rationally demonstrated to have universal validity? Several factors seem to encourage a preference for ethical relativism: the intellectual difficulty of verifying prescriptive claims, the discovery of diverse value systems among world cultures, the realization that personal bias can affect one's interpretation of reality, and the desire of educators to respect the intellectual autonomy of students. However, the discovery of commonalities across cultures, the intellectual drive to find underlying order in human affairs, especially the desire to resolve painful value conflicts through a universally consistent logic, and the effort to avoid moral driftlessness all lead us away from relativism toward affirmation of some universally justified values.

The issue is posed in the classroom if a concern for students' intellectual autonomy communicates the relativistic judgment that "anything goes," that no standards of goodness or excellence can be established for everyone. On the other hand, the effort to prove the universal validity of a value can take a dogmatic tone and violate a spirit of open inquiry. Since a relativistic or universalistic orientation has such fundamental impact on what a student learns, each rationale should explain its position on this issue.[14]

Closely related to the relativism problem is the "indoctrination" problem: To what extent should the curriculum attempt to influence student support or rejection of particular values? Four general positions have been taken. The "censorship" position objects to *any* attempt by educators to discuss or to influence student values. The "laissez-faire" position allows discussion and study of value issues so that students may become aware of their own commitments, but it prohibits the teacher from trying to influence student conclusions as to which values might be preferred over others. The laissez-faire and censorship views tend to agree that influencing student values is inappropriate—either because teachers are allegedly incompetent in this area (they are not more knowledgeable than anyone else as to the right values) and/or because the attempt to influence student values is considered a violation of student privacy and intellectual autonomy. The laissez-faire view recognizes that value issues may be of great concern to students and should, therefore, be studied with care in a totally neutral fashion. The censorship view, however, does not trust the school to handle such sensitive questions. It contends that since teacher bias cannot be avoided, all discussion of values should be prohibited.

---

[13] Shaver and Strong (1976) offer a helpful analysis of values in educational rationales.

[14] Examples of rationales that do address the question are Oliver and Shaver (1974), Newmann and Oliver (1970), Kohlberg (1971), Kohlberg and Mayer (1972). All reject a relativistic orientation.

A third position is the "intellectually open, rational persuasion" approach. Here the teacher may influence student values by demonstrating in an open, honest, rational process that some values are preferable to others. One might, for example, explain why the principle of "consent of the governed," in spite of its limitations, is more consistent with justice than the principle "might makes right." To be honest and open, opposing arguments must be welcome and seriously discussed, and there must be no effort to coerce student agreement with the favored value (e.g., through grades and subtle forms of teacher approval). The "intellectually open, rational persuasion" approach gives both teacher and student the right to be intellectually honest. If the teacher actually believes certain values are more justifiable than others, it would be dishonest to hide that. At the same time, the student should have the right to ponder these questions in an open fashion. No evidence or argument should be withheld because of teacher concern that the student might reach the wrong conclusion.

The final approach is "inculcation." It also endorses the teacher's right to influence student values, but does not require a process of open inquiry. Any pedagogical device that is effective might be used to inculcate commitment to the right values. Myth, folklore, hero worship, peer group pressure, subtle forms of intellectual inquiry in which the evidence is stacked might all be used to generate emotional attachment. According to the inculcation approach, a society has the right to instill in its youth whatever values it cherishes. Rationales for civic education should make explicit the extent to which they endorse any of the approaches and why.[15]

- *Nature of Social Reality.* Recommendations on what ought to be taught are grounded in assumptions about the nature of reality. The mandate to teach constitutional rights, for example, may be based on the prediction that certain rights are likely to be violated in the future unless the citizen is ever-mindful of the need for their vigilant protection. The recommendation to teach rational decision-making rests on the assumption that persons are actually capable of objective consideration of alternatives. To urge participation in electoral politics is usually to assume that the electoral system provides an avenue for citizens to gain control over their lives.

---

[15] Superka et al., (1976) offer a comprehensive review of approaches to values education. Their taxonomy of approaches differs slightly from mine.

Since we could make an infinite number of claims about how the world functions, even the most thoughtful educators will be able to disclose only a small portion of their beliefs about social reality. Nevertheless, a rationale for civic education should disclose the central societal concerns to be addressed and the salient factual assumptions and predictions regarding those concerns. One rationale might define the fundamental problem of our age as rapid social change and try to cultivate coping skills based on specific predictions on the changing nature of work, interpersonal relations, or information processing. Another approach might see the central issue as potential destruction of life on the planet, through war or excess consumption. A third might view the problem as preservation of the American way of life in a shrinking world of "alien" cultures. Once the presumed fundamental societal problem is identified, it can be examined and challenged.

Factual assumptions related to resolving the problem should also be disclosed. Suppose we agree that destruction of life on the planet is the central issue, and that formal education ought to try to prevent it. What strategies are most likely to save us? Is the first step to change particular public policies (e.g., those on arms control or trade)? If so, what organizations must be involved? Perhaps the first step must aim at changes in individual behavior (e.g., reducing consumption or interpersonal violence). Connections must be drawn in the rationale between social problems and proposed educational solutions. Educators may speak of consciousness-raising, changing attitudes, conveying critical information, teaching the skills of thinking, of coping with personal stress, of public participation; but it is often debatable as to whether a given educational strategy is likely to deal adequately with the designated social issues.

A rationale for civic education would begin to identify its important assumptions about social reality if it answered questions like the following:

1. What are the most fundamental human needs?
2. What are the effects of various political, legal, and economic structures on the attainment of human needs?
3. In what ways has the human species progressed and regressed throughout its history?
4. To what extent can human beings tolerate diversity within and between cultural groups?
5. To what extent are human actions voluntary and rational vs. involuntary and irrational?
6. What areas of human affairs are susceptible to modification through deliberate human intervention and what areas cannot be intentionally controlled?

7. What are the possible and most probable scenarios for world history in the next century?

The questions are complex, none can be answered conclusively, and educators may be honestly confused about their own beliefs. Nevertheless, we cannot intelligently decide on whether we agree with any given approach to civic education, unless we are told about some of the constructions of social reality on which it is based. Educators probably do have positions on such questions, usually unarticulated and discernible perhaps only through inference. Sound judgments about the adequacy of any approach, however, can be made only with awareness of the approach's assumptions on the more cosmic questions.

- *Nature of Knowledge.* Analysis of social reality can turn to the analysis of knowledge itself: What constructs do we use to describe the world, how are they created, how are they to be evaluated? Here we touch such fields as sociology of knowledge, philosophy of science, analytic philosophy. As a curriculum recommends what students should know, it implicitly takes a stand on such questions as: What theories, generalizations, concepts, facts are most useful for defining and understanding certain problems? What methods of inquiry are preferred in seeking or creating knowledge? What is the ultimate purpose of seeking knowledge and what is the nature of truth?

The first question poses the problem of selection of content. Apparent competition among history, the social sciences, and the social studies—and within each area, competition among various fields—has produced little agreement on what knowledge is most important for citizens. Should students learn the multiple causes of revolutions, the basic elements of due process of law, the ways in which public opinion can be manipulated, the concepts of socialization and class structure, the rise and decline of various cultures?

We tend to approach the problem of selection of content in one of three ways: (a) Assume that no critical choices need be made, because all important knowledge can be taught. (b) Agree that critical choices must be made, but since it is impossible to defend them rationally, we must accept their non-rational, whimsical character. (c) Agree that critical choices must be made, and attempt to justify them through various criteria; for example, the self-evident value of knowledge, the fact that teachers and/or students are interested in the knowledge, the alleged superiority of conceptual theoretical knowledge to concrete, factual knowledge, the relevance of particular knowledge to the study of a given problem. Unfortunately, these criteria, alone or in combination, cannot completely resolve problems in selection of content. What is self-evident or interesting to some may not be so to others. In some cases certain facts may be intellectually more useful than concepts or theories; and even if conceptual, theoretical knowledge is recognized as more powerful, the problem remains as to *which* concepts and theories should be taught. Finally, selecting problems to study or selecting particular knowledge on the basis of its relevance to a given problem very often entails wide latitude in the choice of content.

As we teach content, we also teach preferred methods for acquiring knowledge. Options here are rarely examined, but a few alternative pathways to knowledge include:

(a) Acceptance of messages from persons who have status as informed authorities (i.e., students should read texts, biography, social interpretation).

(b) Independent rational inquiry based on formal logic and empirical research techniques (i.e., students should gather and interpret original data, and analyze the logic of arguments).

(c) Spontaneous brainstorming and intuitive expression (i.e., students should engage in creative, divergent thinking without dependence on authoritative knowledge or scientific proof).

(d) Private experience not subject to public rational verification, such as mysticism, meditation, religious revelation.

Prevailing approaches to the quest for truth fall in the first two categories, acceptance of authority and scientific method. Note, however, that these can imply serious contradictions. Acceptance of authority suggests a relatively passive role for students (the experts will study the problem and tell us the results), while scientific method can suggest an active, unrelenting questioning where the student, as an independent observer, helps to create knowledge. On the other hand, important questions have been raised about undue reverence for scientific rationality: Does it discourage unconventional thought? Does it aim excessively at discovery of order and methods of control? Approaches to civic education have not communicated an awareness of alternative paths to knowing, nor have they explained which paths should be pursued, in what relative degree. The authoritative and scientific paths seem to dominate, but they have been adopted uncritically.

Finally, what is the nature of truth and why seek it? Scientific rationality seems to imply that the ultimate purpose is to discover order and lawfulness in human affairs, to eliminate contradiction and uncertainty so that human beings can exert more control in their existence. Another viewpoint asserts self-knowledge as the ultimate purpose, awareness of one's innermost nature in relation to one's environment. Another conception emphasizes the discovery and processing of an endless set of contradictions and ambiguities, not to eliminate them, but to grow from them. There is also the problem of knowledge as a "two-edged sword." When we discover that some knowledge may be used to destructive ends (biological warfare or genetic tampering), we are confronted with the question of whether limits should be placed on the pursuit of knowledge itself. Our conclusion will depend upon whether we view the purpose of knowledge as serving humankind in a beneficial way or whether knowledge for its own sake is seen an ultimate good, regardless of its uses.

To articulate major curriculum goals in a civic education rationale, and to justify them with reference to assumptions about the nature of values, social reality, and knowledge are obviously enormous challenges. Positions taken on these issues will result from and/or influence the positions taken on the six other elements.

Nature of Learning.

How do humans learn? A comprehensive rationale discusses the process as well as the goals of education. Alternative theories of learning are still in dispute, but two general orientations occupy the attention of researchers and seem to be assumed by teachers: social learning theory and organismic developmental theory. An emerging framework, which I call dialectical synergism, also deserves attention. The orientations are compatible on some issues, contradictory on others. This chapter is too brief to present their complexity, but the sketches of alternative conceptualizations of learning can help differentiate among approaches to civic education.

A. *Social Learning*

According to social learning theory, humans are influenced or taught to behave by rewards or reinforcers in the environment. If rewards such as praise, economic benefits, status, and love are given for certain behaviors (e.g., writing, working hard, obeying authorities, athletic skills, aesthetic pursuits), then people will "learn" to behave in these ways. Conversely, when certain behaviors (e.g., lying, stealing, bad grammar, smoking) elicit punishment such as social disapproval, economic exploitation, withdrawal of love, physical abuse, decline in status, then those behaviors will disappear.

Persons who share the social learning orientation differ on some crucial issues: (1) To what extent is learning under the exclusive control of external stimuli in the environment as opposed to internal mechanisms in the learner such as drives, motivations, or cognitive mediation? (2) To what extent does the learner voluntarily or intentionally select those environmental stimuli that serve as reinforcers, or are the reinforcers predetermined by external or internal conditions beyond the learner's voluntary control? One extreme position views the learner as a highly malleable, passive creature, limited by biological factors, but otherwise completely under the control of external influences. The other sees the learner as having some autonomous motivations and cognitive processes that, through interaction with external influence, produce behavior change or learning.[16]

In attempting to explain or to influence learning, persons within the social learning orientation focus on different phenomena. Radical behaviorists ask for specific, discrete behaviors that educators might desire (e.g., naming the two houses of Congress) and then search for specific reinforcers (e.g., teacher praise, grades, or feedback on whether the response is correct) that might elicit the behavior. Those with a "modeling" orientation look to general behavior desired (e.g., engaging in discussion) and to persons who affect the student because of strong emotional attachment. The bond between the child and the significant person results in the child's effort to imitate or take on specific behaviors and general attitudes of the model. Broader sociological orientations focus less on discrete behaviors and personal modeling, more on general institutional impact. If any given message (e.g., the virtues of personal consumption or individual mobility) happens to be stressed by dominant institutions (schools, families, churches, media), it will be learned. People learn to function in general roles such as student, parent, or worker, for example, because they are bombarded with relatively consistent messages that define the proper expected behavior.

B. Organismic Development

Organismic development theory rests on two major claims. First, within the person there are innate underlying structures which, with proper interaction with the environment, will unfold over time from lower, simpler, or less adequate methods of coping to higher, more complex, or more adequate methods. Second, the learner is basically an active agent, interacting with the environment in such a way as to advance development, although unaware of particular structures to be developed. This perspective conveys the sense of a journey from immature, dependent, vulnerable childhood to a destination of mature, independent, secure adulthood. Indications of learning are to be found not only through changes in discrete learner behaviors, but through changes in internal structures which develop as a result of interaction between the organism and external stimuli.

This view is represented in work spearheaded by Piaget (1937), who charted cognitive development from the "sensori-motor" phase to "formal operational" thought. It is the basis of Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development in which the learner progresses from "preconventional" to "postconventional" styles of ethical reasoning. It is also evident in theories of ego development. Erikson's (1959) stages in the life cycle begin with the stage of "trust" and end with the stage of "integrity." Loevinger's (1970) conception charts a path from "presocial" to "integrated."

While these approaches differ in important ways, they share a view of the organism developing in a progressive fashion. As theories of learning, they also share some deficiencies. They do not completely explain how a person advances from one stage in development to the next. Nor do they concern themselves with learning beyond the mature or highest stage. Presumably learning can continue to occur after one reaches the highest stages; but if developmental growth has ended, what then is the nature of learning? In spite of these difficulties, civic education rationales should respond to the probable existence of a developmental dynamic in learners.

---

[16] Bandura (1971) offers an extensive review of social learning theory.

C. *Dialectical Synergism*

The label is mine, for the viewpoint to be characterized is too new and emergent to have been widely recognized as a distinct theory of human learning. It grows largely out of a reaction to developmental orientations. Though it acknowledges the existence of innate structures and their modification through interaction with environment, dialectical synergism parts company with organismic development in two important respects. First, it denies any final definition of "maturity" or end point to growth. Instead, it posits an unending process where people develop by coping with tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities as inevitable, and, in many cases, even exciting conditions of human existence. The point of dialectic is not to achieve the highest stages of thought in which all problems are resolved, but to understand that the resolution of ambiguities and contradictions only creates new ones to face; their "solution" generates further problems; and so it goes. One continues to grow and develop by continually struggling with a never-ending set of issues.

Second, dialectical synergism argues that to function *exclusively* at higher stages of development (e.g., formal operations or Stage 6 ethical reasoning) is to breed alienation from self and society. One learns not by abandoning one's childlike modes of thought and feeling, but by incorporating them into one's interaction with the world. That is, to continue learning in adult life, "lower" stages of development must be used actively along with higher stages; for example, motor skills in playing musical instruments or craft work, concrete operational thought in managing household affairs, "conventional" ethical reasoning to enjoy social gatherings, as well as formal operational thought or postconventional reasoning in thinking about certain social problems. To reject or completely devalue earlier stages of development is, in a sense, to sever one's ties with one's personal history and one's fellow humans.

In relation to cognitive learning, Riegal (1975a) argued the dialectical view, and a variety of recent scholarship on dialectics is presented in Riegal (1975b). Hampden-Turner (1970) presented a model of personal growth that addresses emotional issues, especially the development of an emotional ability to suspend one's views and to risk oneself to be influenced by others, while at the same time investing one's competence in efforts to influence those others. Learning occurs when two people mutually open themselves to the influence of another and attempt to exert influence on the other. In providing an alternative conception of human change or growth, dialectical synergism has not, however, answered the question of how one should teach or organize an environment to stimulate that process.

Most approaches to civic education fail to discuss the nature of learning, but the social learning orientation seems to prevail in familiar recommendations that the teacher should use modeling and proper reinforcement to teach desired student behaviors. In spite of lip service to Piaget, theories of development rarely guide instruction, and dialectical synergism is virtually ignored. Unfortunately, none of the general orientations offers much in the way of practical solutions for curriculum developers or teachers. Research in social learning theory has hardly begun to tell us what particular reinforcers to use to teach particular things to particular people in particular situations. Developmental theorists are only beginning to work on suggestions for specific teaching strategies or ways to organize content to advance students from one stage to the next or to expand their application of thought within a stage. Advocates of dialectical synergism have not yet explained how to help people cope with contradictions in a productive fashion.

Theories of learning may remain incomplete for some time, but our conceptions of what ought to be taught, and how, still depend in part on assumptions we make about learning itself. Rather than assuming the need for one broad theory to explain all learning, we might find particular theories useful for particular kinds of learning; for example, reinforcement theory may explain the learning of simple behavioral tasks, and developmental theory may explain the acquisition of an abstract social perspective.

Definition of Community

To be a good or effective citizen is usually seen as equivalent to being a member in good standing of some community, but what are the ultimate group referents for citizen loyalty and responsibility? From a nationalistic perspective, the good citizen serves the nation state, and this has been a dominant theme of civic instruction in the United States. Yet, most persons belong to many communities and constituencies: families, religious organizations, ethnic-cultural groups, occupational organizations (i.e., businesses, professional groups, unions), social welfare institutions (schools, prisons), and political-legal communities such as municipalities, counties, and states. Increasing attention to worldwide human interdependence suggests that primary civic obligations might be directed toward ever-more inclusive referents, such as the human species (past and present), all living matter, the planet, or the universe.

Which fundamental community or communities is civic education intended to serve? A familiar American response is to claim that civic education should help the individual function effectively in all the various communities in which he or she takes part. This response is inadequate in at least two ways. First, it implies that all communities are to be equally valued: citizenship in a group dedicated to genocide would be valued equally to citizenship in a group dedicated to civil liberties. Because some groups may violate values assumed to be important in an approach to civic education, it would not be appropriate to endorse unconditionally all groups as equally deserving of citizen loyalty. Second, civic education that rates membership in all groups on an equal footing creates serious problems for the citizen when the demands of membership in two or more groups conflict; for example, a person who belongs to a labor union that decides to strike against the state's law. The issue is further illustrated when members of an exploited minority claim they have no responsibility to abide by rules in the dominant political-legal system, because the system has consistently denied their right to participate in it. Their ultimate referent for citizenship may be their cultural heritage, not the official political-legal system that governs them.

Another position suggesting no particular community as a referent argues that civic loyalty be focused ultimately only toward basic principles of justice. One does not teach loyalty or responsibility to any specific group, but instead the commitment and skills required to practice, in whatever groups one finds oneself, the principles of justice. Approaches to civic education that place exclusive emphasis on critical thinking or the acquisition of disciplined knowledge can also repudiate, by implication, ultimate commitment to any particular constituency. The citizen should be loyal ultimately only to the principles of truth, inquiry, critical thought which presumably transcend allegiance to any particular political-legal units.

Much of the confusion in civic education can be traced to lack of clarity and/or disagreement on the ultimate community referent for citizenship. One's position on this question will depend, of course, on assumptions made about the nature of values and the nature of social reality.

Citizenship and Other Goals of Schooling

Those who try to persuade the schools to put more emphasis on civic education are all too familiar with the reply, "Of course citizenship is important, but we have other priorities too." Other objectives have been advocated persuasively: basic skills in language and mathematics, career development, preparation for the requirements of higher education, health and safety, aesthetic and humanistic sensitivity. We also find complicated rationales for goals in psychological education, consumer education, human relations training. A perusal of curriculum literature shows that a persuasive case can be made for teaching almost anything. The more difficult problem, however, is to rank and justify the importance of all the various "goods" in relation to one another.

School administrators, teachers, parents, and youth are bombarded with a bewildering array of attractive alternatives which all compete for a place in the school curriculum; in a sense, their advocates all want a piece of each student's head. To establish priorities, some school systems have begun to carry out "needs assessments," often through citizen opinion polls where student achievement data may be available as input into the citizens' ranked preferences. This method establishes priorities, but largely through a political process, not through the generation of a rationale. Ideally, educators would develop alternative rationales to which the citizens would respond.

Unless civic education programs are justified with reference to the total school program, their proposals will only add to fragmentation and incoherence. One illustration of the problem is lack of attention to longitudinal sequence, kindergarten to twelfth grade. Most curriculum projects are developed to fit a particular grade level (11th grade United States History or 7th grade Geography) without reference to the students' previous or future studies. A complete rationale for civic education should, however, take a longitudinal view of the instruction it proposes. What does it assume regarding the students' experiences prior to and after formal instruction?

Sequence also raises the problem of relationship to other goals of schooling. Suppose a school decides that during grades 1–3 exclusive attention will be given to language and numerical skills. Would this be helpful or harmful to one's proposed conception of civic education? Could one's proposed approach to civic education enhance the achievement of basic skills in those grades? To the extent that a rationale for civic education must respond to other goals of schooling, it must locate itself within a general curriculum theory.

Schools and Other Social Agencies

We need to be reminded that education can and does occur outside of school, and that, in proposing programs for education we must, therefore, differentiate between the educational tasks that can and ought to be performed by schools versus those that are and ought to be handled by agencies beyond the school, such as the family, church, workplace, mass media, or peer group. The "limits of schooling" point has been made through historical analysis (Commager, 1975), quantitative studies on academic achievement (Jencks et al., 1972), analysis of socialization process (Panel on Youth, 1974; Coleman, 1976), and general social criticism (Newmann & Oliver, 1967; Illich, 1970; Oliver, 1976). It is also reflected in constitutional principles of separation of church and state (don't teach religion in schools) and in citizens' claims to privacy (don't teach about personal matters, such as sex, in school).

There are two main arguments behind limiting the school's role in civic education. First, is the normative claim that schools should be "politically neutral." School endorsement of certain forms of civic education is seen as inappropriate because of potential violation of intellectual integrity or of the exclusive right of other agencies (such as the family) to educate children on some matters. The study of controversial social issues or student involvement in social action can thus come under attack. If learning about civic issues is perceived to be influenced more by emotional, nonrational commitments than by objective scholarship, then the study of such subjects would seem to encroach upon intellectual openness and integrity. Furthermore, other agencies such as churches, partisan political organizations, businesses, or cultural groups may see their rights to exert influence inhibited if the school, a state-supported institution, begins to delve into issues in which the other agencies have a dominant interest. If, under the guise of education, the authority of the state is used to support or combat particular partisan interests, this would be unfair to those interests that fail to attract the school's support.[17]

The second argument raises practical concerns. It claims that some forms of civic education in school are inefficient or ineffective, because other non-school agencies have such overwhelming influence on students as to either nullify the work of school or, if consistent with it, to render it unnecessary. The mass media, the peer group, family norms, and corporate institutions inevitably transmit their own form of civic-political education, regardless of the intentions of professional educators. As the argument goes, there is little the school can do to affect the influence on values, beliefs, and behavior exerted by such institutions. According to this view, changing civic education requires changing the messages communicated by social institutions at large, and this probably demands no less than major structural changes in the institutions themselves.

In a more positive vein, extra-school institutions may be seen as offering more effective, constructive civic instruction than schools. Skills in political participation may best be learned through authentic participation, where citizens involve themselves not for the purpose of learning, but for the purpose of pursuing goals they have as citizens: election of specific candidates, passage or repeal of regulations in consumer affairs, environmental protection, civil rights; assisting the defense of an accused person; starting a youth service agency, or working for improved trash collection. There is no substitute for authentic experience in the role of citizen, and this role is most faithfully executed only as students become involved in organizations beyond the school. In summary, rationales for civic education, taking into account the "limits of schooling" critique, need to explain the extent to which school and non-school institutions should be relied upon.

---

[17] Newmann (1975) refuted most objections to school-sponsored student involvement in social controversy.

Authenticity: Consistency Between Goals and Process

A major source of disillusionment, cynicism, distrust, and lack of credibility is perceived inconsistency between professed ideals and actual practice. An example relevant to civic education is the glorification of the value of democracy in an autocratic institution (the school) that often arbitrarily deprives its members of opportunities to practice consent of the governed. Another example is the rhetorical value placed upon intellectual curiosity, openness, and honesty, but a system of school evaluation and credentialing that often tends to stifle or violate each of these. A final illustration is the lip service given to cooperation, working in groups, and getting along, but a system of rewards (grades, admission to further education, jobs) based primarily upon individual (not group) achievement and in most cases individualistic competition.

The illustrations are not intended here to suggest particular institutional changes (such as democratizing the schools or abolishing grades), although elsewhere (Newmann, 1975) I have advocated some. The point is that inconsistency between ideals and practice, whether perceived or real, is likely to impede the effectiveness of any program. To expect all programs to achieve a perfect fit between their ostensible goals and the means or process used in their pursuit would be unrealistic. As Bell (1976) reminded us, we cannot escape certain contradictions between humanistic goals and the institutional mechanisms of modern technology to reach them. Nevertheless, the developers of each program should address this problem. The entire institutional process should be closely examined to discover possible violations (however unintentional) of the official or ultimate ideals. Such examination may sometimes uncover actual inconsistencies, sometimes only perceived ones, and sometimes neither. When actual inconsistencies are exposed, efforts should be made to resolve them through modification of goals and/or process. When inconsistencies seem to be the result of misperception or misinterpretation, these must be confronted in an open fashion, allowing "accusers" and "defenders" opportunity for dialogue over questions of program or institutional integrity.

Often the authenticity of civic education programs falters on what might be called the truth and authority issue. Students are told that their history and social studies courses will teach them about the nature of democracy, how the system works or has worked. Frequently, however, students' non-school experiences (interaction with adults, peers, the media) tend to contradict or raise questions about what is learned in school (e.g., on topics such as how a bill becomes a law, how accused persons are given due process, or how American foreign policy interprets the right of national self-determination). When information and explanations acquired outside of school are seen as more adequate than those provided through school, the entire process of schooling loses credibility in students' eyes.

Credibility can be lost in two ways. First is the relatively straightforward challenge to authority when students conclude that "truth" found outside school seems more adequate than the truth found inside. At this point, the school has a chance to recover credibility if it allows for open inquiry into the apparent problem, with the possibility that the teacher, in response to additional evidence, may alter his or her teaching. If, however, teachers view challenges to their teachings as challenges to their underlying authority, they may try to solve the "authority" problem by stifling open consideration on the "truth" problem. If this is done, the institution's authority is doubly undermined, for it then makes a mockery not only of its specific teaching, but of its underlying purpose. Students are unusually perceptive in determining when educators are acting to maintain their authority and when they are acting to search honestly for knowledge.

Rationales for civic education should explain how to deal with authenticity problems.[18] They should outline strategies for insuring some consistency between educational goals and the process of instruction and insuring that the knowledge conveyed will stand the test of challenge from the students' interaction in the non-school environment.

Diversity

In their zeal to advocate a particular approach to civic education, proponents often fail to explain how their approach responds to human diversity in interest, ability, age, sex, cultural affiliation, personality, and socio-economic status. In short, what forms of citizenship education are most appropriate for various kinds of people? Perhaps certain groups of adults, such as those in their first full-time job, those who are neither employed nor in school, or those who hold public office all need citizenship education as much as youth, but in different forms; and perhaps civic education for youth also should vary considerably in response to student diversity. To the extent that groups and individuals have a right to maintain an authentic sense of self or unique collective identity, plans for civic education must avoid standardized conceptions to which all citizens are expected to conform.

---

[18] Newmann (1977) proposed six criteria for educational authenticity derived from the political principles of equal liberty and consent of the governed. Alternative approaches to civic education can be judged on each of the criteria.

Civic education rationales should clarify, for example, whether diversity in student ability requires comparable diversity in students' educational goals. If one concludes that most people are not capable of high levels of abstract moral reasoning, but that a few are, then perhaps some goals for the less competent masses might be different from some goals for the more competent few. "High level" reasoners might be taught to accept social responsibility for "low-level" reasoners, and the "low-levels" might be taught a sense of self-respect that does not depend upon their being able to manipulate abstract ideas or to talk like sophisticated "high-level" thinkers.

If one assumes no fundamental, unalterable differences in competence, this prospect, so troubling to modern liberal egalitarian thinking, does not arise. That is, if all students are considered equally educable with regard to all the goals of civic education, then the issue of elitism can be avoided. If, however, we see the likelihood of some people becoming more competent than others in civic tasks, even under optional conditions of educational intervention, our approach to civic education must explain how diversity in human talent will be handled.

A common way to cope with this problem is to introduce the idea of *individual potential*: educate each person to the full potential of his or her ability in different areas. What does "individual potential" mean when applied to a vision of citizenship? We might view some students as having unique potentials for civic leadership, others with unique potentials as devoted followers; some may have unique potentials for understanding politics, others for fighting crime. Would the discovery of unique "civic potentials" lead to diverse educational goals in citizenship, depending upon students' different interests and competence levels? If we suspect important differences in talent, but just let the chips fall where they may, does this guarantee justice for the less talented? Proponents of civic education programs have not exposed or defended their views on this problem.

Rationales must also confront demands by cultural, ethnic, political, and socio-economic groups to preserve a heritage or to serve group needs as defined by the group. To what extent should civic education differ for blacks vs. whites, males vs. females, poor vs. rich, and for ethnic and religious groups trying to preserve separate traditions? Any local school district may face conflicting demands, based on group identifications, within its own community. The district's rationale should explain how different aspirations for civic education among local groups will be handled. Developers of programs aimed at more than one district must take account of the strong tradition of local control of education and explain how a national or centrally designed model might be adopted without loss of local autonomy.

Use of the Framework

We have suggested that in order to be intellectually complete, any rationale for civic education should address seven general issues, an admittedly demanding intellectual challenge which to our knowledge has never been attempted. These elements are considered necessary but not sufficient in the justification of any particular program. The issues raised above help to insure that rationale statements are conceptually complete; but, in addition, program advocates must make technical or instrumental arguments showing that proposals are, in fact, likely to achieve their goals at a reasonable cost.

The elements are proposed not to lead to the endorsement of any particular approach, but to keep all approaches "honest" in the sense of requiring them to respond to critical issues. If alternative rationales were generated, the elements could serve as a set of guidelines, offering a vehicle for comparison among approaches. We could ask of each approach: How thoroughly does it address each element? What position, if any, does it take on each element? To what extent can we support its position on each element? Funding agencies, commercial publishers, local school districts, and classroom teachers could use such a framework to evaluate proposed programs.

The elements ask some questions that perhaps only academicians have the resources (that is, time, training, and interest) to consider, and it may be unfair to expect local practitioners to build sophisticated positions on all issues. This might be remedied by offering inservice support to teachers to work on rationale development and by supporting academicians to research the framework's questions, eventually to share findings through publication and consultation with local teachers and administrators. To generate rationales responsive to this framework, we need additional support at several levels: local education agencies (e.g., school in-service programs), foundation and government funding in curriculum development, professional associations (conferences and special publications), universities (coursework and faculty research). Whether such support comes forth will depend upon the willingness of individuals to step back from clichés, fads, gimmicks, and transient political passions, and think more systematically about civic education.

The plea for an investment in rationale-building may be greeted with skepticism. Teachers cannot afford the luxury of waiting until such complicated issues are resolved—they must respond to young people daily. Since issues raised by the framework will probably always elicit controversial answers, proposed programs will forever be based on uncertain foundations. To the extent that rationale-building takes time and may not resolve important issues, it seems to offer no help with practical problems of civic education. It is further argued that educational policy cannot be determined purely through rational analysis. Educational personnel, to maintain their own power, money, and status, depend upon the support of various groups (unions, taxpayers, certification agencies); and publishers, merchants, and social service professionals stand to benefit in material ways from school adoption or failure to adopt specific programs. In this sense, program decisions are seen as outcomes of struggles for power, not as dispassionate intellectual inquiries about the ideal form of education. According to such political interpretations, intellectually complete rationales are merely rationalizations served up by vested interests trying to gain or maintain power.

If we view educational policy formation exclusively as an irrational struggle for the use of coercive power, then, admittedly, thorough rational analysis of the content of programs becomes only an academic exercise. We should note, however, that power can be sought and maintained also through the use of concepts and justifications that appeal to values beyond self-interested power maintenance. Educators, publishers, parents may propose programs to gain or keep power; but in order to prevail, they may also need the strength of intellectually complete rationales. When used only as ammunition to gain power, rationales can be called rationalizations. But that is irrelevant, for even in a political struggle, rationales are likely to be more effective if they respond to elements in our outline.

I agree with skeptics that comprehensive rationales alone cannot solve all problems of civic education. As indicated at the outset, better rationales will not necessarily eliminate disagreement about the preferred course of civic education, nor will they give technical solutions on how to teach preferred approaches. Why, then, should we continue the search? There are three important reasons. First, educators have an *intellectual* responsibility to try to understand what they are doing and why. Second, sound rationales do offer some, albeit insufficient, *practical* assistance in narrowing the options as to what and how to teach. Third, persons wielding power through state-supported institutions have an *ethical* responsibility to justify their actions.

If rationales responded to the proposed outline, this could assist in the adjudication of disputes over educational programs; focusing discussion on a common set of guidelines would help inform conflicting factions about the nature of their disagreements. The guidelines might even reveal that some factions are more in agreement than had previously been assumed. A comprehensive rationale will also suggest directions for future work on how to organize and teach specific curricula.

My insistence upon the need for thorough rationales stems fundamentally from an ethical position: Those to whom power is delegated (e.g., educators with power to affect the lives of children) or those who propose that power be used in particular ways (e.g., advocates of curriculum for the schools) have an obligation to justify their use of power. That justification must be grounded in universal principles of justice, human dignity, equality, and not merely in a self-interested attempt to enhance one's power over others. A rationale is, therefore, the vehicle through which the educator justifies to the community at large his or her use of the power that the community has delegated to institutions of formal education. Any particular rationale may have the effect of enhancing or reducing the power of the educator; it may lead to actual improvement or deterioration in the education of youth. Regardless of their effects, however, educators have an intellectual and ethical obligation to build more complete rationales.

REFERENCES

Apple, M. Toward increasing the potency of student rights claims. In V. F. Haubrich & M. W. Apple (Eds.), *Schooling and the rights of children*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975, 198–207.

Bandura, A. *Social learning theory*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1971.

Bell, D. *The cultural contradictions of capitalism*. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Berlak, H. The teaching of thinking. *School Review*, 1965, *73*(1), 1–13.

Butts, R. F. Historical perspective on civic education in the United States. In National Task Force on Citizenship Education, *Education for responsible citizenship*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Coleman, J. *Policy research in the social sciences*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972.

Coleman, J. S. The ways of socialization. *Center Magazine*, 1976, *9*(3), 3–10.

Commager, H. S. Public responsibility and the educational enterprise. *National Elementary Principal*, 1975, *54*(5), 6–15.

Dewey, J. *Democracy and education*. New York: Macmillan, 1916.

Erikson, E. Identity and the life cycles. *Psychological Issues*, 1959, *1*(1).

Fair, J. & Shaftel, F. R. (Eds.). *Effective thinking in the social studies*. Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1967.

Fenton, E. (Ed.). Cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. *Social Education*, 1976, *40*(4), 187–215.

Hampden-Turner, C. *Radical man: The process of psycho-social development*. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1970.

Harvard Committee. *General education in a free society*. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Hirst, P. H. Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. In R. Archambault (Ed.), *Philosophical analysis and education*. New York: Humanities Press, 1965, 113–138.

Hunt, M. P. & Metcalf, L. *Teaching high school social studies*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Illich, I. *Deschooling society*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Jencks, C., Smith, M., Acland, H., Bane, M. J., Cohen, D., Gintis, H., Heyns, B., & Michelson, S. *Inequality: A reassessment of the effect of family and schooling in America*. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

Kohlberg, L. Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In David A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of socialization theory and research*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 347–480.

Kohlberg, L. From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive and developmental epistemology*. New York: Academic Press, 1971, 151–235.

Kohlberg, L. *Collected papers on moral development and moral education*. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: Center for Moral Education, 1973.

Kohlberg, L. *Collected papers on moral development and moral education*. Vol. II. Cambridge, MA: Center for Moral Education, 1975. (a)

Kohlberg, L. Moral education for a society in transition. *Educational Leadership*, 1975, *33*(1), 46–54. (b)

Kohlberg, L. & Mayer, R. Development as the aim of education. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1972, *42*(4), 449–496.

Lewenstein, M. *Teaching social studies*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

Loevinger, J. & Wessler, R. *Measuring ego development*. Vol. I. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1970.

Mehlinger, H. The crisis in civic education. In National Task Force on Citizenship Education, *Education for responsible citizenship*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Newmann, F. M. *Education for citizen action: Challenge for secondary curriculum*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.

Newmann, F. M. Alternative approaches to citizenship education: A search for authenticity. In National Task Force on Citizenship Education, *Education for responsible citizenship*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Newmann, F. M. & Oliver, D. W. Education and community. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1967, *37*(1), 61–106.

Newmann, F. M. & Oliver, D. W. *Clarifying public controversy: An approach to teaching social studies*. Boston: Little Brown, 1970.

Oliver, D. W. *Education and community: A radical critique of innovative schooling*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1976.

Oliver, D. W. & Shaver, J. P. *Teaching public issues in the high school*: Logan: Utah State University Press, 1974. (First published by Houghton Mifflin in 1966.)

Panel on Youth. Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee. *Youth: Transition to adulthood*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Patrick, J. J. Main themes in political education in American secondary schools. Paper for Conference on Political Education in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, Indiana University, Bloomington, September 15–19, 1975.

Phillips, R. D. *Teaching for thinking in high school social studies*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1974.

Piaget, J. *The construction of reality in the child*. New York: Basic Books, 1954. (First published in 1937.)

Raths, L. E., Harmin M., & Simon, S. B. *Values and Teaching: Working with values in the classroom*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1966.

Riegal, K. F. From traits and equilibrium toward developmental dialectics. Paper presented at 1974–75 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Lincoln, NB. (a)

Riegal, K. F. (Ed.). *The development of dialectical operations*. Basel, Switzerland: S. Karger, 1975. Reprinted from *Human Development*, 1975, *18*(1, 2, 3). (b)

Schwab, J. Structure of the disciplines: Meaning and significances. In G. W. Ford and Lawrence Pugno (Eds.), *The structure of knowledge and the curriculum*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, 1–30.

Shaver, J. P. & Berlak, H. (Eds.). *Democracy, pluralism, and the social studies: Readings and commentary*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

Shaver, J. P. & Strong, W. *Facing value decisions: Rationale-building for teachers*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1976.

Simon, S. B., Howe, L. W., & Kirschenbaum, H. *Values clarification: A handbook of practical strategies for teachers and students*. New York: Hart, 1972.

Simon, S. B. & Clark, J. *More values clarification*. San Diego: Pennant Press, 1975.

Superka, D. P., Ahrens, C., Hedstrom, J. E., with L. U. Ford & P. L. Johnson. *Values education sourcebook*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Education Consortium, 1976.

Chapter Two

Human Consciousness, Social Criticism, and Civic Education

Harold Berlak

> *The priests devote their efforts to maintaining the vestigial structure; the prophets seek new perspectives whereby this vestigial structure may be criticized and a new one established in its place.*

Kenneth Burke (1935), eminent literary critic and man of letters, speaks here to the fundamental question of continuity and change, and he alludes to a dilemma that confronts many of us in our personal and professional lives as teachers. Are we prophet or priest; devoted to creating a new future, or to maintaining the society as it is? The thesis of this chapter is that virtually all the daily activities of teachers, including their choices of what and how to teach, reveal their resolutions to this dilemma, as do the activities of the curriculum specialists who write for children or teachers, those who teach teachers or presume to clarify curriculum issues for others—myself included. Newmann's (Chapter One) separation of approaches to civic education into eight categories (historical/social scientific, legal, social problem, critical thinking, values clarification, moral development, community involvement, and institutional school reform) may prove quite useful in resolving theoretical and practical curriculum issues, but debate over the merits of one approach as compared to another is futile unless the centrality of the continuity and change dilemma to all other pedagogical and curriculum questions is acknowledged and explored. If children's views of social life, their conceptions of political reality, and their unquestioning assent to the existing system are left unaffected by an educational experience, it hardly matters whether they have spent their time mastering historical texts (arranged chronologically or topically), working or observing in a factory, community or

---

HAROLD BERLAK is on the faculty of Washington University at St. Louis, where he has directed the Metropolitan St. Louis Social Studies Center and co-directed the Washington University Elementary Curriculum Project. He has taught junior high social studies, as well as studied Primary Schools in England.

government agency, or sitting in classrooms doing value clarification or moral development exercises. While the probability of persons with differing interests and dispositions becoming competent critics of the society may be enhanced somewhat by using one approach rather than another, it is doubtful that the differences often associated with each general approach are more important than the question of whether the teacher encourages or discourages students to examine the relationship of social-political economic arrangements past and present to the ways in which people live their everyday lives—which includes what takes place between teachers and students at school. In this chapter, I will attempt to clarify the dilemma, to formulate and justify a position on political or "civic" education, and to describe some of the materials developed by the Washington University Elementary Social Studies Project that exemplify the position.

The Basic Dilemma

I will state the most basic dilemma of political education before arguing my case for its resolution. On the one hand, the purpose of schooling (civic education, social studies are but special cases) is to insure continuity of a society—that is, the passing on to others in the society the traditions and inclinations to act that will insure a reasonably close resemblance of present social processes and forms with future social processes and forms. On the other hand, schooling is to make a contribution to change by helping the young become increasingly self-conscious and competent in questioning the adequacy of existing societal solutions (e.g., its present traditions, social-economic forms) to the changing conditions of social-political life.

Over the years many of the disputes over social studies and political education in the schools have directly or indirectly centered around this dilemma. The arguments over whether teachers should raise issues or discuss topics that parents or authorities deem taboo, or over the relative merits of "problems" vs. "disciplinary" approaches lead sooner or later to disputes over underlying assumptions about the primary functions of schooling in society. As has been pointed out by a number of persons over the years, the statement of the issue in terms of polarities can be misleading (e.g., Dewey, 1938; Oliver, 1960). The idea that schools for the young could take as priority or sole goal the encouragement of fundamental social criticism is foolishness, as is the more rampant contemporary myth that schools are nothing more than well oiled social machines for imprinting the society on the young. A great deal of recent so-called "radical revisionist" writing that takes a Marxist or Socialist perspective (such as Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy, 1974; Jencks et al., 1972; Katz, 1971; Kozol, 1975) seems to argue that there is no dilemma at all, merely iron certainty that the schools will reproduce society. Why trouble ourselves with civic education if schools have no significant political or economic effects on the lives of the young?

This is not the place to undertake a critique of these writers. It has been done admirably by others (Karabel & Halsey, 1977; Featherstone, 1976; Heilbronner, 1976). The significant point here is that any conception of political education rests upon an assumption that experience, whether arranged by school officials or not, is capable of altering the ways in which a person views the world. The assumption that schooling experiences can make a difference rests upon a notion that persons are not merely victims of their previous social histories and present social circumstances; but that through increased awareness or "consciousness" of the forces that act on them and within, they are capable of seeing the world differently and, hence, they may be capable of acting differently.

Though the term "consciousness" is an ambiguous one that is often avoided in scientific discourse, it nevertheless remains as a central conception in formulating educational programs. What is an educator's role, if it is not to help those he or she teaches to become increasingly conscious of the physical and social world, and of the social, economic, and other forces that have affected and continue to affect their daily lives? I will return to the issue of the relationship of schooling and "consciousness" later.

School, Curricular Reform, and Teachers' Role

Perhaps Bowles and Gintis' (1976) and other radical critics' views are a useful corrective to the naiveté revealed by liberal school reformers during the era of the "New Frontier" and the "Great Society." In my experience, however, the liberals were not alone in their naiveté. In the 1960s, many radicals and conservatives also shared the belief that significant social change was not only possible but imminent. Having lived through the period as a curriculum developer, it was my experience that not all teachers, administrators, or curriculum reformers were taken in by the passionate rhetoric of the time. The ambivalence and skepticism of the latter group were more likely revealed in private conversation than public utterance, however. The art of the school or curriculum reformer, one must recall, begins by getting funded. Dedicated reformers, even those whose optimism is thin, rarely think the unthinkable—certainly not aloud. While there may have been ambivalence and skepticism, the public record shows that with hardly an exception reformers, radical or liberal, gave little thought and devoted few words to clarification of the assumptions about social change that were implicit in their work.

Surely teachers and theorists, workers in the field at all levels, need to be attuned to the very real forces that act upon all of us. Schooling in America is conducted within one of the largest bureaucracies and political economic concentrations of all time, the modern industrial capitalist state. Yet simplism generally prevails in most statements of "rationale" or objectives. Relatively few teachers or curriculum specialists have come to terms with the implications of the fact that schools are government agencies and that governments in all modern industrial states are subject and respond to powerful economic pressures, legal, illegal, covert and overt, exerted by many groups—particularly those that are well organized and financed, and determined to protect their own interests. The facts of Watergate reveal, if nothing else, that there are a lot of people and organized groups who prefer things as they are, and persons with money and power in or outside of government will go to some length to suppress information and criticism they do not see as in the "Community" or "National Interest," which suspiciously often coincides precisely with their own. Certainly, the fact that there are also within the fifty states individuals and groups, in and outside of government, leaders, workers, members of university communities, teachers and others, including able and earnest members of the National Council for the Social Studies, who do their best to distinguish personal from public interest, and also work hard to create a more open society and a politically conscious critical and active electorate, does not greatly diminish the power of those whose best interests are served by a citizenry that does not ask too many questions too often.

The recent history of social studies reform in the United States, I think, strengthens the contention that schools are not fertile ground for the sort of civic or political education that informs and encourages a critical examination of society and its institutions and social relations. Few of the projects produced curricula that encouraged social criticism. Yet even these generally cautious efforts to move the teaching of history and social studies away from the pedantry of one-damn-thing-after-another were far from universally welcomed. Whatever the merits of these efforts, there was little in the now aging "New Social Studies" that leaned very strongly toward "political" or "civic" education, in the sense that students were encouraged to ask questions about the adequacy of existing economic and political forms. Many of the projects shunned any explicit idea of "political" or "social" education, opting rather for the mantle of legitimacy bestowed by scholarly disciplines. These curricula, with few exceptions, were to teach students the "structures" of academic "disciplines" that presumably were politically neutral organized bodies of substantive and methodological knowledge, a proposition that is as patently false now as it was fifteen years ago.

What I have said thus far may appear to further buttress the conventional wisdom of the late 1970s—that school reform, though it may make school life less grim for teachers and children, will likely have no practical social and political consequences. Many reform-minded political leaders and governmental and foundation bureaucrats who fervently supported the reforms of the early and late 1960s have shifted their priorities. And the prevailing view that social reforms are impossible through the schools also likely accounts for the present preoccupation with forms of value or moral education (or development) that focus primarily inward, thereby avoiding the difficult questions that are raised when one inquires into the *relationship* of social and political conditions to the development of personal and social morality.

The position I take is that the task of the curriculum theorists, specialists, and teachers is neither as hopeless nor as grand as some suppose. Surely, if changes in curriculum, or in any significant aspect of social life, depend upon raising individual consciousness, then it is unreasonable to expect that a change in administrative structure or curriculum, or the addition of a few resources will in themselves have major impact on children's views of the social and political world. Curriculum specialists in the schools or university, after all, do little more than produce textbooks, films, games, specific suggestions, or general guiding ideas for teachers. Materials themselves are not likely to alter the social forces or the teachers' consciousness of the particular forces that have acted and continue to act upon them. It is the developing political consciousness of the individual teacher that is central to any change in teachers' orientations to civic education. Many of the so-called "implementation" models that were and continue to be used by research and development groups are not predicated upon raising the awareness of teachers and helping them to explore alternatives; rather, teachers are still most often taken by administrators or governmental bureaucrats to be "targets," objects of social engineering, a technocratic view of change whereby individual consciousness is superfluous. In many of the curricular reform efforts of the 1960s, teachers were treated as though they were machines devoid of the capacity to feel, think, and make judgments based on their experience.

Civic education, then, in the sense it is used in this chapter, is possible, but only when there is consciousness and increased awareness by teachers of the issue of continuity and change. The tools of the teacher's trade—books, journal articles, films—created by curriculum workers can lead to enlightenment and change only when used by teachers who are themselves engaged in social inquiry, are themselves actively exploring alternative ways of looking at and understanding their social and political world. At most, curriculum specialists can make available, to the willing and interested, books, visuals, films (and any other material objects the human mind is capable of conceiving) that will be useful in the job of helping students gain perspectives on our nation's political and social history, on their personal experiences, including the students' own values and moral judgments as professed or revealed in their behavior, and on the positions they take or will take as adults on social and political and economic issues of the time.

A Justification for Political Education

The position taken here—that there is within society a continuing dilemma of continuity and change—rests upon an assumption that *Homo sapiens* is capable of self-awareness or consciousness. We are all objects in the environment and indeed shaped by social physical circumstances; but we are also subjects, initiators of actions that influence and change these circumstances. It is only through citizens' heightened consciousness of the forces that act upon them that they may come to understand, delineate, and/or actively pursue alternative possibilities; or, in other words, become the politically informed and involved person whom we as political educators say we aim to create.

It is not necessary to plough the full depth and reaches of the concept of consciousness (or the critically important related Freudian concept of the unconscious) to gain some clarity on the immediate task of formulating and clarifying the goals of civic education.[1] Developing "awareness" or consciousness suggests increasing our understanding of the forces operating within and on us in the present situation, that affect our thought and behavior in our everyday lives. Social awareness implies, at the very least, coming to understand how the forces toward reproduction of the existing society and ways of viewing social reality may be operating within and upon us. A teacher or student whose consciousness is raised, then, is becoming increasingly aware of cultural and economic forces that may have helped to create the conditions and quality of life in the workplace.

"Consciousness" is significant for political or social action because persons are less likely to remain passive victims to these forces if they gain perspective on their social lives. In the women's movement, for example, increasing awareness of the internal and external forces that press toward acceptance of a subservient relationship to men strengthened the press toward change. Thus, to have heightened consciousness or awareness implies that one may not take what is as what is possible. It implies also the exploration of alternatives. If persons begin to recognize how they unknowingly have been influenced by the condition of their work, they may move closer to engaging in efforts to rearrange such conditions.[2]

---

[1] For a more complete discussion of the question of consciousness and its relationship to action, see Berlak and Berlak (1977); also Karabel and Halsey (1977).

[2] Obviously there is no certainty that a person who has awareness of a situation will act. An exploration of the many reasons for this is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Developing consciousness, then, involves two related pursuits: First, increasing the capacity of persons to objectify themselves; that is, seeing themselves and the circumstances of their work and play from the perspectives of others. These other perspectives include norms, traditions, world views, social values, and priorities other than one's own. Second, developing consciousness involves the exploration and pursuit of alternatives. It should be clear that this process of objectification and exploration of alternatives may not be benign. It has profound implications that are not likely to be entirely overlooked by some of those who have the most to gain from maintaining existing conditions and institutions.[3]

In sum, the primary aim of political education is the raising of consciousness. That involves helping our students to view the circumstances of their daily life and the possibilities for action in terms of the perspectives of others, not only specific others, but using George Herbert Mead's (1934, 1938) concept, in terms of *generalized others*—in terms of values, norms, beliefs, and images of the future that are represented in a variety of cultures, within and among nations and peoples of the world, past and present, including differing past and present traditions of knowledge and knowing. And it is the awareness and understanding of these other perspectives that is requisite to the development of alternative possibilities—that is, change.

The second goal of civic education is implicit in the first: it is the development of our students' capacity to examine and explore alternatives. In more specific terms, this requires that students acquire particular skills and knowledge that enable them to examine prospectively and retrospectively the consequences of particular solutions of the polity, factory, family—an examination that will surely be self-serving or muddled if individuals are not aware of the character of the social lenses, the presuppositions embedded in the perspectives they use in constructing and interpreting social situations.

If these goals of civic education sound dangerously seditious, and arouse suspicions that heretical perspectives (i.e., Marxism) might be introduced to corrupt the minds of the young, I should remind the reader that change through "raised consciousness," or "knowing," is also a cornerstone of major strands of Christian and of liberal democratic thought. This position has no more seditious possibilities than James Madison's frequently quoted aphorism, "A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives." Those who take Western Liberal Constitutional ideals seriously must, to be true to those ideals, commit themselves to consciousness raising and examination of alternatives for political action.

---

[3] Some perspectives on some aspects of political and social life, whether introduced by the media or the schools, are more likely to be tolerated than others—the re-examination of women's role is, for example, more likely to be an acceptable pursuit than examination of the role of the CIA in domestic politics. The presentation of the perspective of democratic socialism is more likely to be tolerated than a Maoist perspective.

The Washington University Elementary Curriculum Materials[4]

Eleven units were developed for the upper elementary grades. Each is an in-depth case study that focuses on a specific family, neighborhood, or group of individuals who are attempting to deal with changes in their life circumstances. In each of the units there is a set of changing circumstances, and the main characters find themselves in a position where they must consider ways of coping with the changes. The need to act may have arisen out of a single event (for example, a decision of a political body to redevelop a section of the city) or may have evolved out of gradual shifts in economic or social circumstances compounded by an immediate problem (as, for example, a poor black sharecropper family in the 1920s struggling to survive, and afflicted by a severe drought or depressed cotton market). The units do not merely depict the difficulties and grimness of life; rather, they are efforts to show a more complete picture, the joys as well as the tragedies and anxieties of daily living.

Each unit, then, portrays a specific group of people in a particular time and place. The individuals and the situations are reconstructions based on social scientific, historical, literary, and journalistic sources. The people (with some exceptions) are not pedagogical contrivances; rather, an effort was made to portray characters whom the children could accept as real persons who feel, think, and change in response to changing events. The units are necessarily simplifications, and, while an effort was made to make them authentic, they are not great literature. They do not quite capture the complexity of social life, the full range and depth of experience and emotion, nor the enigmatic quality of human existence.[5]

Within each unit there is a "problematic situation," but this does not mean that the units focus upon political issues or problems in the narrower sense. The problems involve changes in the circumstances that become apparent not only to the characters we have created, but, it is hoped, to the students as well. The events of each unit unfold over a five- or six-week period, assuming approximately four hours a week are spent on the learning activities related to the units. From our experience in teaching the units, over this period of time the children do become aware of the internal and external pressures on the main characters to alter their habitual patterns of living. The children come to know the people in the unit and are aware of one or two specific issues that have arisen out of the changing circumstances. In more dramatic terms, there is a crisis of some kind, and through various means the children are brought into the drama so that they may to some degree experience it. As an example, in *One City Neighborhood* (Berlak & Tomlinson, 1973) the issue revolves around what to do about a neighborhood in the path of an urban renewal project.

---

[4] Three of the eleven units were published by Random House, N.Y. They are: *A Village Family*, *One City Neighborhood* and *Changing Neighborhoods*. The other units are: *Urban Renewal in Lagos* (Nigeria); *Two Soviet Families; A Village in India; The Navajo in the City; The Dispute of Dorea Head* (use of atomic power to generate electricity); *The Black Experience* (1917–1920); *The American Revolution; The Cattlemen and the Cowboys.*

[5] Some of the simplifications were by design. Some social studies materials for children are benign to the point that there is hardly a semblance of a relationship between the life depicted in textbooks and the children's own life experience. But we think there are some good reasons for protecting children, particularly the younger ones, from bearing witness to the more sordid examples of man's inhumanity to man, and from viewing some of the more severe manifestations of the deep psychological distress that often accompanies major changes in persons' social lives.

Not until the children become familiar with the people and events, do they engage in what we call "dilemma discussion lessons," usually two or three in each unit. For these lessons, activities are provided to assist the teacher in helping children gain practice in the use of the skills of logical argument and the use of information to support positions. Ours is not, however, a "critical thinking," "issue," or "problem centered" approach, any more than it is a humanities, social scientific, or historical approach, as these terms are ordinarily used in the social studies curriculum literature. Critical thinking is no more important a goal than a child's gaining an understanding of the social context, the perspectives of the many individuals within the context, and the concepts (or language) persons need to make sense of their social and personal world. Indeed, our view is that skills have little meaning to a child if taught as a formal grammar, a collection of critical thinking skills to be mastered outside the context of recognizable human situations.

Following is a brief statement of four learning objectives. These objectives are a somewhat more explicit formulation of the two broad goals of political education given above:

(1) Awareness, understanding, experiencing, feeling, and seeking situations and life circumstances (one's own and others') from the perspectives of others.
(2) Understanding that the physical, social, and historical contexts of personal social life constrain both individuals and groups, but also represent alternative possibilities for change.
(3) Acquiring the language (the set of concepts) needed for understanding and thinking about social structures, forces, and relations.
(4) Developing the inclination and ability to use the skills necessary for a more thorough analysis of alternatives available to persons in their social-political life.

Examples from one unit are given below to illustrate how the materials may be used by the teacher to realize these objectives.

One City Neighborhood is the story of the "renewal" of an older multiethnic, predominately Italian, working-class neighborhood near downtown Boston that was destroyed during the 1950s to make way for a middle- and upper-income high-rise apartment complex. The project at the time was seen by some as a step in the direction of arresting the deteriorating economic situation of the city, particularly its commercial core.

Objective 1—Understanding the Perspective of Others

The children through a variety of pedagogical means come to view the events, the social, political, and economic circumstances surrounding this urban renewal project from four perspectives: First, from that of the residents—the children, the men, women, young and old, who lived in the neighborhood. The children in the classroom see, hear, and read about the way the residents lived, worked, and played, what they thought and worried about. Through the medium of a sound filmstrip, the children in the classroom are taken to see the old neighborhood by some of the residents—three boys about the same age as the children. They witness some common boyhood adventures in the neighborhood as the boys share their thoughts, their pleasures, and hopes. Two short stories, "Spring Street" and "Roscoe Rossini," introduce adults of the neighborhood, their workday lives and their growing concerns about the economic future of this section of the neighborhood. Two other stories, "Anna's Diary" and "Tina's Kitchen," portray the lives and a number of the special concerns of the younger and older women of the community. In addition to the students' reading, listening, and seeing, a great variety of active learning materials is used in conjunction with these materials. In "Roscoe Rossini Accounts," the children examine a resident merchant's financial accounts for the years 1947, 1950, and 1953. On the basis of the information and other facts they have gleaned from the text, sound filmstrips, and stories, the children make predictions for the year 1955; and they may be given the opportunity to role-play various possibilities. The children read a "newspaper," adapted from news articles written at the time. They interview their own parents and other persons. Then they compare the views on the problem of arresting urban decay with their own and those of their classmates. One of the more powerful ways we found of helping children gain the perspectives of others was through what we call "Extended Role Play." Children over a week or more play out the daily lives of the people who live in the neighborhood. They re-create physically the places that have become familiar to them: the bakery, the grocery, the tenements, the school, the church.

A second perspective the children come to know is that of the officials of the Boston Redevelopment Authority who view the question of renewal not solely in terms of the interests of the residents, but in terms of the economic welfare of the city as they interpret it. And while some in this group saw the best interests of the city as ill-served by the destruction of the neighborhood, their view did not prevail. In order to gain this perspective, the children engage in a variety of activities. A sound filmstrip re-creates a meeting of a Boston Redevelopment Authority, where the children see and hear the situation from the point of view of members of the Authority. They read newspaper accounts (simplified and adapted from original documents), and engage in writing, discussion, categorization, and role-play activities in order to help them gain this perspective.

A third perspective is that of the middle-class professionals and business people who become residents of the new high-rise apartments. The children read interviews with the new residents and conduct their own interviews, with some of the children acting as residents and others as newspaper reporters.

Finally, the children re-examine all these perspectives from the vantage point of time. The children watch and listen to actual interviews of ex-residents, adults and children, taken ten years after the renewal, in which they compare their present life to their memories of the old neighborhood, and offer their opinions on the wisdom of the now completed renewal plan.

Objective 2—Understanding Context and Constraints

The unit itself is a way of representing to the child the significance of context, of the particular set of social circumstances and economic arrangements, that bear on the lives of the individuals in it. Understanding of the context in this narrower sense is of primary importance for children of this age, but there is also some effort to put this particular urban renewal project into the larger context of the problems that confront cities generally. For this reason, there is in each unit several situations we call "micro cases" that portray briefly circumstances that both parallel and are different than those that are portrayed in the unit. By comparing similarities and differences, the children, it is hoped, will become aware of the dangers of overgeneralization and yet be able to recognize significant similarities in social situations.

Objective 3—Learning of Social Concepts

Social concepts are the language, both common and technical, that persons use to talk and think about social phenomena. Children, as do all persons, need concepts for exploring alternative courses of action. Virtually all the concepts in the units are taught in the context of the children's immersion in the study of the people and their changing circumstances. Again, a variety of pedagogical approaches is used: texts, filmstrips, stories, simulations, role play, sorting and categorizing games. A few of the concepts that are dealt with in this unit are "cost of living," "urban planning," "property tax," "sales tax," "tradition." In some instances, because of the complexity of the concept, or the risk of losing the story line, concept learning activities have been devised that are removed from the Boston context.

Objective 4—Developing the Inclination and Ability to Choose from Alternatives

In each unit there is at least one series of "dilemma discussions" where children become involved in considering the alternatives for action open to the individuals portrayed in the unit. Children take positions and offer reasons in support. The dilemma discussions also call attention to the fact that individual and collective action, though limited by the situation, is not entirely determined by outside forces. There is an effort to avoid one of the difficulties that often arises when children (and adults) discuss controversial issues—that of more passion being generated than respect for fact and cogent argument. The materials provided for these discussions are intended to be used to help children develop their abilities for using data, constructing a logical case, and re-examining their own positions based on their increased understanding of the various perspectives on the situation.

Pedagogy

By pedagogy we mean the way the materials in the curriculum are used by the teacher in the teaching situation to realize the objectives. We do not attempt to dictate teachers' classroom behavior; to do so would be to treat them as objects, and is inimical to the educational goal we are attempting to foster. There is no way to replace a teacher's judgment by offering prescriptions. But teachers are, of course, busy; and we do offer many suggestions based on our experience in the field tests of the materials. For each lesson there is an "overview" that attempts to put the lesson in broader context to clarify the curriculum developers' intentions, a brief statement of "objectives," and several alternative teaching strategies which teachers may wish to consider when devising their own teaching plans.

Theory and Practice in Curriculum

The title of this chapter promises a good deal more than is delivered. While a large number of theoretical issues and practical problems are touched upon, there are some striking deficiencies and omissions in the discussion. A curriculum theory that deals with a particular area of the school program is obviously only a piece of a broader curricular theory, and a curricular theory is only one aspect of a theory of schooling and society. Many of the important and fundamental theoretical issues explicit and implicit in this discussion are not dealt with systematically. I have made no effort in this chapter to formulate explicitly a theory of knowledge and learning. It may be clear from what I have said that I reject Skinnerian Behaviorism as well as the hierarchical and ontonogenic assumption of many Piagetians, including Kohlberg. The position I take on learning is more akin to the dialectical position of Riegal (1973, 1975).

However, while I can certainly be justifiably faulted for not being more comprehensive, precise, and systematic in my theorizing, I am convinced the merit of our curriculum work resided not in the adequacy of the theory, but in our effort to relate practice to theory, and theory to practice. The development of curriculum theory should be grounded in experience as well as in the various intellectual and philosophical traditions. The development of curriculum theory requires practical as well as theoretical investigation. Many curriculum theories are overdeveloped; they lack the sustenance of experience, and would benefit from efforts to put them into practice. Many curriculum theory efforts would also benefit from the experience and wisdom that astute and reflective classroom teachers can bring to bear on both the theory and practice of curriculum. The charge of detachment from the real world of children and schools has been directed at university-based social studies specialists often for good reason. There is, of course, also the risk at the other extreme of being so preoccupied with practicalities that basic questions about the nature of school and society and the teaching/learning process are ignored or trivialized.

The prospects for an effective civic education depend upon the development of the political consciousness of teachers, school administrators, curriculum writers, and others who underwrite curriculum efforts, and who recognize the important but limited place an enlightened civic education can play in the continuing struggle for renewal of our social, political, and economic institutions.

REFERENCES

Berlak, A. & Berlak, H. The dilemmas of schooling; A dialectical behaviorist perspective. St. Louis, MO: 1977 (mimeo.).

Berlak, A. C. & Berlak, H. Toward a social psychological theory of schooling. *Interchange*, 1975, *6*, 3.

Berlak, H. & Tomlinson, T. R. Model for the Metropolitan St. Louis Social Studies Center. Final Report, Project No. 2-004, Contract OE 5-10-313, Feb. 1967. (In ERIC.)

Berlak, H. & Tomlinson, T. R. *One city neighborhood.* New York: Random House, 1973.

Berlak, H. & Tomlinson, T. R. *A village family.* New York: Random House, 1973.

Berlak, H. & Tomlinson, T. R. *Changing neighborhoods.* New York: Random House, 1975.

Burke, K. *Permanence and change.* New York: New Republic Press, 1935.

Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. *Schooling in capitalist America.* New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Carnoy, M. *Education as cultural imperialism.* New York: David McKay, 1974.

Dewey, J. *Experience and education.* Kappa Delta Pi, 1938.

Featherstone, J. Review of *Schooling in capitalist America. New Republic*, 1976 (May 29) *174*(22).

Heilbronner, R. L. Review of *Schooling in capitalist America. New York Review*, 1976 (April 15), *23*, 13.

Karabel, J. E. & Halsey, A. H. (Eds.). *Power and ideology in education.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Katz, M. B. *Class bureaucracy and schools.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

Kozol, J. *The night is dark and I am far from home.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975.

Jencks, C., Smith, M., Acland, H., Bane, M. J., Cohen, D., Gintis, H., Heyns, B. & Michelson, S. *Inequality: A reassessment of the effect of family and schooling in America.* New York: Basic Books, 1972.

Mead, G. H. *Mind, self, and society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Mead, G. H. *The philosophy of the act.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Oliver, D. W. Educating citizens for responsible individualism. In, F. Patterson (Ed.), *Citizenship and a free society: Education for the future.* 30th Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1960.

Riegal, K. F. Dialectical operations: The final period of cognitive development. *Human Development*, 1973, *16*, 346–70.

Riegal, K. F. Toward a dialectical theory of development. *Human Development*, 1975, *18*, 50–64.

Chapter Three

Learning and Earning Citizenship Through Participation

Dan Conrad
and Diane Hedin

Recently, we met with two high school students who are elected representatives to a city-wide committee for youth affairs. In response to questions about what their committee did, they ticked off an impressive list of accomplishments: They had successfully lobbied with the city council to change an outdated ordinance prohibiting youth under 16 from using recreational devices such as pinball and foosball machines; they had just passed a resolution to establish a city-wide job bank for teenagers after discovering that no governmental unit was responsible for teenage employment; and, finally, they talked about their newly found confidence and competence in working with influential adults in their city—the mayor, the superintendent of schools, and labor leaders. When asked how their high school teachers and administrators viewed their involvement, their mood changed from ebullience to discouragement. They were "hassled" about being excused from classes to attend important city government hearings, and they were refused credit for their committee work. Their teachers questioned whether they could grant credit to an experience the school staff had not organized and supervised; they doubted whether it fulfilled government course requirements since it did not cover the same content; and they raised several other related concerns.

It is a striking comment on the state of the art in education that only teachers and school administrators would fail to recognize the students' experiences as citizenship education! But this statement should

---

DAN CONRAD is Chairperson of the Social Studies Department at Eisenhower High School in Hopkins, Minnesota, and director of that district's Youth Challenge Program. DIANE HEDIN is Assistant Director of the Center for Youth Development and Research at the University of Minnesota, and director of ACT (Affirming Our City Together), an action learning program of the Minneapolis Public Schools. Together they teach the course "Action Learning for Secondary Students" at the University of Minnesota.

not be interpreted to mean that we are part of the chorus of people proclaiming the schools to be strongholds of reaction and intellectual and creative wastelands, philosophically opposed to any changes that would enhance students' freedom and growth. Rather, we recognize that factors such as the pressure to maintain order among large and diverse groups of students (and to do so at low cost) often lead to conformity, emphasis on rules, and the intellectual dullness of our schools that the students in our example encountered.

Our real purpose in relating the incident above is to introduce the major ideas in this chapter. They are that:

(1) Young people are citizens now, not merely preparing for citizenship;
(2) As citizens, adolescents can contribute significantly to the welfare of their communities;
(3) As adolescents, they benefit from the opportunity to participate as citizens;
(4) Schools can and should facilitate youth participation in community affairs (though too often the pressures for organizational order—keeping track of and supervising large numbers of pupils in ever-larger buildings—inhibit such civic involvement).

From the above assumptions our primary recommendation emanates:

(5) Youth participation should be a central ingredient in the process of citizenship education.

This chapter draws out the implications of the above ideas by describing a variety of ways in which students are already involved in citizen action and how schools are working such projects into their educational programs.

Youth participation as one ingredient in citizenship education makes both theoretical and practical sense.[1] While it would be personally entertaining and possibly even edifying to present a comprehensive rationale, we do not do so in this chapter. Partly that is because we were not asked to address that task, but more fundamentally because we view education as inescapably a mixture of theory and practice in which (1) even the most carefully constructed rationale is incomplete and may be misapplied (and probably won't be "heard") unless its practical implications are spelled out, and (2) it is not inherently obvious that abstraction must necessarily precede experience, and questionable whether an adequate theory can be constructed other than out of practice. A further problem in developing and using educational rationales is that the central questions are not reducible to fundamental truths. Each element involves unverified hypotheses, value judgments, reference to one authority versus another, and so on. What we are then left with are more or less persuasive and logically consistent polemics—and this is true whether the writers are of the genius and stature of Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, or Bruner, or holders of more pedestrian abilities and credentials, such as ourselves. We have thus chosen to make our case as much by example as by philosophy, and make only feeble attempts to mask the nagging polemicism which creeps into our discourse from time to time. In fairness we should add, however, that we are not unmoved by the formidable challenge presented by Newmann in the opening chapter, and we have tried to clarify where we stand on the issues which he raises to the end that our position appears at least reasonable, while still being incomplete and falling short of unquestionable, eternal truth.

---

[1] That these are not the same is a commentary on both.

Citizenship and Community

Eschewing philosophical sophistication is no excuse for fuzziness, particularly in giving some indication of the kind of "citizens" which we believe schools should be encouraging—and educating—students to be. For some peculiar reason, the idea of citizenship, and citizenship education, is nearly always associated with social studies generally, and with the process of government particularly. Yet when most people think of the "good citizen," they do not only think of the person who knows and cares about politics and government, the person who votes regularly, who can tell you which state has a unicameral legislature, or who can unhesitantly and unerringly distinguish between separation and division of powers. The image which arises is of the person who acts decently, who knows and cares about the affairs of his or her community, and who demonstrates this concern through overt actions.

Such a notion is often dismissed as the quaintly naive idea of the "man-in-the-street," as if this automatically disqualifies it as a guide to educational practice. Yet, while lacking operational concreteness, it has a respected place in democratic theory, being reflected, for example, in the conception of the "good citizen" described by T. V. Smith and Eduard C. Lindeman (1958) in their classic, *The Democratic Way of Life*. It is the notion of citizenship as "membership," implying a recognition of mutual interest with all other community members, a sense of shared concern for the welfare of the total community, and a willingness and ability to contribute to the well-being of that community.[3]

---

[3] Lest we later be accused of the ploy of slipping in a peculiar definition of terms in the form of a rather innocuous-appearing statement, we should point out that we are deliberately not limiting our conception of democratic citizenship to: (1) a legally prescribed set of rights and duties; or (2) the performance of clearly defined "political"

To focus on citizenship as an active endeavor, where the test of excellence is more in what the person does in his community than what she or he knows about it, does not restrict one to a parochial conception of community. John Dewey (1916), in *Democracy and Education*, argued that the strength of a democracy lies in the sense of shared concern which is held by the members of all its communities, the recognition of overlapping interests, the awareness that one's welfare is inextricably entwined with that of a wide range of others. Especially as we enter the era of the global society, it can be argued that the concern of each of us must expand from the egocentrism of the child to the inclusive vision of the world citizen.

This broadening of concern must begin somewhere, and, as we will argue later in this chapter, getting students out of the adolescent island of the school and involved with businesspersons, politicians, small children, the aged, and the handicapped is to begin in very concrete ways to widen their perspective of the variety of persons with whom their own welfare and responsibility are linked. As with other attitude changes, the vision arises more clearly from experience than persuasion, and is expounded more eloquently in action than in words.

Youth Participation

Since our purpose is to make a case for youth participation as a central element in this wider conception of citizenship education, another definition is in order. By *youth participation*, we mean the direct involvement of adolescents in the life of the community, ideally in activities concerned with ameliorating or solving social issues and problems. The goal is to not just *talk* about public issues, but to *do* something about them. Because youth participation can take so many forms, it is difficult—and probably of limited value—to define it more precisely. However, there are some criteria by which we may be able to assess the relevance of participatory programs for citizenship education, the central one being that they should supply the conditions for the growth of democratic values *and* an orientation and commitment to act upon those values. Such conditions include, at a minimum:

1. ***Performing tasks that both the students and the community think are worthwhile.*** Since youth's major contribution lies in performing tasks which, while needed and desired, are not high on the list of services for which society is willing to pay, it is crucial that the young people have shared power in defining worthwhile tasks. Happily, it is not

---

acts, such as voting or attending party caucuses; and (3) most importantly, we are not arguing out of the "if the shoe pinches" notion of democracy, which tends to elevate selfishness to a virtue, implying that the interests of society are best promoted when each individual works diligently and skillfully for his or her personal well-being.

difficult to identify mutually agreed upon community needs. For example, students have provided free day-care for low-income families; helped elderly people remain in their own homes and apartments by assisting them with such chores as snow shovelling, or shopping; and given presentations on sexual assault (and how to protect oneself) to thousands of girls and women.

2. ***Having others depend on one's actions.*** The opportunity to make decisions that have real consequences for other people as well as oneself is an experience often denied to teenagers. For example, contrast the difference between a student skipping a social studies lecture, on the one hand, and not showing up for his volunteer assignment at an institution for retarded children on their field trip day, on the other. In the first case, only the student himself sustains any consequences. However, in the second case, the student's decision affects: (a) the children, who are both denied an opportunity to learn and explore, as well as perhaps the loss of trust in a new friend; (b) the staff of the institution, which must make adjustments to accommodate an absent volunteer; and (c) fellow high school students, who may be later excluded from this facility as volunteers because of this student's unreliability. It is this experience of real, and often serious, consequences for other people that is the hallmark of a good youth participation project.

3. ***Working on tasks that challenge and strengthen one's thinking—cognitively and ethically.*** One important idea in developmental psychology is that both intellectual and moral growth occur only when one stretches beyond the range of one's previous knowledge and performance. Only when one discovers the inadequacy of one's problem-solving capacities through exposure to new intellectual challenges and new social roles does one seek better ways of organizing previous experience and action. Because the roles that teenagers play have been restricted almost entirely to that of student, it is not difficult to identify challenging, novel social roles for youth to try out, such as peer counselor, legislative intern, tutor, or pollution watcher. But not any experience will do. One that matches the student's intellectual, emotional, and ethical levels is needed to yield the maximum educational value. An experience that demands skills too far above the student's current functioning will be discouraging; one too far below will be boring. However, attempts to both think about and implement the "matching" problem are still in their infancy (Graham, 1976).

4. ***Having some responsibility to make decisions within their projects or placements.*** Such responsibilities serve several purposes:

a. They increase the likelihood that the students will be truly engaged and involved in their community activity. Merely following instructions or observing someone else's decision-making ability is insufficient to maintain student interest for very long.

b. Since the ability to make responsible, reasonable, and adequate decisions is perhaps the single most important skill in adult life, students need practice doing so within semi-protected settings in the company of adults who can offer guidance, support, and technical advice. Youth participation can provide for several levels of such decision-making. Making decisions should start immediately, and the student who opts for youth participation should have a range of projects from which to choose. For the student working within a social agency, governmental, or business office, allowing the young person to make some day-to-day decisions, such as how to deal with a 4-year-old who refuses to leave the student volunteer's side, as well as attending staff planning meetings, would partially fulfill this component of a "good" youth participation project. In projects initiated and operated by students, there is ample room for student responsibility, including the chance to learn from projects that fail.

5. ***Systematically reflecting on the experience.*** In our view of youth participation, action is not separated from thinking. Rather, thinking in the forms of careful observation, perceptive questioning, and synthesizing the immediate experience with accumulated knowledge is a prerequisite for effective citizen action. This point is developed more fully in the section Learning Requires Action.

Youth participation activities which meet these conditions include volunteer service, internships, social and political action, community studies, and students' projects to improve the school or community.[3]

Youth Participation as a Method of Citizenship Education

Our belief that youth participation should be a major component of citizenship education grows out of these four observations:

1. Adolescents are citizens now, not merely preparing for citizenship;
2. Society needs the participation of youth;
3. Youth need to participate;
4. Learning requires action.

Adolescents' Current Status as Citizens

In the past decade, the general social movement to grant more power to powerless persons has found a new frontier, America's children and youth. Buttressing the moral position of youth rights advocates has been the growing body of knowledge from the academic disciplines about the capacities for rationality and judgment even in young children. Indicators of the success of the movement have been the dramatic changes in the legal status of youth, including the extension of the right to vote to 18-year-olds in 1971; the Gault decision in

---

[3] These guidelines are similar to those suggested by the National Commission on Resources for Youth (1974, pp. 226–230).

1967, which guaranteed due process to children in juvenile courts; and the Supreme Court decisions in relation to the public schools which (a) guarantee free expression of opinion to students (*Tinker* vs. *Des Moines Independent School District*, 1969) and (b) hold that students in secondary schools may not be suspended without a hearing (*Sullivan* vs. *Houston Independent School District*, 1969) (Hauchbrich & Apple, 1975).

These new legal rights represent only the tip of the iceberg in the far-reaching movement toward granting more citizen privileges to youth. Recommendations for changes come from directions as diverse as the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee (1974), the student rights statements written by teenagers around the country, and social critics such as John Holt (1974) and Paul Goodman (Adams et al., 1971, pp. 1–8). These studies, reports, and statements have called for major revisions in our present laws and practices with respect to youth in several areas: finances (age should not bar a person from retaining and using one's own money or making valid purchases and contracts); work and employment (the Coleman panel recommended that there be a dual minimum wage to encourage employers to hire inexperienced students); medical care (adolescents should be able to seek medical or psychiatric care on their own); and legal assistance (adolescents should have access to legal services on a confidential basis to discuss their personal grievances).

Taken together, these changes and recommendations for change in the legal and social position of adolescents constitute an emerging view of the adolescent as a citizen with concomitant rights *and* obligations. It is noteworthy, and disturbing, that the main thrust of the discussions about the changing position of youth have focused almost entirely on their *rights* and on the obligations and responsibilities that adults have *toward* youth. We—both youth and adults—have disregarded the fact that adolescents, as citizens, have obligations to their parents, their community, their government, and their society. Adolescence is not a moratorium in the exercising of social responsibility, in which a person is absolved from having to lift a finger to help others or to contribute to the betterment of the society. The next sections of the chapter discuss how youth's obligation to their society is compatible with their psychological and learning needs as well as with community needs.

Society Needs the Participation of Youth

America is increasingly becoming a nation of segregated subpopulations, separated less by geography than by social characteristics. Walter Cronkite, Sears, Roebuck & Co., and McDonald's have homogenized our speech, dress, and taste to where it is hard to know who one is—or where. But this very sameness has been countered by finding other ways to distinguish or isolate people from each other. The old standards of race and income have been joined by new discriminators such as marital status, physical and mental condition, and age. To racial and economic ghettoes have been added singles' bars, facilities for the handicapped, senior citizen high-rises, and schools as places where people are supposed to mingle with their own kind and pursue their separate identities.

It is this sense of separateness that has spawned what seems to be a national movement toward what Peter Marin (1975, p. 45) has labeled the "deification of the self." Books ring out with titles such as *Power! How to Get It. How to Use It* (Korda, 1975) and *Winning Through Intimidation* (Ringer, 1974), offering themselves as survival guides to a society that pits each of us against all the rest. New therapies, such as EST (Erhard Seminars Training), exhort their participants to realize that each person is all powerful and thus (solely) responsible for her or his own fate, and that those who are poor, hungry, or powerless must have consciously chosen that fate.[4] Even the so-called "humanistic" therapies have turned inward in a veritable orgy of self-absorption and exploration leading us on to private nirvanas. To quote Peter Marin (1975) again, the underlying message in all of this is that "We are in our proper place; the others are in theirs; we may indeed bemoan their fate or even, if we are so moved, do something to change it, but in essence it has nothing to do with us." And further, "What disappears in this view of things is the ground of community, the felt sense of collective responsibility for the fate of each separate other [p. 48]."

Separateness, selfishness, and narcissism, masquerading as enlightenment and liberation, should alarm those of us who are concerned with citizenship education. The health of a democracy is dependent on the capacity of its citizens to recognize their shared concerns, to consider moral complexity, to accept responsibility for the fate of others, and to be willing to confront and alter injustices—whether their own or someone else's. While youth participation will not alone reverse this trend toward the denial of human reciprocity and community, it can, at the very least, serve as a first step toward counteracting the overemphasis on the self.

To spell out all the causes and costs of "separateness" would require another chapter (and other authors), but one particular form is of special relevance here—the segregation of youth from adults. "Generation gap" and "youth culture" have become household words, with an array of movies, books, and TV specials illustrating how the exclusion of the young from the adult community has been countered by the former in a life style that, in turn, excludes adults, in a sparring match that sometimes looks a little like a war.

---

[4] California school children have been trained in EST under a Federal grant; see Mark Brewer (1975, p. 35).

Most of the attention has been focused on the immediate effects of the conflict, effects ranging from lack of communication to delinquency. More recently, commentators have been counting the longer-run costs of such separation, costs which must ultimately be paid by any society which inadequately prepares its youth for adulthood. In the past three or four years, an array of studies and reports from government agencies, foundations, university departments, and school organizations have bemoaned this separation, and passionately and convincingly urged that youth be reinstated into the whole community, encouraged to interact with a wider range of people, involved in more real and meaningful tasks, and afforded more responsibility—in short, that they be allowed to act as citizens in the deepest sense of that term.[5]

For social studies educators and school administrators to ignore this challenge or even to respond with nothing more than colorful and up-to-date curricular materials and classroom methods is to misread the seriousness of the situation and to neglect a responsibility. Schools are where kids are, and inescapably it is from somewhere in those schools that they must be encouraged to participate in the broader life of the community, to both practice and to act on their citizenship. To the degree that social studies teachers have a responsibility for developing citizens, they should at least be joining, if not leading, in this endeavor.

But even to count the benefits of youth participation in such terms as better communication, less vandalism, and more adequately prepared citizens is still to miss a critical point of the argument for such programs. The same TV documentary that portrays the evil of "wasted youth" may include a further litany of pressing social problems without ever noting the obvious link between them. The link is that youth are not just a resource to be developed for the future, but are, right now, a resource to be enlisted in the fight for a better society. Throughout this chapter, we cite dozens of examples of youth making an impact on their communities. We will not add to the list here, but suggest the need to revise the typical view of schools as isolated centers of learning. Instead, they should be seen as fully participating *community* institutions, as centers to which students not only come to learn, but from which they go out into the community to use what they have learned, to add their strength, talents, and energy to those of others tackling society's problems. Imagine a rather typical high school of about 1,400 students. If each of those students averaged only one hour a week in service to the community during a school year, that community would receive the benefit of over 50,000 hours of student effort. Add in younger students, and multiply this across the country, and a new meaning is added to the notion that "America's greatest untapped resource is its youth."

---

[5] See National Association of Secondary School Principals (1972), Weinstock (1973), National Panel on High Schools and Adolescent Education (1975), National Commission on the Reform of Secondary Education (1973), Center for Youth Development and Research (1973), and Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee (1973).

Youth Need to Participate

A. Psychological Needs of Adolescents

A small girl enters the kitchen where her mother and father are busily preparing for guests. She brightly asks how she can help and is politely told that her greatest contribution would be to play quietly and stay out of the way. This little vignette from everyone's childhood is repeated over and over again in our societal treatment of adolescents.

Along with the emergence of prolonged adolescence and extended schooling has come the notion that this stage of life is a "holding period," an interval during which youth are expected to stay out of the way, observe but not participate in adult life, and, most of all, enjoy themselves and stay out of trouble. There is something wrong with our socialization process when adolescence, the stage of life when energy and sometimes even idealism are highest, has become a time when waiting is the central task. This is damaging to both the community and to the adolescent. The community is denied the contribution that youth can make, and the adolescent is denied the satisfaction which comes from making a contribution. While everyone wants to feel she or he makes a difference, this wish is particularly strong during adolescence.

The need for self-importance and the need to make a significant contribution to the environment in which one lives are the dominant psychological needs of adolescents. John Mitchell (1975), in a useful book on the topic, warns us that these needs can only be fulfilled through doing important work. It is not enough to *tell* young people they are important. Neither receiving "warm fuzzies" nor being the target of a "strength bombardment" will substitute for building, working, and creating tangible products thought important by the adolescent and his close associates. In the absence of important contribution, the adolescent invents habits and pastimes which ensure that both his teenage and adult years will be impoverished and non-productive. Meaningless ritual, exaggerated concern with popularity, trivial social relationships, second-rate cynicism, and psychological apathy are some of the consequences of denying young people the right to involve themselves in the essential work of the society. The implications of this view of adolescent development for citizenship education are clear. Because the full and healthy development of adolescents requires that they be engaged in constructive work and make positive contributions, the opportunities for civic involvement must not be viewed as a nice "extra" but as a necessity for all students.

B. Implications of Developmental Theory

An equally persuasive and systematic argument for youth participation can be derived from the theories of cognitive developmental psychology, as grounded in the educational philosophy of John Dewey and spelled out by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. The key concepts (and they are only superficially summarized here) are that human beings move through distinct stages of social and cognitive development. Each stage is a unique way of interpreting experience and understanding the world. Whether or not growth and development occur from stage to stage depends on the quality of interaction with the environment. The crucial point is that growth does not occur automatically. Instead, a person needs a series of significant interactions with the environment to promote movement to higher stages of development.

The developmentalist would not argue that learning through direct experience alone is sufficient to achieve developmental growth. While experience is often a good teacher, it is not automatically so, as both our individual and collective histories so painfully demonstrate. We have all met a person who tells us pompously that his judgment is superior because he has been in the "business" for 25 years. But does he mean 25 years or 1 year times 25?

From a developmental standpoint, learning includes two basic spheres of activity: (1) *significant experience*, in interaction with (2) *careful reflection*. Merely providing students with lectures, readings, and/or exhortations about citizenship will accomplish little. Some of the most recent findings of the survey on citizenship of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (1976, pp. 25–26) bear this out. Though we could reasonably assume that students were given accurate information about the following content areas through their social studies curriculum, one-half of both 13- and 17-year-olds thought that the President can appoint members of Congress; 12 percent of 13-year-olds and 14 percent of 17-year-olds believed the President is not required to obey the law; only 53 percent of the 17-year-olds and 31 percent of the 13-year-olds knew that each state had two senators in the United States Senate; and half of the 13-year-olds thought it is against the law to start a new political party!

In summary, the practical implication of developmental psychology for citizenship education is that there is a need to provide students with new, stimulating, and challenging experiences, with the opportunity for significant social role-taking (the process of taking the perspective of another), combined with careful reflection. The failure to do this may result in the cessation of a person's psychological—intellectual, ethical, personal—growth.

Learning Requires Action

We can well imagine that a teacher or administrator could have read to this point, and even agreed with much of what has been said, without being moved to abandon his or her citizenship curriculum and replace it with a youth participation program. Putting aside the question of the writers' ability to communicate and persuade, the reader may reasonably wonder: (1) whether a participatory citizenship program might not neglect many important facets of social studies' learning, and (2) whether participation/experience is really a very effective way to learn.

The first question is relatively easy to answer. While we strongly advocate that community participation be included in the repertoire of methods in citizenship education, we are not suggesting that it replace other approaches. Neither do we see it as a clear and infallible guide to specific content. An experience-based learning model, one that requires students to pursue and apply their knowledge and skills through very real and significant action, is compatible with and should enhance the other emphases in the field, such as critical thinking, moral reasoning, the social science disciplines, law, structure of government, and social problems. Knowledge of the specific content of the Bill of Rights, for example, may best be learned through memorization. The application of this knowledge, and even its retention, may require more engaging activity, such as surveying community attitudes toward constitutional rights or assisting a lawyer in a civil liberties case.

To answer the second question on the effectiveness of experiential learning, we must at least raise the matter of different modes or processes of learning. Olson and Bruner (1974), in an insightful article, suggested that humans have available to them three different modes of learning. They learn through contingent experience, through observation of models, and through symbolic systems. More actively stated, these are learning by doing, by looking, and by being told. One of their major points is that while there are nearly always some differences in the modes, they "converge as to the knowledge they specify, but they diverge as to the skills they develop" (Olson & Bruner, 1974, p. 132).

There are common pieces of information about a legislative body, for example, that can be learned either through verbal and written symbols, or through direct observation and experience. The skills used to extract the information, however, are radically different. Thus, an educator must be concerned not only with the knowledge he or she wishes to convey, but by "the mental skills that are developed in the course of acquiring the knowledge" (Bruner & Olson, 1974, p. 149).

While we cannot do justice to the complexity of this idea here, we do want to suggest at least one implication. Schools, especially secondary schools (and, even more particularly, social studies courses), have placed enormous emphasis on learning through symbolic systems. How successful we have been is open to question. But even if we grant some "success," the schools clearly have fallen short in helping students develop their observational and experiential patterns of learning. They may be able to read a book and to comprehend a lecture, but how capable are they of reading and comprehending their own experiences—the skills they will be called on to use most often in their adult lives? Thus, to urge more youth participation is not just to make a plea for more satisfying educational experiences, or even for more adequately trained citizens. It is to take a stand on the question of the fundamental skills which our students must have for thinking about and dealing with their world.[6]

In addition to developing the skills of learning from contingent experiences, the experienced-based learning model can also enhance more familiar classroom approaches. First, the opportunity to do something significant with and about what is taught in the classroom has the effect of increasing the students' *motivation*, as they begin to see the connection between what they learn in school and experience in the world, and feel the tension created by their own personal investment in the outcome. For example, we have had students sit with rapt attention while we read the state regulations on nursing home standards. They listened because they were angry about the treatment given to the elderly in the facility in which they volunteered. Their motivation to learn the state regulations came from their personal relationship to the problem, their felt need for the information, and their serious intent to apply what they learned.

Secondly, youth participation programs involve the students in *gathering original data* and in *reality testing* both their own conclusions and those presented in the classroom or text. For example, a student interning in a city attorney's office discovered a clear pattern in traffic court decisions, leading her to the conclusion that there were "guilty judges" and "innocent judges," a finding which challenged the textbook's version of the dispassionate and even-handed rule of law.

Her discovery suggests, thirdly, that students in youth participation programs can gain practical experience in the difficult task of learning to *generalize* from particular instances to general principles, and to *transfer* this learning to new situations—in this case, she used her handy bit of knowledge in debates on the criminal justice system. Furthermore, youth participation programs engage students in *critical thinking* and *moral deliberation* as they consider such issues as whether to challenge a policy about the treatment of children in an institution for the retarded. One of our students was shocked when children who misbehaved were put in a dark closet, euphemistically known as the "quiet room." She had to decide whether this was a defensible practice, and then weigh the consequences (to herself and others) of challenging this policy against keeping quiet in order to maintain her volunteer role. She had to look at whether it was more important to speak out against inhumane treatment of people, regardless of their IQ, or be considered a misinformed and "troublesome" volunteer. In such cases it is clear that students will also receive personally meaningful *feedback* as to the correctness of their assessments and the consequences of their decisions.

---

[6] Elsewhere we have made a beginning attempt to sketch out how skills in learning from experience may be developed (Conrad and Hedin, 1976).

The underlying central claim is that active participation engages the student in the *application* of what he or she knows, believes, and can do. When students act on their concern for the environment, use their knowledge of chemistry to check for pollution in a stream, apply their knowledge of the political-legal system to finding ways to halt the pollution, or combine their knowledge of the facts of the case with their ability to communicate them to others, they are engaged in the acid test of all learning—that it can be applied effectively in making a positive difference in the world.

We as educators are not more inclined than anyone else to apply what we know or teach. As Exhibit A, consider the principle we all learned in "Economics I," called the law of diminishing returns (page 24 in our edition of Samuelson, 1964). A reasonable translation of this principle is that successive applications of similar material by similar methods in similar settings (by similar people?) will have progressively less impact on the students and may even reach the "point of negative returns." Contrasting the wide-eyed enthusiasm of first graders to the glazed-eye boredom of twelfth graders gives painful and compelling evidence of the decreased power of the classroom experience. By the time a person is a senior in high school, he or she has already sat through more than 12,000 rather similar hours of classroom instruction and become immune to the method and weary of its setting. It is little wonder that a new course in, or a slight alteration of, the citizenship curriculum does not substantially affect student knowledge, attitudes, or actions.

Despite the daily reminders that we are faced with the impossible task of entertaining a hostile audience for 13 years of their lives, we somehow hold on to our faith in classroom instruction. We would do well to consider Arthur Schlesinger's (1975) gentle admonition to educators:

> We alone know how limited and marginal our impact generally is on the boys and girls, the young men and young women, delivered by their families to our passing and inevitably superficial care. We do the best we can, but we do not have it within our power to repair all the inadequacies of the family, the church, the marketplace, the media, and other social institutions, although they have it within their power to blame us for not doing so [p. 179].

Our modest suggestion is that a qualitatively different method, such as youth participation, is more likely to engage and motivate the student than will another dose of classroom instruction.[7] Youth participation is no more a panacea than any other single method, but, for most young people, community involvement activities in any of its forms—teaching first aid to young children, lobbying at city hall, or painting the home of a poor family—is at the least a new experience. Partly because of this novelty and accompanying challenge, such experiences are usually found by students to be satisfying and enjoyable. This is not a trivial outcome. We are all inclined to repeat satisfying experiences, and, if the experience of citizenship education can be that (and hopefully some of the other things we have suggested as well), we may have come very close to achieving our goal.

With this we reluctantly close our theoretical case for citizenship education through youth participation. We have said more than we intended (and less than we could), but we did want to respond to Newmann's thoughtful plea for more comprehensive rationales. To the degree that we have couched our arguments in unorthodox terms and categories, we did so not to avoid the fundamental questions he raises, but to approach them freshly, in the spirit, if not the letter, of his charge. The rest of the chapter is devoted to descriptions and illustrations of the kinds of things young people have done as active citizens. Perhaps this is no less a rationale than what has preceded.

Forms of Youth Citizenship Participation

Like most educational "innovations," youth participation has developed more out of practice than from philosophy. Here and there across the country individual teachers, administrators, students, and parents have initiated programs to meet their own interests, objectives, and needs—and those of their community. One consequence is that the programs do not fall into neat categories. Some are for credit, others are not. Some are attached to particular disciplines or subject areas, others are not. Some include a significant classroom component, others do not. Similar forms of student action may be a means to quite different objectives. Strikingly different student actions may be a means to quite similar objectives. While this creates problems for people who thrive on neat categories—such as academicians and writers of articles—it is likely of little consequence to anyone else. As long as the proponents have a sense of what they are after and a reasonable plan for getting there, where the program fits into a classification scheme is incidental.

---

[7] Just as importantly, it is more likely to engage and motivate the teachers as well.

We have chosen to categorize our examples by the general nature of the student action described. The "typologies" are not meant to be taken with great seriousness, as the categories unavoidably overlap and programs could reasonably be placed in more than one section. The purpose is mainly to arrange the examples into a more comprehensible pattern than a completely undifferentiated listing of individual programs would afford. The criteria we have used for selection is that (1) we have some firsthand knowledge of the program, and (2) each is a reasonable illustration of how students are *acting* as good citizens to the benefit of the community and themselves.[8]

Social/Political Action

The most obviously relevant category of participatory citizenship education is this one, which includes programs focused on student efforts to influence public decision-making. The most common form of such action is for students to become involved in political campaigns, to attend caucuses and political meetings, and to join party and candidate organizations—usually on the urging of their social studies teacher. While we applaud such participation, and unashamedly urge our own students to engage in such activities, we do not do so with any illusion that they are particularly potent forms of citizenship education. Most political meetings are boring and rather meaningless. Most campaign jobs are tedious and trivial, with young volunteers getting the worst of a poor lot. Many of the incentives which attract adult activists (personal or organizational obligation, habit, desire to be with friends, or vested interest in an issue or candidate) do not operate for youthful participants. And while campaign work may give some students a clearer picture of the tedium of political life and may generate a long-run political interest in others, it seldom brings them close to the real mechanisms of public policy-making or gives them either skills or experience in influencing community decisions. For these, a different level of involvement is required—and not so easily arranged.

One way for students to perform a more potent political role is to join an active citizen organization. Minnesota has a rather effective Public Interest Research Group which depends on student involvement and regularly assigns high school students tasks of considerable responsibility in investigating pollution, consumer fraud and safety, and the like. Another avenue is for students to work directly with state legislators or city councilpersons or to form their own research and lobby groups around a particular issue. The authors worked with one such group of students who lobbied intensively for the 18-year-old civil rights bill and who later, when it became clear the bill would pass both houses with or without their further involvement, combined their knowledge of the legislation with their sensitivity to student concerns to produce a pamphlet explaining the new law to other students. The Governor saw the pamphlet and liked it so much he ordered 80,000 copies to be printed and distributed statewide.

---

[8] For a wider selection of more complete program descriptions, see Conrad and Hedin (1975), National Association of Secondary School Principals (1975), National Commission on Resources for Youth (1974), and all issues of *Synergist*, published by the National Student Volunteer Program of Action.

Serving as representatives of their own constituency, youth, is another way for students to become involved in the political world. There are many examples of youth serving on local governmental committees and commissions, though the success of such involvements has been mixed. The example with which we began our chapter about the two students who are elected representatives from their high school to a city-wide Committee on Youth Affairs in St. Paul does illustrate that such involvements can be vehicles for exerting influence over issues that relate to their age group, such as teenage employment and recreation, and for gaining the skills and confidence to take action in public affairs.

But most political action takes place closer to home. In the St. Paul Open School, students operate a Consumer Action Service. Students receive complaints from parents, teachers, other students, and the general community about various consumer problems and attempt to find redress for the injured party. So far, they have handled more than 50 cases in two years and have successfully resolved about 80 per cent of them. The cases have ranged from a student who thought he should get a refund from a movie theatre which advertised quadraphonic sound when it only had a single speaker, to the parent of an Open School student who believed her landlord owed her a large sum of money for extensive damages caused by a leaking pipe. The students have even opened a booth in the downtown shopping area to solicit consumer complaints from all over the city. In another form of political activity, students in the New City School in St. Paul can participate in a Public Service Video class. They learn to use television as an instrument of social influence through such means as producing documentaries of local problems.

Finally, experience in influencing policy can sometimes be gained within the school system itself. Innumerable examples exist of students using their influence to eliminate dress codes, alter suspension policies, create smoking lounges, and the like.

While it is possible to generate a respectable list of examples of young people exerting political influence, it is still a relatively rare phenomenon. There are many reasons for this, the most critical of which are: (1) most students are not very "political"; (2) they (often realistically) have little confidence that their actions could be consequential; and (3) they lack the skill to mobilize what power they actually have.

It is part of the contention of this chapter that it is through the less obviously "political" actions such as volunteer service and community projects that students may be most likely to develop a concern for serious social problems and to build a sense of confidence that their actions can make a difference. As for skills, there is not much available in schools that realistically prepares students for effective political action should they have the concern and confidence to try. One hopeful approach has been outlined by Fred Newmann in *Education for Citizen Action* (1975) and further elaborated in *Skills in Citizen Action: An English-Social Studies Program for Secondary Schools* by Fred Newmann, Thomas Bertocci and Ruthanne Landsness (1977).

Community Projects

The kind of student projects we include in this category fall somewhere between the social/political action above and the agency volunteer work that follows. They are volunteer work, but not with an agency; they include social action, but action directed more toward ameliorating a particular need than toward influencing public or institutional policy. In large part, they are projects which have been initiated, organized, and staffed by high school students with minimal assistance from adults and with little or no connection with ongoing community organizations. One of the strong merits of such projects is that they provide the experience of organizing and participating in group efforts toward common goals—a critical skill for citizens in this, or any, society.

Teenage Health Consultants is an organization initiated and run by high school and college-age people in the Twin Cities area. It began with young people who were involved with local teen health clinics and who were dissatisfied with the kind of health care and education available to other youth. Of particular concern was the absence of accessible and accurate information on sexuality. The response was to train cadres of students to be health consultants to their peers. Students first participate in an 18-session training course. They then share their newly acquired knowledge by staffing health and counseling offices in schools; making presentations to school, church, and youth groups; developing educational materials; working in health clinics and youth hotlines; and, most importantly, doing what could be termed "leaning against the locker" consultation with peers.

In another project, a group of Westport, Massachusetts, junior high "science addicts" became concerned with their town's gluttonous consumption of energy. Not satisfied with merely talking about the problem, they helped a nature center cut its fuel consumption by 75 per cent by researching and installing a solarized heating plant in the Center's greenhouse. Another example of kids coming to the aid of their community occurred in a medium-sized Midwestern city. The city council was told that it needed a count of all the trees in the town in order to obtain federal assistance for control of Dutch elm disease. After being stymied for two years, the council was rescued by a veritable army of tree counters who completed the job in less than four weeks. Who were they? Citizens concerned about the welfare of their community, who happened also to be elementary and junior high school kids—trained and organized by students in a high school social studies course.

Not surprisingly, youth projects come in a variety of sizes and styles. Students manage and operate the only available recycling center in some communities; in other places they produce and distribute a community newspaper; in yet others they are building parks and using their talents to add a touch of artistry to their neighborhood; industrial arts students redecorate and perform minor repairs in the homes of low-income, elderly residents; home economics students provide meals for elderly residents near the school and run a shopping service for others; students in science have advised their city government on where a bicycle trail can be laid through a marsh with minimal disturbance to local ecology—and on, and on, and on.

Volunteer Service

Often the best way to begin a youth participation program is by placing students as volunteers in social service agencies. Here the needs are already identified, supervision and expert guidance is on the scene, and, most importantly, students are genuinely needed and thus assigned significant and responsible tasks. In such settings, the value of their contribution is clearly recognized both by the students and their new adult associates.

In Hopkins, Minnesota, an old industrial town in the Minneapolis area, the 12th grade social studies course begins with a Community Involvement Fair. Representatives from some thirty community agencies sit at tables in the streamer-bedecked library explaining to students the needs of their agency and how the students can help, and arranging mutually satisfactory volunteer commitments. Each fall, between 80 and 90 per cent of the seniors choose to make such a commitment as part of their social studies course, and some 350 16- to 18-year-olds are thus added to the pool of people working to improve life for others in that community. In commitments ranging roughly from two to 20 hours a week, students volunteer in nursing homes, elementary schools, day-care centers, the Red Cross, schools for mentally and physically handicapped children, and in many other comparable places.

What the students actually do in these placements varies widely. In a nursing home, for example, some may primarily provide companionship; others may help feed those who need such help, organize a recreation program, conduct daily physical exercises, help decorate rooms, and much more. In the other agencies, a similar variety of activities takes place, with students matching their energy, skills, and imagination with the needs of the agency and the people served by it. That students are valued by the agencies is made clear through the tasks assigned them and by comments such as one made recently (to one of the authors) by an agency director: "I sent my staff a memo asking who needed volunteer help and got almost no response and was puzzled until I noticed that I had failed to mention the volunteers would be from Eisenhower High School. The next day I was flooded with requests. Your kids have a good reputation here."

Such programs are being seen more and more often in Minnesota and elsewhere. In Robbinsdale, Minnesota, a social studies program which served as a model for the one described above sends more than 400 students into volunteer service each year. Two hundred junior and senior high school students in the Duluth Cathedral Community Commitment program contribute 600 hours of service each week to 2,000 people in 58 different agencies. At Regina High School in Minneapolis, service to the community has become the unifying theme for the entire school, and each department seeks ways to use what is taught in its classes to help others within and outside the school. In the Minneapolis Public Schools, a major project is underway to make youth participation an integral part of its secondary school program, across all grade levels and all subject matter areas. Volunteer service is the largest part of this program.

Perhaps it is a measure of the narcissistic cynicism of our day that volunteer service is self-righteously attacked as demeaning labor, recreation for the rich, the "band-aid" approach, "nice" but not very important, and as a way to divert energy from the really crucial issues of our day. What the detractors miss is that there are all too few examples of people reaching out to one another, acting on deep-felt concerns, admitting that we may owe something to others, helping others without expecting payment in return. Volunteerism has played a vital role in the history of American social welfare, is still the most common form of direct citizen involvement, and is the most common vehicle for youth participation in the general community. It can break down barriers between institutions and groups in the community; it can give students the experience of truly making a difference to someone; it puts students in positions of leadership and responsibility; and it involves them as active citizens, meeting significant community needs.

Community Study

By community study, we mean the application of social studies skills—such as conducting surveys and doing anthropological and historical research—to community needs. Again this type of participation can take several forms, of which we will illustrate three.

One common form is the survey of community attitudes. In one suburban community, the city council wanted to know how people were reacting to two recently completed public housing projects. In a rural community, the town council wanted to know how the people felt about six prominent community issues, and in what order of importance they would place them. In both cases, rather accurate surveys were taken by social studies students, and the results presented to the council. While we still are not awed by the value of learning survey research techniques, the students did learn something about this method and about community attitudes on particular issues. In the second example, the students' efforts had some influence on the council's policy-making.

Another form is the firsthand study of community institutions. In the Twin Cities, high school and college students are serving as monitors in community-based corrections facilities for juveniles. They receive training in participant observation and ethnographic research methods, and then live for several days in these group homes and treatment facilities. The young people are uniquely qualified in that they are close enough to the age of the residents to quickly become their confidants. The perspective of the young person is also valuable in assessing the appropriateness of the treatment program for youth. The data collected by the youth monitors are shared with corrections officials and the wider public to help make juvenile corrections programs humane and helpful. In many other places, less controversial on-site examinations of community agencies are conducted by students. For example, students learn about criminal justice in jails, courts, and attorneys' offices; about health in hospitals; about economics in banks and welfare offices; about city politics in council chambers and neighborhood action centers.

A third form has been spurred by the success and publicity attending the Foxfire project in Georgia. In large numbers of communities, young people are researching the history of their area, interviewing older citizens, and producing newspapers, pamphlets, and the like. In some, they are relearning the skills of the past, restoring old structures, rebuilding log cabins and sod houses, and in other ways helping the community reclaim and preserve its heritage—while themselves gaining a sense of pride and belonging in their own city or town.

Internships

Finally, something should be said about internships in which students may spend from a few hours a week for a quarter to full time for a year with an adult with artistic, occupational, or academic experience of interest to the student. At their best, internships are a way to get on the inside of an organization, to experience an occupation firsthand, to get an in-depth view of how community decisions are made, or to test clearly one's competence to fill an adult role. At their worst, they are exercises in tedium in which the student's "task" is to watch a boring bureaucrat attend lifelessly to trivial duties, where they (both the student and the bureaucrat) are never given an assignment they can care about or in which their own actions make any difference. For such an experience, the student might as well stay in school. Recently, a municipal functionary told one of the authors that he was reluctant to have a high school intern because the student would soon discover that a 14-year-old could more than adequately do the job for which he was paid $25,000 per year!

In Oregon, the state government has opened slots in virtually all its state offices, and in the past few years hundreds of Salem area students have had internships (or extended observations) with government officials as part of the Governmental Responsibility and Student Participation (GRASP) program. Students study the state government extensively in the classroom to give them an overall picture of the decision-making process and to help them see how "their" department's activities fit into a larger picture.

In Decatur, Georgia, government students, after a semester of study, observe the work of department heads in various city offices. They then undertake projects needed by these departments, such as a study of the cost of crime, a survey of rat infestation, or a history of the cemetery with predictions of future needs for burial space.

In these states and elsewhere, other students act as interns with mayors, prosecutors, judges, lawyers, newspaper editors, artists, businesspersons, welfare workers, and even school officials. The quality of these experiences varies so widely that it is difficult to make any valid generalizations about them except to say that their value depends on:

1. Identifying slots that have the potential for significant action by a high school student (Associating with a judge may be interesting for a while, but how often does he need the advice and counsel of a teenager in reaching a verdict?);
2. Finding adults who can recognize and actualize the potential in the placement (Are there real tasks in the organization that students can do?);
3. Locating sponsors who are willing to support and guide the student's learning, particularly if the student is primarily an observer;
4. Assigning only students who are independent and self-directed to internships. A senior in a Minneapolis high school said it best: "If you are going to get anything out of an internship in the county attorney's office, you have to see everything as a way to learn. If you are asked to file some documents, read them. If you are waiting for the attorneys, eavesdrop on conversations in the waiting room. And, most importantly, never stop asking questions."

Program Models

Good ideas in education are superfluous if they cannot be translated into actual school programs. Even if it is accepted that both the student and community will benefit from the direct participation of youth, and that there is a multitude of significant involvements for young people in the social and political arena, some may still doubt whether such programs can be incorporated into their school structure. Such skepticism is not unfounded. Those attempting to include experience-based learning in the curriculum will be faced with a myriad of obstacles—traditional beliefs concerning the caretaking role of the high school; presumed immaturity of the students; rigid curriculum requirements; problems of time, transportation, and liability; inflexible schedules; skeptical parents, staff, and students. Yet hundreds of high schools are offering community service and social action programs, so the problems are not insurmountable. There is not space in this chapter for a very comprehensive detailing of possible models, but we can give some indications of the range of ways in which many schools have attacked the structural problems.[9]

Volunteer Bureau

In this type of program, students volunteer for the intrinsic value of volunteering (and perhaps to break the tedium of the school day) and receive no academic credit for doing so. In some cases, the work is done during the student's unscheduled time—after school, or during a study hall, especially if it can be placed near lunch or at the end of the day. A coordinator, either on a full- or part-time basis, identifies and places students in involvement opportunities and follows up and reviews each student's work. Usually this is a school employee, but may be someone from a community organization such as a Voluntary Action Center or local service club.

Community Action Credit

In this second category, community experiences are not only facilitated and encouraged by the school, but are also accredited. Often, a community service credit is given for an established number of work hours. For example, 100 hours = 1 semester credit. This may or may not be used in lieu of some other credit, such as social studies or humanities. A common procedure is for a student to prepare a proposal outlining what he or she wants to do, for how long, for what purposes, and with what product (if any) to be produced in the end. This is reviewed by a faculty advisor or program coordinator. If approved, the student acts on the proposal in the time blocked out. For some, it may be one full school day a week; for others it may be after-school activities; and in some cases, students may be given from a month to a semester away from school to participate. In structure, this model is very similar to the various independent study options and Senior Semester programs available on most college and some high school campuses.

---

[9] For a more detailed account by the authors of this chapter, see Conrad and Hedin (1974, pp. 22–28).

Laboratory for an Existing Course

This kind of program has enabled many schools to introduce a community action component into their academic program with little or no immediate change in curriculum, school structure, or staff deployment. In this model, students in existing courses use either long-term community action or extended observation as a way to "reality test" course content, gather data and examples, and make use of what is learned in the class. Students may engage in the community activity during school hours or after school, depending on the student's schedule and agency need. This is often done in lieu of a more distasteful requirement, such as a research paper. Generally, the classroom teacher is responsible for helping students find appropriate off-campus experiences and for the general supervision of students. In some cases, one day a week is set aside specifically for talking about the involvement activities.

Community Involvement Course

This model represents an attempt to combine the strongest features of the previous two into a course which exists as an integral part of the school's academic program. Here the community experience forms the heart and is the central focus of the course, but it is combined with an ongoing classroom experience where the emphasis is on providing some information, skills, and generalizing principles to directly assist students in interpreting their experiences and operating more successfully in their placements. A typical example would be a one-semester social studies class meeting two hours each day. Students spend four days (8 hours) in the field and one day (2 hours) in class. The additional hours per day (for teacher and student) are gained by giving the student double social studies credit or an additional elective credit or by making the course multi-disciplinary. Here, the necessary time is directly built into both the teachers' and the students' schedules and lessens or eliminates the need for extra staff, students missing classes, and so forth.

Action Learning Centers

A fifth approach, a district-wide learning center, can allow for more specialized and varied community involvement programs than a single high school can usually offer. In this model, students from several high schools have the option of attending a learning center for a part of the day. Typically, a student might spend half-time for a semester at the center. There are several advantages to such an approach. First, it allows the teachers who have skills and experience with youth participation to work with students from all over the district. Secondly, it provides a mechanism for initiating action-learning without the dissension that changing the curriculum and the schedule might cause in some schools. It also increases the available pool of students for specialized offerings. An action learning center can afford to offer courses that a single school could not justify in terms of student demand. Obviously this is best suited for large school systems or a consortium of smaller ones.

Sequence of Courses and Experiences

This is the most ambitious model, which may explain its infrequent appearance in secondary schools. Where such models do exist, their goal is often directed toward the development of the skills, motivation, and competencies for effective social and political activism. This goal, according to the proponents of this approach, can only be accomplished over a considerable period of time and through an integrated sequence of classroom and community experiences. Usually, such a curriculum combines: (1) formal courses on such topics as social problems, communication, politics, values, and ecology; (2) community-oriented assignments in these courses; and (3) a practicum experience, providing for sustained participation in a community project.

Concluding Note

We make no claim to having discovered a new approach to citizenship education. That adolescents should learn, and perhaps "earn," their citizenship through productive effort in the community is still the norm in most of the world. It was not that long ago in our country that teenagers were *counted on* to fill significant roles. That someone would have felt compelled to deliberately promote this idea would have seemed insane a century ago!

But industrialization changed many things, among them the roles of youth and the means by which they are trained to be productive adult citizens. By the turn of the century, progressive educators such as John Dewey were already citing the need for more significant tasks for youth. In the 1930s, the emphasis was on society's need for the contribution of young people, and educators such as George Counts (1932) were even asking *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* In the early 1950s, there was another "reincarnation" of the idea of youth participation in the form of Columbia's large, but short-lived, Citizenship Education Project. It is now the 1970s, and we offer this chapter as evidence that good educational ideas never die. They are just rediscovered every twenty years.

REFERENCES

Adams, P., Berg. L., Berger, N., Goodman, P., Michael, D., Neill, A. S., & Ollendorff, R. *Children's rights: Toward the liberation of the child.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

Brewer, M. We're gonna tear you down and put you back together. *Psychology Today*, 1975 (August), 35–45.

Center for Youth Development and Research, University of Minnesota. Requirements for healthy development of adolescent youth. *Adolescence*, 1973, *8*, 291–316.

Conrad, D. & Hedin, D. Some action learning models. *National Association of Secondary School Principals Bulletin*, 1974, *58* (385), 22–28.

Conrad, D. & Hedin, D. *Action learning in Minnesota.* St. Paul: Minnesota Association of Secondary School Principals, 1975.

Conrad, D. & Hedin, D. How to learn from nonclassroom experiences. *Synergist, 5* (3), 1976, 20–23.

Counts, G. *Dare the schools build a new social order?* (2nd ed.) New York: Arno Press, 1969.

Dewey, J. *Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education.* New York: Macmillan, 1916.

Graham, R. Youth and experiential learning. *National Society for the Study of Education Yearbook.* Part 1. *Youth.* 1975, 161–193.

Hauchbrich, V. & Apple, M. *Schooling and the rights of children.* Berkeley, Ca.: McCutchan, 1975.

Holt, J. *Escepe from childhood: The needs and rights of children.* New York: Dutton, 1974.

Korda, M. *Power! How to get it. How to use it.* New York: Random House, 1975.

Marin, P. The new narcissism. *Harper's*, 1975 (October), 45–51.

Mitchell, J. *The adolescent predicament.* Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975.

National Assessment of Educational Progress. *Education for citizenship: A bicentennial survey.* Citizenship/social studies Report No. 07-CS-01. Denver: NAEP, 1976 (November).

National Association of Secondary School Principals. *American youth in the mid-seventies.* Conference Report. Reston, Va.: NASSP, 1972.

National Association of Secondary School Principals. *25 action learning schools.* Reston, Va.: NASSP, 1975.

National Commission on the Reform of Secondary Education. *The reform of secondary education.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.

National Commission on Resources for Youth. *New roles for youth in the school and community.* New York: Citation Press, 1974.

National Panel on High School Education. *The education of adolescents: The final report and recommendations* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, No. (OE) 76-00004, 1976.

Newmann, F. *Education for citizen action: Challenge for secondary curriculum.* Berkeley, Ca.: McCutchan, 1975.

Newmann, F., Bertocci, T., Landsness, R. *Skills in citizen action: An English-social studies program for secondary schools.* Madison, Wis.: Citizen Participation Curriculum Project, University of Wisconsin, 1977.

Olson, D. & Bruner, J. Learning through experience and learning through media. *National Society for the Study of Education Yearbook.* Part 1. 1974, 125–150.

Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee. *Youth: Transition to adulthood.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Ringer, R. *Winning through intimidation.* Los Angeles: Los Angeles Book Pub. Co., 1974.

Samuelson, P. *Economics.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Schlesinger, A., Jr. What do we tell our students? Thoughts after Watergate. *School Review, 83*, 179–195.

Smith, T. V. & Lindeman, E. C. *The democratic way of life.* New York: New American Library, 1958.

Weinstock, J. (Ed.) *The greening of the high school.* New York: Institute for Development of Educational Activities, Inc., 1973 (March).

Chapter Four

Citizenship Education and the Slow Learner

Charles K. Curtis

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss citizenship education for slow-learning students and to propose one approach that might be employed in classes for these students at the secondary level. The intent is not to provide a definitive statement—if, indeed, such a statement were possible—to resolve once and for all the numerous problems in this area. In fact, it is likely that more questions will be raised than answered.

A brief description of the population of concern is in order. Presently, a number of terms are used to refer to slow-learning, non-academic, and non-regular program students in today's schools. Many of these expressions are ambiguous, misleading, psychologically unsound, value-laden, and, to the students to whom they refer, probably quite embarrassing. Although initially these terms were conceived so that a particular school population might be more precisely identified (and thus their educational needs more adequately met), the proliferation of terms that currently exists serves only to add confusion to an already ambiguous system of categories. Recent perusals of the literature have revealed that, whereas "disadvantaged," "culturally deprived," and "ghetto youth" described discrete student populations when first introduced, these terms, along with "terminal students," "educationally-subnormal," "somewhat backward," "socially disadvantaged," "alienated," "inner-city children," "slum children," "minority pupils," "educationally deficient," "undereducated," and "slow learners" are now being used to describe similar populations of students (Passow & Elliot, 1968, p. 3; Storen, 1968, p. 3; Weber, 1974, pp. 18–19). Regardless of the ways in which the terms are used, however, it is reasonable to assume that within each group of students will be a number to whom the original connotation of the word "slow learner" would have applied. While, no doubt, an argument contesting the practice of

---

CHARLES K. CURTIS is an Assistant Professor with a dual appointment in the Departments of Social Studies Instruction and Special Education in the Faculty of Education, the University of British Columbia. He has taught slow learners and non-academic students in several junior and senior secondary schools in the Vancouver area.

classifying students according to the criteria implied by these categories could be developed (see Nimnicht & Johnson, 1973), classification systems are part of the educator's tool bag; they continue to exist because, if properly used, they have a certain utility for curriculum planning.

Nevertheless, it is with some reservation that the students with whom this chapter is concerned are described as "slow learners," a term popularized by, among others, Abramowitz (1959, 1963, 1968, 1970), Ingram (1960), Johnson (1963), Abraham (1964), and Shelton (1971). Generally these students are characterized as possessing below average intelligence, as experiencing difficulties with conventionally taught subjects, and as having poorly developed reading skills. Additionally, as a group, these students may record a greater number of absences from school and may be more subject to breaches of school discipline than students in academic programs. Furthermore, continued failure to achieve academic success may have resulted in lowered self-esteem and a decreased sense of worthiness, particularly in the school environment.

According to some estimates (for example, Tansley & Gulliford, 1960, p. 6; Telford & Sawrey, 1967, p. 196), perhaps one-fifth of the school population might be categorized as slow learners. The proportion of slow learners to regular program students in a particular school population may vary depending upon the nature of the community from which the student population is drawn. There is a tendency for the number of students manifesting the characteristics of slow learners to be higher in schools whose students come from low socio-economic areas and to be lower in schools located in affluent middle-class communities. Presently, both in the United States and Canada, slow-learning students are enrolled in special work-oriented programs, in classes of the regular program especially composed of low-achieving and reluctant students and usually designated as "adapted," "modified," or "x" courses, and, though perhaps less commonly, in integrated academic classes. When enrolled in integrated classes, slow-learning students tend to be somewhat older than their classmates.

Objectives of Citizenship Education

Citizenship education has long been considered by special educators to be an important aspect of the social studies program for slow learners. The primary goal of the citizenship education program for slow-learning students is in accord with that for the regular social studies program: to prepare students for responsible, involved citizenship in a democratic society. Despite this common aim, however, the characteristics of the "model" citizen described by social studies educators bear little similarity to the qualities of good citizenship described in the literature regarding the slow learner.

An examination of a number of articles and books[1] relating to citizenship education and written during the past half-century revealed that the attribute most frequently ascribed to the model citizen was that he or she possess a reasonable knowledge of his community's economic, social, and cultural problems and that he or she be committed to their resolution. The adherence to a belief in the equality of individuals and the manifestation of a concern for the constitutional rights of all citizens ranked second in the lists of characteristics. Other characterizations of the good citizen, in order of frequency, were: respect for law and order in society; open-mindedness to the opinions of others and receptiveness to new facts; appreciation for both the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and possession of the decision-making skills requisite for effective participation in the democratic process.

In contrast to the preceding, for the slow learner the primary attribute of good citizenship was that he or she be gainfully employed and possess acceptable work habits. The second most frequently mentioned criteria were that he or she respect and obey the law and have a rudimentary knowledge of local statutes. A third commonly stated characteristic was that the slow-learning adult should share in the "responsibility" for the quality of life in the local community. Responsibility was variously interpreted to include: accepting responsibility for one's own family; maintaining the house and furnishings in a good state of repair; respecting a neighbor's property; treating neighbors in a courteous manner; helping to keep the neighborhood clean, quiet, and orderly; and, returning borrowed articles.

A comparison of the two sets of descriptions suggests a marked contrast in expectations. Whereas the citizen educated in the regular program is to be socially aware, sophisticated and capable of dealing with the problems of society, while manifesting a mature, unselfish concern for the welfare of his fellows, the graduate of a program for slow learners is to demonstrate good citizenship by being an employed, law-abiding, non-disruptive member of the community. Indeed, while descriptions of the model citizen imply a faith in the democratic ideal of participation, by implication it would seem that the expectation of some educators has been that the slow learner not become an encumbrance on the rest of society. This position was succinctly expressed by Kolstoe (1970, p. 28) when he wrote that good citizenship for mildly retarded adults would be exercised "largely by not becoming burdens on society, rather than by positive civic activities."

---

[1] For example: Washburn (1933, pp. 124–138); Quillen & Hanna (1948, p. 60); Crary (1951); Carpenter & Spieseke (1953, pp. 1–18); Wesley & Wronski (1958, p. 78); Roselle (1966).

Citizenship Education Programs

A somewhat similar contrast was disclosed when the course content of a variety of high school citizenship education programs[2] for both groups of students were compared. As Newmann noted in Chapter One, citizenship education in American schools (and, to some extent, Canadian schools also) has been organized around a variety of approaches. Among the most frequently described programs for achieving the goals of citizenship education have been those consisting primarily of a study of the growth of democracy in the United States. Programs centered on the historical study of the evolution of democracy are based on the assumption that the appreciation of democratic ideals and the comprehension of democratic institutions and processes are promoted by the knowledge of their historical development. Occupying a position of importance in citizenship education similar to that of history are the traditional civics programs in which the organization of municipal, state, and federal governments, the election processes and the responsibilities of elected representatives, and the domains of the several levels of government are studied.

The influence of Jerome Bruner was reflected in many social studies programs developed during the last decade. Though citizenship education remained a primary concern of social studies educators, social studies was defined to include instruction in the concepts and inquiry modes of history and the several social science disciplines. Lately, values education programs have begun to make an impact on citizenship education.

Little concern for the latter approaches to citizenship education could be found in the writings of special educators or social studies curricula for slow-learner programs. In addition to simplified history and government curricula modeled after the aforementioned courses, slow-learning students in secondary schools have been offered a fare that included lessons on patriotism, national symbols, holidays and traditions, and famous citizens. Furthermore, studies concerned with inculcating the student with a sense of responsibility for himself and his family, with making and keeping friends, with accepting community responsibilities, with the use of leisure time, with the role played by religion in society, and with occupational preparation have been common occurrences in classes for slow learners. In one large metropolitan area, the students in a secondary slow-learner program were taught to "dispose of their garbage properly," to turn off light and water faucets, and to "feed birds and help protect their [the birds'] needs."

Comparisons such as these suggest that a sizable number of educators doubt that most slow learners will play any more than a passive role in the political life of their community or nation. Such a view raises serious questions about our commitment to the concept of participatory democracy, a commitment highly espoused by both American and Canadian societies. It seems ironic to note that when the nation is threatened with war, no one doubts the capability of men and women who may have been designated as slow learners during their school years to serve their country. In time of national crisis, we fail to see the relationship of participatory citizenship to intelligence.

---

[2] References available from the author upon request.

Assumptions Basic to Many Citizenship Education Programs for Slow Learners

Consider for a moment some of the basic assumptions that, either intentionally or unintentionally, seem to have significantly affected citizenship education for slow learners. As mentioned earlier, the first and probably the most important assumption seems to be that, when slow-learning students reach adulthood, they will play, either by choice or circumstance, an inactive part in the decision-making processes in their community. The validity of this belief has seldom been challenged in the literature. Perhaps, at least in part, it results from educators' experiences with slow learners in social studies classes. Their apparent lack of interest in the social studies has been well documented (see, for example, Dimitroff, 1965, p. 188; Frerichs, 1969, p. 213; Strom, 1965, p. 87; Curtis, 1972). Whether or not it is sound practice to infer future citizenship behavior from students' attitudes toward social studies is open to question. If, however, many adults previously identified as slow learners do accept a passive role in the affairs of the community, it may be that the limited expectations for slow learners and the simplified, often childish curricula they experience in the schools inhibit their desire and ability to function effectively as democratic citizens.

A second assumption that seems implicit within the description of the attributes of good citizenship for slow learners is that they are not to be expected to make rational decisions about the problems of their society. This belief presumes that slow learners lack the intellectual faculty to understand the nature of such problems and to make reasonable evaluations of proposed courses of action that might be taken to ameliorate them. It is relevant to note here that there is little evidence to suggest that slow-learning adults (if, indeed, they may be referred to as such once they leave school) are any less able than the majority of other citizens to comprehend and form sensible opinions about the problems facing society. After monitoring radio "hot-line" broadcasts in Vancouver, British Columbia, for a number of years, I have concluded that when no particular scientific expertise was required to understand a specific problem, and when syntactical and grammatical errors were overlooked, the opinions expressed on the air by many interested, knowledgeable, but uneducated persons were not essentially different in quality from those expressed by many obviously bright and articulate persons.

American and Canadian societies purport to prize rationality. Particular emphasis is placed on intelligent decision-making behavior at the polls. Although we may often assume that, as adults, slow learners will be less competent and qualified voters than will average and bright pupils, sufficient evidence to support the argument that slow learners vote less intelligently than the great majority of the population could not be found in the literature. Indeed, is there any empirical data that imply that the patterns of voting behavior for slow learners are in any way different or unique? Again, my experience with the "hot-lines" suggests that, during any provincial or federal election in Canada, persons who (as indicated by the quality of their speech and the manner in which they express themselves) might earlier have been in classes for non-academic students will, depending upon the nature of the issues being discussed, express opinions that indicate support for an array of programs that range from the political right to the left.[3]

Certainly, one may question the assumption that slow learners as adults are any less able to deal with the complexities of societal problems (at the level at which citizens are reasonably expected to handle the issues involved in the problems) than are graduates from regular programs. With the possible exception of two studies reported thirty years ago (Gates, 1946; Pace, 1949), large-scale political socialization research has continually failed to produce evidence that graduates from high school programs are adequately prepared to rationally consider problems and issues in contemporary society (Melbo, 1936; Wilson, 1938, pp. 84–89; Langton and Jennings, 1968; Bagby, 1974; Sanstead, 1975). Following a study of the research conducted prior to 1963, Newmann (1963) concluded that few citizens are interested in, or have any knowledge of, their community's affairs, that a large number of voters fail to "perceive the candidates' stands on various issues," that a substantial percentage of the adult population does not exercise the franchise, and that politically concerned persons tend to associate with groups that "reinforce" their views. And there is some evidence that suggests that intelligence might not be a significant factor in this area. Price (1951) reported research studies conducted with large groups of very bright to superior secondary school students that led to the conclusion that a great majority of the students possessed a "serious lack of social sensitivity concerning community problems and a startling absence of community citizenship experience."

---

[3] It is interesting to note that during its brief period as the Government of British Columbia, the socialist New Democratic Party had the avowed support of the blue-collar unions while at the same time it had a greater number of university-educated members than the other four parties collectively. Quite obviously, education was less a factor in party selection than other variables. Only to the extent that a general lack of education affects the kinds of vocations open to slow learners, with the possible result that many slow learners may have similar economic and political concerns, is it probable that education (and, perhaps, intelligence) has any effect upon voting behavior.

One might also question whether there is reason to believe that a positive relationship exists between intelligence and attitude toward basic democratic freedoms. Investigations conducted at Northwestern University (Mack, 1956) and Clark University (Nash, 1959) disclosed that a large measure of disagreement about fundamental rights existed among supposedly bright college students. In what may well be the only large-scale survey that attempted to compare the attitudes of "dull-normal" students (enrolled in the senior secondary grades) with "superior" students, no significant difference was noted in the patterns of the responses of the two groups to questions that had them indicate whether they would deny civil liberties to certain deviant or controversial members and groups in their community (Scoval, 1962).

There appears, then, to be reason for questioning the basic assumptions upon which many citizenship education programs for slow learners have been developed. It may be that we have been operating for too long on suppositions for which we have insufficient empirical evidence. By so doing, we may have severely narrowed the scope and lessened the quality of the experiences offered to slow learners in the citizenship education program. Without data that give credence to these assumptions, we should set them aside and accept our commitment to prepare slow-learning students for active citizenship in their community. This is not meant to suggest that we ignore the qualities of citizenship that have been advocated for slow learners. There is no reason to quarrel with objectives that are concerned with adequate vocational preparation and the development of citizens who accept responsibility for maintaining themselves and their families, and who attempt to live peacefully with their neighbors. These are commendable objectives for all students. My contention is that until the citizenship qualities of slow learners are enlarged to encompass the characteristics now reserved for the model citizen described earlier, they fall short of an acceptable goal. If we are to err in our expectations for slow learners, it seems more in keeping with our concept of democracy to aim too high, rather than too low.

Preparing Learning Experiences

Before we examine one approach that seems to be appropriate for use with slow-learning students in high schools, some consideration must be given to learning styles. It is difficult to talk with any great amount of certainty about the learning styles of slow-learning students. In fact, it is probable that the methodologies suitable for these students are the same as those that are effective with students in the academic program.

According to comments made in the literature (by, for example: Featherstone, 1951, p. 43; Magnifico, 1958, p. 129; Ingram, 1960, p. 217; Johnson, 1963, p. 312; Karnes, 1970), social studies presented in special education classes should be organized into small, concise units of study and taught in a fairly structured classroom environment in a manner that provides for numerous concrete, firsthand experiences. Moreover, some special educators have contended that social studies is most successfully taught when a wide diversity of learning experiences is utilized and provision is made for practice, repetition, and review. The importance of making instruction concrete through the extensive use of field studies, community resource persons, and audio-visual materials as means for encouraging active student participation has often been mentioned. Classroom teaching techniques such as role-playing, creative dramatics, socio-drama, and debate have also been suggested in the literature as being suitable and effective methods for involving students in a particular study. Furthermore, using group and committee work as means for furnishing democratic experiences in group leadership, in the acceptance of responsibility, in the resolution of differences of opinion, and in group planning is also widely advocated.

Again, certain basic assumptions have been made concerning the nature of the slow learner. As a group, slow learners are portrayed as living in a world of concrete objects, rather than abstract ideas (McFeely, 1944, p. 64; Heck, 1953, pp. 329–347; Nickel, 1957, p. 373). Because of this, they are seen to possess a greater faculty for learning by "seeing" and "doing" than for learning through the development and application of abstract generalizations. In the same vein, they are described as learning best when they are active, involved participants in the study (Conovitz, 1939; Schmidt, 1942; McLendon, 1965, p. 246), rather than passive observers, the role too often required of students in regular classes. Additionally, slow learners are considered to have limited powers of concentration (Tansley & Gulliford, 1960, p. 169; Garton, 1961; Northam, 1961), and this quality is said to be manifested in an attention span—at least in the classroom—that is decidedly shorter than that of their peers in the regular program. As a consequence, slow learners are said to become restless, bored, and uninterested, and to misbehave as they quickly tire of the activities of a particular class period. The literature also characterizes the slow learner as having a narrow range of interests (see Utley, 1961).

Suitable content for the social studies program in slow-learner classes has also been described in the literature. Generally, educators have recommended that the content should be selected from the contemporary scene, should have a "here and now" quality, should provide direct contact with reality, and, at least during the initial stages of the study, should be related to the everyday experiences of the students (Winterbourn, 1944, p. 165; Waite, 1971, p. 103; Schwartz, 1975, p. 27). Perhaps Webster's (1966, p. 586) comment that content for the social studies program should not be "far removed from the realities of life in both time and space" best describes the criteria that are said to determine suitable course content in social studies programs for slow learners. In addition to the plea for content that is current, authentic, and topical, it should be relevant to the needs and experiences of the students (Carl, 1970; Hartmann, 1970).

As with the previous assumptions, the validity of these assumptions about learning needs to be examined. Presently, our knowledge of the kinds of learning experiences that are appropriate for slow learners in social studies classes is limited, consisting primarily of the observations of classroom teachers. In addition, usually only those lessons that have gone particularly well are reported in the journals. This would appear to be a field that is ripe for experimentation.

Several problems seem to be inherent in some of the suggestions made for planning learning experiences for slow learners. First, if we adhere too closely to them and limit our teaching to the "concrete" and avoid abstractions, we may exclude the development and application of useful generalizations, an important aspect of social studies instruction. Second, because of a concern for the alleged "short interest spans" of slow learners, we may be inclined to offer them brief, superficial, discrete units of study that fail to provide for in depth investigations or for the development and practice of particular skills (e.g., of critical thinking) that require extensive repetition and application if they are to be learned, even at an elementary level. Third, to adhere too closely to these suggestions may result in the overuse of audio-visual materials and the near total exclusion of newspapers, magazines, and other kinds of print materials from the social studies class.[4]

Despite the impoverished state of research in this area, we can be reasonably confident that slow learners—and, indeed, perhaps most students—will profit from instruction that attempts to actively involve them in the learning experiences. Additionally, selecting content that has meaning to the students and that they can accept as being relevant to their lives and education should be an effective approach with both slow learners and academic program students.

Although not frequently referred to in discussions of social studies instruction for slow learners, a study reported by Rosenberg (1962) has some bearing on the topic. Following a rather extensive investigation of adolescent self-image, Rosenberg concluded that a relationship existed between self-concept and interest in public affairs. On the basis of this relationship, Rosenberg postulated that people with low self-concepts tended not to discuss public affairs as often as those with high self-concepts. Such a condition was probable, he suggested, because of the "threat" posed by the possibility that one's opinions might be scorned or ignored, and because people with low self-concepts are "doubtful that they have anything worthwhile to contribute." Concern for the development of satisfactory self-concepts has long been espoused by special educators. This concern has particular significance for social studies teachers of slow-learning students. In order for citizens to function effectively in their community to exercise any control over their existence, they must be aware (at least to some extent) of the problems of their society. Attempting to change self-concepts by utilizing learning strategies designed to provide students with successful experiences would seem to be appropriate pedagogy in slow-learner classes.

---

[4] The tendency to minimize reading in the social studies class has been noted by, among others, Jarolimek (1967, p. 168) and Dempsey (1972, p. T7). Opposition to this practice was voiced by Abramowitz (1963), who cogently argued that to attempt to avoid the reading problems of slow learners by employing non-print materials was, in fact, merely to beg the issue. Indeed, he contended, the social studies program should "address itself" to the problem, and social studies teachers should feel obligated to provide instruction designed to increase the reading skills of all their students.

The Investigation of Contemporary Community Problems

If we return for a moment to the qualities that characterize model citizens, inferences can be made about the specific skills and attitudes they probably possess. Reading skills, for example, are implied in the statement that each "possess a reasonable knowledge of his community's . . . problems." Although television will probably continue to play an important role in informing us of significant events as they occur, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and so forth often provide a greater variety and depth of information, and they have an advantage over television in that they can be read and pondered at one's leisure. Moreover, in order to deal intelligently with all the information that they receive, and to make rational decisions on the basis of it, citizens must possess, at least to a rudimentary degree, the skills of critical thinking. If, as described, model citizens are committed to the resolution of societal problems, they should know of the various actions one might take to effect change in a democratic manner. Among the attributes our citizens ought also to possess are a belief in their own worthiness and a degree of confidence adequate for discussing their points of view with others, a receptiveness to the opinions of others, and a tendency to espouse basic democratic rights for all persons.

If we direct our instruction toward the development of these skills and attitudes that (along with others) help to define the model citizen, then our claim that we are concerned with educating slow learners for effective participation has more substance than if we limit our primary objectives to preparing students with occupational skills. Such a proposal, however, raises many questions, such as:

(1) What are effective pedagogies for increasing slow learners' awareness of societal problems?
(2) Does the awareness of societal problems lead to an interest in investigating them?
(3) Does a commitment to the resolution of contemporary problems result from an awareness of the problems?
(4) To what extent can slow-learning students be taught critical thinking skills?
(5) What degree of critical thinking skills is necessary for evaluating the data relevant to a particular problem and for weighing proposed alternative solutions to the problem?
(6) Do persons with special training in critical thinking tend to employ these skills to think rationally about public issues?
(7) What strategies are appropriate for increasing reading skills in social studies classes for slow learners?
(8) Does the development of reading skills lead to increased interest in reading, particularly of newspapers and magazines?
(9) What learning experiences can be provided to increase self-concept, reduce dogmatism, and positively affect attitude toward basic civil rights?

It is not our purpose, nor are we presently able, to provide adequate responses to all of these questions. Several, in fact, are not limited to the domain of the special educator. The questions are suggested because they are germane to the development of a rationale for including the study of community problems in slow-learner social studies classes at the secondary level.

During the past several decades, a large number of articles advocating student investigation of contemporary problems and the issues implicit within the problems have been published. A review of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. In general, however, arguments in favor of including such studies in the social studies curriculum have centered around the need for citizens to be informed about the problems of their society and around the right of students in a democratic state to investigate them in the classroom. Additionally, educators have contended that the investigation of contemporary problems provides the training most suited for preparing students to cope with these problems once they leave school.

The few references to the study of contemporary problems in social studies classes for slow learners suggest that the literature in this area has failed to generate much interest among special educators. Nevertheless, there appears to be no valid reason for excluding slow learners from the population to whom the arguments favoring the examination of social problems apply. Interestingly, the strongest positions taken by special educators writing in this area have been rebuttals of the charge that students in special programs for non-achievers lack the degree of sophistication necessary to deal satisfactorily with social problems. The arguments that they have presented are relevant primarily to slow-learning students in "disadvantaged" schools.

In responding to the comment that including social problems in special education curricula is not good practice, Gross (1952) insisted that where students have been helped to understand the relationships of particular problems to their lives, they have "managed successfully" to investigate them. Papero (1970) contended that since disadvantaged children encounter poverty, drug addiction, crime, and discrimination daily in their environment, the school has the obligation to assist them in understanding the issues involved in the various problems. Ornstein (1966, p. 287) suggested that including the examination of societal problems within the social studies programs for these pupils indicates to them that the school is "aware of the problems" and is concerned about their amelioration. He believed that by ignoring community problems in the classroom, the school "enters into a tragic conspiracy of irresponsible retreat from reality."

An additional argument for including the study of contemporary problems in classes for slow learners is related to the nature of such studies and to assumptions of what constitutes good pedagogy in special classes. Certainly, the investigation of community problems satisfies the criterion that content in slow-learner classes should have a "here and now" quality. The investigation of these problems provides the student with a "direct contact with reality," and, if properly selected by the teacher or if chosen by the students, the problems may have particular relevancy to their lives. Moreover, through the use of field studies and resource persons, the students can be furnished with a variety of concrete, firsthand experiences.

Returning to a consideration of the questions posed previously, one effective strategy for developing the slow learner's awareness of societal problems is to include the study of such problems in the social studies curriculum. This comment is not as obvious as it first might appear. It is entirely possible that a group of students might thoroughly investigate several problems in their community and still be relatively uninformed about others equally as significant. Some evidence, however, can be provided (Curtis, 1977) that suggests that the study of a single problem over a period of several months can have a startling effect on student awareness. Prior to an investigation of housing as a social problem, the students in several non-academic secondary classrooms were asked to identify important problems in the community. The combined lists for the classes contained only four topics: jobs (but not the problem of unemployment), inflation, poverty, and housing. When a similar request was made following the completion of the study, most students' lists identified at least nine or ten significant problems, while the combined lists totaled twenty-four. (The students in these classes manifested an awareness of community problems that I have not yet witnessed in the senior academic grades.) Furthermore, each of the fifty-four anonymous respondents to a questionnaire administered subsequent to the completion of the project study expressed the view that studies of these problems were important to their education and should occupy a prominent role in the social studies program. Whether this awareness of and apparent interest in community problems led to a commitment to their resolution is unknown. At any rate, during the period of the project, students were heard to remark that these problems—particularly the lack of adequate housing facilities for middle- and low-income families—threatened the quality of life in their community and something should be done to resolve them.

The study of community problems provides a vehicle for developing lessons designed to teach critical thinking skills in slow-learner classes. The perusal of a large number of articles dealing with critical thinking revealed the existence of a general consensus among the authors that content for teaching critical thinking skills should be selected from contemporary societal issues and problems. The paradigm most often recommended for investigating community problems and for developing critical thinking skills was the inquiry model, with variations by Dimitroff (1965, p. 194), Chernow and Chernow (1973, p. 172), and Curtis (1974). Appropriate materials suggested for teaching critical thinking are those that are commonly mentioned for studying contemporary problems: newspapers, magazines, radio and television programs, questionnaires, and interviews with community resource people. Critical thinking could be encouraged most frequently during the analysis of data phase of the inquiry model.

Although a paucity of research exists in this area, there is some evidence to support the claim that slow learners can be taught critical thinking skills (Case & Fry, 1973). To what extent these can be taught remains unknown. (Nor does it appear that anyone has yet attempted to determine what degree of critical thinking is suitable for understanding the data associated with community problems.)

Beyond providing a suitable model for investigating contemporary problems and for teaching and practicing critical thinking skills, an inquiry approach has several other advantages when used with slow learners. In one sense, each step of the model may be viewed by students as a short unit of study, even though the investigation of a particular problem may continue for several months. To some extent, this may satisfy the criterion that acceptable pedagogy with slow learners involves arranging the content into brief units. The clearly defined stages or steps of the inquiry model provide a structure or framework for presenting certain activities at specific points in the study in a logical sequence that can be understood by the students. Discussion and evaluation of the evidence relating to a particular problem provide an opportunity for argument and debate, while dramatics may be an effective method for encouraging the students to examine the feelings of people involved in the problem. In addition, an inquiry approach offers opportunities, both at the collection and analysis of data stages, for group and committee work.

The kinds of materials usually available for studying community problems may be suitable for encouraging interest in reading and for developing reading skills in slow-learner classes. There seems to be a general consensus among special educators that a successful reading program for adolescent slow learners in the secondary school depends less on the teaching of phonics, the broadening of sight vocabulary, and the refinement of word analysis skills than on the development of proper attitudes toward reading (Johnson, 1963, p. 209; Tansley & Gulliford, 1965, pp. 140–141; Weber, 1974, pp. 80–81). Strategies for changing negative attitudes toward reading have been described by several educators. Weber (1974, p. 83), for example, suggested that slow learners' attitude toward reading changes when the need to solve a problem provides them with valid purposes for reading. Williams (1970, p. 69) argued for the importance of providing slow-learning students with reading materials that had "functional significance," while Hawkins (1972) developed an individualized reading program for an undereducated black youth that combined the use of interesting materials with the need to learn. Certainly the study of contemporary problems can furnish numerous opportunities for encouraging students to read, for increasing vocabulary, and for teaching reading comprehension.

It is difficult to suggest a minimum level below which the students cannot handle the reading associated with contemporary problems. On the basis of experiences with such studies, I suggest that most students whose reading ability falls somewhere between the middle and top elementary grades will be able to read most newspaper and magazine articles. It is interesting to note that an analysis of several selections from the *British Columbia Hansard* (the provincial form of the *Congressional Record*) revealed reading levels that varied from grades seven through nine.[5]

The study of contemporary problems also provides opportunities to employ strategies designed to modify student attitudes. Attempting to change attitudes through classroom instruction is, at best, a very difficult matter. While a number of articles and books have focused on the many variables that may affect one's sense of worthiness or degree of closed-mindedness, surprisingly few authors have reported research completed in these fields. A thorough review of the literature relating to self-concept is not appropriate here; however, several comments that are germane to a discussion of controversial problems with slow learners bear mention.

---

[5] The reading levels of these passages would have been rated even lower had the members given more attention to the length of their sentences as they spoke.

Several authors have suggested that presenting a challenge to students' academic abilities is an effective strategy for affecting self-concept. Coopersmith and Silverman (1969) argued that the student must be "challenged" in order to help him gain self-confidence, a position also taken by Purkey (1970, p. 50). Investigating community problems, with particular attention to the development of reading and critical thinking skills, will present such a challenge to most classes of slow-learning students. An awareness that these skills are increasing, coupled with an understanding of the amount and difficulty of the work being accomplished, might also positively affect student attitudes toward themselves.

Other factors associated with contemporary problems that might affect self-concept relate to the nature of such investigations. By studying community problems, the slow learner is removed from the simple studies too frequently offered him in the secondary program; instead, the student enters the "real" world and deals with matters commonly the domain of adults. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that when interest is generated by an investigation of a particular problem, students may find occasion to discuss the study with their parents and other adults. Should such discussion take place, it may serve to reinforce positive attitudes toward the study with a possible "spin-off" effect on student self-concept. Moreover, the interaction between students and adults that often occurs during the collection of data, in which students are usually not treated by the resource persons as slow learners, may also positively affect self-concept.

There is some evidence that supports the contention that degree of closed-mindedness can be affected by classroom instruction (Ehrlich, 1961; Frumkin, 1961; Pannes, 1963). Presently there appears to be a negative correlation between amount of schooling and degree of dogmatism. Kemp (1963), Weir (1963), and Mouw (1969) concluded that open-mindedness was encouraged in classrooms where students were allowed to express their opinions freely and where a variety of views was tolerated. The study of contemporary problems necessitates the examination of divergent positions and should be conducted in a classroom atmosphere in which students feel free to express and argue their views. If this atmosphere can be maintained in classes of slow-learning students, it is reasonable to assume that degree of student dogmatism will be affected.

Slow-Learning Students Examine a Contemporary Problem

Recently, the preceding strategies were employed with classes of slow-learning and non-academic students in a number of British Columbian secondary schools (Curtis, 1977). These schools were located in a variety of environments ranging from the large metropolitan Vancouver region to small rural communities. In each class, students utilized an inquiry approach to investigate housing conditions in their community. During the period of the project, interest in, and knowledge of, community problems increased (noted earlier); self-concept, critical thinking, and reading comprehension skills improved; while the degree of closed-mindedness among the students decreased.[6]

The investigations, lasting in several classes for almost half a term, were initiated with an exercise requiring teams of students to go into the community and, with the assistance of local realtors and newspaper advertisements, locate and describe housing facilities available for particular income groups. As the investigations progressed, hypotheses were formulated and examined by the students. These hypotheses were concerned with the adequacy of existing facilities, the factors affecting the costs and availability of housing, and the actions that might be taken—especially by the several levels of government—to encourage the construction of additional housing and to make existing accommodations more accessible for low- and middle-income families. Among the many topics that were studied during the investigations were: mortgages; lending rates; building regulations; building materials and methods; the role of unions; property, import, and excise taxes; housing problems of large families, families with children, and of people with divergent life styles; subsidized housing programs, alternatives (e.g., mobile homes, condominiums) to traditional housing, renting, and rental legislation.

Newspapers, magazines, political brochures, government publications (including selections from the debates of the provincial Legislative Assembly), along with other materials readily available in most communities, provided sources of data for the investigations. Critical thinking lessons[7]—based upon the skills described by Ennis (1964)—were developed from tapes of radio "hot-line" programs and the publications of various citizen and special interest groups.

Both field studies and interviews with resource persons played an important role in the housing investigations. Not only were they additional sources of relevant information, but they served to make the studies more concrete by furnishing the students with direct, personal contacts with persons involved in specific aspects of the housing problem in their community. Furthermore, these activities often permitted individuals and groups of students to be working on their own away from the direct supervision of the teacher, providing them with numerous opportunities to practice responsible behavior.

---

[6] The assessment program consisted of the pre- and post-test administrations of The Newspaper Headlines Test (see Oliver & Shaver, 1974, pp. 282–284), the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory, the Cornell Critical Thinking Test, the Dogmatism Scale, the Reading Comprehension Subtest of the Gates-MacGinitie Reading Test, and the Freedoms Scale (developed by the author for the study).

[7] Copies of student worksheets for several lessons are available from the author upon request.

While lack of suitable housing accommodations was determined to be a major social problem in each of the communities studied, because of differing conditions among the communities, the treatment of the various aspects of the problem varied with each class. As a consequence, although some field studies and interviews were common to most investigations, all of them depended to a great extent upon the particular community in which they were conducted. Some of the field studies—in several instances actually planned by the students—included surveys of apartment dwellers' opinions of recent rental legislation, visits to factories and building sites, and tours of housing projects for low-income groups and nursing homes for the aged. Some of the interviews conducted by the students were with bank and mortgage company managers, realtors, builders, developers, manufacturers of building materials, local and provincial politicians, trade unionists, city managers, operators of mobile home parks, managers of apartment blocks, and workers in social welfare agencies.

Surveys of student and parental attitudes toward the housing study and toward including the examination of contemporary community problems in the social studies curricula were conducted after completion of the studies. As noted earlier, students' responses favored including these studies in the social studies program. Generally, the students' arguments centered around the need to be informed in a democratic society. Responses from parents contained a similar theme. Additionally, some parents expressed approval for the housing study by describing their involvement with it. The following statements were selected from the comments of several parents:

> The study this year was of interest to the students and parents as well. Questions asked at home were in-depth, and a lot of research was done at home as well as in the school.

> My daughter found the study interesting and relevant. We discussed it at length within the family, and all gained a little by it.

> My son discussed many aspects of the program with us. I think it made him much more aware of his own future requirements and concerned over what the housing problem will do to him and others in his age group.

This study was not intended to provide answers to all the questions previously posed in the chapter. It did, however, support my previous experience that with adequate teacher and pupil planning—and the support of people in the community—slow-learning students can investigate community problems. Furthermore, the study provided support for a number of teaching strategies with potential for impacting closed-mindedness, critical thinking, self-concept, and reading.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter, several assumptions that seemed to be implicit in the lists of characteristics indicative of good citizenship for graduates of slow-learner programs were examined. Criteria that might be employed to select content and learning experiences for slow-learner social studies classes were also discussed. The study of controversial community problems was suggested as one approach to citizenship education that might be suitable in social studies courses for these students in the secondary grades. Additionally, a recent study involving slow-learning and non-academic students in the investigation of a contemporary problem was described briefly.

Much remains unsaid. The investigation of contemporary problems is not recommended as the total social studies program in the secondary school. Instead, it seems more appropriate to integrate these studies within the regular program and initiate the investigations either as student interest suggests or as the teacher deems necessary. Moreover, citizenship education cannot be considered the sole domain of the social studies program. If we broaden our concept of good citizenship, it is probable that a program will be developed that requires all the teachers of a special education program in a particular school to plan their instruction cooperatively.

The discussion of values has been postponed for another time. This is not meant to imply that such discussion is irrelevant to a consideration of citizenship education or the study of community problems by slow-learning pupils. In fact, as the investigation of a problem focuses on the consideration of what should be done about it, it becomes obvious that the values held by the students assume a significant role in the discussion. Although more work with slow-learning students is needed in this area, I suggest that during these discussions the students be made aware of the values implicit in their statements and of any inconsistencies or value conflicts implied by their arguments.

Public education in a democratic nation is committed to preparing all students with the skills necessary for accepting the responsibilities of citizenship. Slow learners, however, probably require a greater amount of assistance than other students. Earlier, reference was made to comments over "hot-line" broadcasts by persons whose diction and grammatical usage betrayed a general lack of education. It was noticed that when these people managed to inform themselves about a particular problem, their opinions seemed no less valid than those of persons who appeared to be better educated. There is, unfortunately, another side to this coin. The same "hot-lines" have also carried comments by similar persons whose ignorance has resulted in vulnerability. Too often they seem to be victims of situations they do not comprehend, and they appear not even to know where they can go to find assistance. The wide variety of experiences involved in the examination of contemporary problems may reduce the degree of vulnerability and increase a sense of where to go to seek help.

REFERENCES

Abraham, W. *The slow learner.* New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, 1964.

Abramowitz, J. Revolutionizing the teaching of social studies to the slow learner. *Social Education*, 1959, *23*, 219–220, 230.

Abramowitz, J. How much subject matter for the slow learner? *Social Education*, 1963, *27*, 11–12.

Abramowitz, J. What kind of social studies for the slow learner? *Social Education*, 1968, *32*, 550–553.

Abramowitz, J. Six questions and answers about slow learners. *Social Education*, 1970. *34*, 140–142, 172.

Bagby, J. L. A comparative analysis of political attitudes, academic achievement, and other selected variables of high school students taking a problems of democracy course with students not taking a problems of democracy course. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1974, *34*, 4683–4A.

Carl, D. Project mobilization. *Research Bulletin*, 1970, *14*, 16–18, 27.

Carpenter, H. & Spieseke, A. Skills needed for democratic citizenship. In Helen Carpenter (Ed.), *Skills in the social studies*, 24th Yearbook of the NCSS. Washington, D.C., 1953.

Case, R. & Fry, C. Evaluation of an attempt to teach scientific inquiry and criticism in a working class high school. *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 1973, *10*, 135–142.

Chernow, F. & Chernow, C. *Teaching the culturally disadvantaged child.* West Nyack, New York: Parker Publishing, 1973.

Conovitz, M. Slow learners in high schools of Newark. *Social Education*, 1939, *3*, 418–420.

Coopersmith, S. & Silverman, J. How to increase self-esteem. *Today's Education*, 1969, *58*, 28–29.

Crary, R. (Ed.). *Education for democratic citizenship.* 22nd Yearbook of the NCSS. Washington, D.C., 1951.

Curtis, C. K. Involvement is the key: Social studies and the slow learner. *The Clearing House*, 1972, *47*, 37–40.

Curtis, C. K. Social studies for the slow learner. *The Clearing House*, 1974, *48*, 456–460.

Curtis, C. K. Investigating contemporary community problems as an approach to citizenship education for slow-learning and non-academic secondary students. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Utah State University, 1977.

Dempsey, J. *This is man* (Teacher's Edition). Morristown, New Jersey: Silver Burdett 1972.

Dimitroff, L. Teaching the social studies to culturally disadvantaged pupils. In J. Beck and R. Saxe (Eds.), *Teaching the culturally disadvantaged pupil.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1965.

Ehrlich, H. J. Dogmatism and learning. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, *62*, 148–149.

Ennis, R. H. A definition of critical thinking. *The Reading Teacher*, 1964, *17*, 599–612.

Featherstone, W. B. What do we know about slow-learners? *The Clearing House*, 1951, *25*, 323–328.

Frerichs, A. H. Teaching social studies to the slow learners. In J. S. Roucek (Ed.), *The slow learner.* New York: The Philosophical Library, 1969.

Frumkin, R. M. Dogmatism, social class, values and academic achievement in sociology. *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 1961, *34*, 398–403.

Garton, M. D. *Teaching the educable mentally retarded—Practical methods.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1961.

Gates, J. W. The civic competence of high school seniors. *Journal of Educational Research.* 1946, *76*, 528–534.

Gross, R. E. Pupil views on teacher opinions in controversial areas. *School and Society*, 1952, *76*, 295–298.

Hartmann, D. P. What kinds of social studies materials for the slow learner? *Social Education*, 1970, *34*, 153, 160.

Hawkins, T. *Benjamin: Reading and beyond.* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972.

Heck, A. O. *The education of exceptional children.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953.

Ingram, C. P. *Education of the slow-learning child.* New York: Ronald Press, 1960.

Jarolimek, J. *Social studies in elementary education* (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Johnson, G. O. *Education for the slow learners.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Karnes, M. B. The slow learner. What are his characteristics and needs? *Today's Education*, 1970, *59*, 42–44.

Kemp, G. G. Improvement of critical thinking in relation to open-closed belief systems. *Journal of Experimental Education*, 1963, *31*, 321–323.

Kolstoe, O. P. *Teaching educable mentally retarded children.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.

Langton, K. P. & Jennings, M. K. Political socialization and the high school civics curriculum in the United States. *American Political Science Review.* 1968, *62*, 852–867.

Mack, R. W. Do we really believe in the bill of rights? *Social Problems*, 1956, *3*, 264–269.

Magnifico, L. X. *Education for the exceptional child.* New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958.

McFeely, R. H. Faculty planning to meet individual differences: For the slow learner. In E. Krug and L. Anderson (Eds.), *Adapting instruction in the social studies to individual differences*, 15th Yearbook of the NCSS, Washington, D.C., 1965.

McLendon, J. C. *Social studies in secondary education.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965.

Melbo, I. R. Information of high school seniors on contemporary problems. *Social Studies*, 1936, *27*, 82–86.

Mouw, J. T. Effect of dogmatism on levels of cognitive processes. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1969, *60*, 365–369.

Nash, P. Should we abandon the Bill of Rights? *Social Education*, 1959, *23*, 371–378.

Nimnicht, G. P. & Johnson, J. A. (Eds.). *Beyond "compensatory education": A new approach to educating children*. San Francisco: Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, 1973.

Newmann, F. Consent of the governed and citizenship education in modern America. *School Review*, 1963, 7, 404–424.

Nickel, K. N. Better education for nonacademic pupils. *The North Central Association Quarterly*, 1957, *31*, 352–384.

Northam, M. E. How to meet the problem of the slow learner in the junior high school. *National Association of Secondary School Principals' Bulletin*, 1961, *45*, 63–65.

Oliver, D. W. & Shaver, J. P. *Teaching public issues in the high school.* Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, 1974. (First published by Houghton Mifflin, 1966.)

Ornstein, A. C. Effective schools for 'disadvantaged' children. In J. Gowan and G. Demos (Eds.), *The disadvantaged and potential dropout.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1966.

Pace, C. R. What kinds of citizens do college graduates become? *Journal of General Education*, 1949, *3*, 197–202.

Pannes, E. D. The relationship between self-acceptance and dogmatism in junior-senior high school students. *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 1963, *36*, 419–426.

Papero, J. M. How can the teaching of social studies to 'slow learners' be improved? *Social Education*, 1970, *34*, 168, 171.

Passow, A. H. & Elliott, D. L. The nature and needs of the educationally disadvantaged. In Harry A. Passow (Ed.), *Developing programs for the educationally disadvantaged.* New York: Teachers College Press, 1968.

Price, R. A. Citizenship studies in Syracuse. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 1951, *33*, 179–181.

Purkey, W. W. *Self-concept and school achievement.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Quillen, I. J. & Hanna, L. A. *Education for social competence.* New York: Scotts, Foresman, 1948.

Roselle, D. Citizenship goals for a new age. *Social Education*, 1966, *30*, 415–420.

Rosenberg, M. Self-esteem and concern with public affairs. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, *26*, 201–211.

Sanstead, W. G. A study of the political attitudes of North Dakota high school seniors. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1975, *36*, 814–A.

Schmidt, B. G. Developing competency in America's retarded adolescents. *Social Education*, 1942, *6*, 119–122.

Schwartz, L. L. *The exceptional child, A primer*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1975.

Scovel, D. The Bill of Rights in Iowa. *Social Education*, 1962, *26*, 448–450.

Shelton, B. O. *Teaching and guiding the slow learner.* West Nyack, New York: Parker Publishing, 1971.

Storen, H. F. *The disadvantaged early adolescent: More effective teaching.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Strom, R. D. *Teaching in the slum school.* Columbus, OH: Charles C. Merrill, 1965.

Tansley, A. E. & Gulliford, R. *The education of slow-learning children*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.

Telford, C. W. & Sawrey, J. M. *The exceptional individual.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Utley, I. The slow learner in the secondary school. *Education*, 1961, *81*, 341–344.

Waite, K. *The educable mentally retarded child.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1971.

Washburn, C. Training for citizenship. *In developing attitudes in children*, The Proceedings of the Mid-West Conference of the Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education, March, 1932. Chicago, 1933.

Weber, K. J. *Yes, they can!* Toronto: Methuen, 1974.

Webster, S. W. Social studies for disadvantaged students. In S. W. Webster (Ed.), *The disadvantaged learner: Knowing, understanding, educating.* San Francisco: Chandler, 1966.

Weir, E. The open mind: An essential in teaching and learning. *Educational Forum*, 1963, *27*, 429–435.

Wesley, E. B. & Wronski, S. P. *Teaching social studies in high schools* (4th ed.). Boston: D. C. Heath, 1958.

Williams, A. A. *Basic subjects for the slow learner.* London: Methuen, 1970.

Wilson, H. E. *Education for citizenship.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938.

Winterbourn, R. *Educating backward children in New Zealand.* Christchurch: Whitecombe and Tombs, 1944.

Chapter Five

The Task of Rationale-building for Citizenship Education

James P. Shaver

I sit in my office. It's a clear, warm February day. Unusual for northern Utah. Where are the snow and the cold? In fact, we are worried about drought; while the East worries about too much snow and cold.

But I am to be thinking, not about the weather, but about a bulletin on citizenship education and about a chapter for that bulletin—a bulletin which is to speak primarily to elementary and secondary school teachers and supervisors.

Yet—here I sit: It is quiet, very quiet. No youngsters shouting, laughing, screaming, running, arguing, giggling, teasing, bickering; or making their presence felt through their silence. No need to think of meeting thirty young, growing individuals for forty minutes, to be followed by thirty more, and then thirty more, and thirty more, and thirty more—until the end of the school day arrives. No feeling of incredible challenge at 8:30 a.m.; and of unbelievable fatigue, of being drained emotionally by 3:30 p.m., with tests and papers to be corrected, tests and assignments to be constructed.

I miss it. Especially the triumphs of a student excited, an insight glimpsed, a personal relationship sustained. Despite the disasters of boredom on faces, of disciplinary actions, of misunderstandings and failures to communicate.

But I opted for the university role, and one set of pressures and pleasures was exchanged for another. That, however, is not the point. It is that this chapter is an attempt to conjoin the two experiences in thinking about rationale-building. And it is meant to stimulate thinking, not to lay down prescriptions. For one of the great challenges of American public schooling is how, given the demands on the time and

---

JAMES P. SHAVER is Professor and Chairperson of the Bureau of Research Services in the College of Education at Utah State University. He has taught at the junior and senior high school levels.

energy of teachers, they can be engaged more deeply and continuously in the task of rationale-building.

"Rationale-building" is a process of making clear and examining the beliefs in one's frame of reference—beliefs about what the world has been, is, will be, can be, and should be like—that influence, consciously or not, his or her behavior as a teacher (Beard, 1934, p. 182). The tendency not to examine those beliefs, to allow often unexplicated assumptions to shape our teaching, has been referred to by critics as a major problem of American education (Silberman, 1970, pp. 379–80), and of social studies education in particular (Shaver, 1977a).

It is not that social studies teachers, or other educators, are any less thoughtful about their assumptions than are other people. But lack of thoughtfulness on their part is of particular consequence because so much rests on their behavior: Citizenship education is critical to society. Whether defined in terms of political activity,[1] or more broadly in terms of living the "good," the moral life,[2] citizenship must be a central concern of the schools—the formal educational agent—of a democratic society. And, while it appears that citizenship education in the schools may be having some impact on attitudes (National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1976), there is still much reason for concern about the inadequacies, especially in terms of the problems to be faced (such as enumerated by Newmann in Chapter One).

Probably no one is more aware of the shortcomings of citizenship education than sensitive social studies teachers and supervisors who, in my experience, often wonder what lasting impact they are having on their students. That concern is often expressed through interest in new materials and programs to be used in social studies classes.

Unfortunately, teacher education in this country has tended to focus on the "doing," active part of teaching—on stating objectives and preparing lesson plans, on how to use textbooks and conduct discussions, on the new materials and programs available for use. These are important aspects of teaching; but they have been emphasized to the detriment of philosophical concerns: What are the assumptions underlying the use of behavioral objectives, of textbooks, of differing discussion styles, of the new programs and materials that one might choose from? In short, teachers have generally been shortchanged in the area of rationale-building.

Think back. How much time and effort can you recall being devoted, by you or your professors, to questions of Why? rather than to questions of How? Even in your Foundations of Education courses, did you focus on *your* frame of reference, *your* assumptions in regard to the elements in a rationale? Or, was the emphasis on abstract descriptions of the social-cultural, historical, psychological contexts of education?[3] Or, on the study *of* standard philosophical positions such as idealism, realism, neo-Thomism, experimentalism, and existentialism? Was there focus on *your* beliefs and *you* as philosopher in regard to the practicalities of building a viable citizenship education program under the trying conditions of public school teaching?

---

[1] Newmann's use of the term "civic education" in Chapter One implies that this is his stance.

[2] Conrad and Hedin (Chapter Three) opt for a broader concern with "decent behavior." Note that a basic consideration in rationale-building for citizenship is your definition, and conceptualization, of the citizenship domain and the desired citizen.

As John Dewey (1933, p. 62) noted so well, when the focus is on disciplinary studies, there is a danger that teacher and student will isolate their intellectual activites from the "ordinary affairs of life," and "tend to set up a chasm between logical thought . . . and the specific and concrete demands of everyday events." That is what frequently happens in education courses. Perhaps it is inevitable in those preservice programs that do not provide concrete experiences—tutoring, teaching, case studies, and so on—prior to or during the foundations and methods courses. For, again citing Dewey (1933, p. 99), ". . . thinking arises out of a directly experienced situation." And, "probably the most frequent cause of failure . . . to secure genuine thinking . . . is the failure to insure the existence of an experienced situation of such a nature as to call out thinking in the way [that] . . . out of school situations do." Dewey was, of course, speaking to the schooling of youngsters; but his assumptions are as appropriate to the schooling of teachers. My experience is that after a year or two of teaching, teachers are ready, if given the opportunity, to move from the discussion of "how to do it" to rationale-building, because they are frustrated from trying to build instructional programs that have the desired effects on students.

Teacher and Supervisor as Philosopher

If your teacher education program, or graduate program in supervision, engaged you in the critical analysis of citizenship education in a democratic society and of the relevant assumptions in your own frame of reference, you were fortunate and probably unusual. That so many teachers and supervisors have been able to initiate and continue such inquiry is a tribute to their commitment and ability. Philosophical inquiry is not easy to sustain, even in the more tranquil university setting; and rationale-building is philosophy in its truest sense—the study of ideas and their implications. This bulletin is really about the teacher (and supervisor) as philosopher. If that sounds pretentious, it may be because teachers and supervisors—along with those in most other vocations and professions in our society—are conditioned to think of themselves as doers rather than philosophical thinkers. Although decision-making is emphasized, it is usually in the context of deciding what to do at various critical points in carrying out assumed roles, rather than in terms of the basic assumptions underlying what is being done.

---

[3] For confirmation of this criticism, see Nash, Shiman, and Conrad (1977).

Of course, philosophy as rationale-building occurs on different levels. Some persons are more inclined to be deeply reflective and analytic; others are more action oriented. Some persons, such as university professors, have role definitions and the supporting time and resources to reflect and to build complex rationales (although many university professors are markedly unreflective about such matters). Complex statements of rationale (such as Oliver & Shaver, 1974; Hunt & Metcalf, 1968) are available. And such conceptualizations are important, hopefully, as input for teacher education programs, as stimulants to the thinking of teachers and supervisors, and as bases for curriculum development.

But complex published conceptualizations are no substitute for rationale-building by those in the schools. The educational moral that Dewey (1961, pp, 159–160) drew in regard to pupils also holds for teachers and supervisors:

> [N]o thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an idea. The communication may stimulate the other person to realize the questions for himself and to think out a like idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning effort at thought.

Although the results may be less complex and sophisticated in many instances, the active involvement of teachers and supervisors in rationale-building is necessary if the academicians' theory-building efforts are to impact social studies teaching. Teachers are the translators, the link between the academician and student. And, the efforts of those in the field as they wrestle with teaching problems at first-hand, seeking and exploring their own assumptions and relating them consciously to their curricular decisions, are critical because the results affect what happens to students daily.

The matter of teachers and supervisors as rationale-builders is, then, not trivial. Nor is there undue presumptuousness in labeling these efforts as philosophical, as John Dewey made clear. Dewey was a philosopher. About that there can be little quarrel. And, he was deeply involved in thinking about the premises that underlie American public schooling. (Ironically, too, while much of his thinking is so much a part of the American culture that we no longer even recognize its Deweyean roots, much of what goes on in the schools that turns off youngsters and defeats the aims of citizenship education runs counter to those same beliefs. This suggests again that Dewey's admonitions in regard to students are applicable to teachers: They must be involved in developing their own conceptual situations, not just given the results of the thinking of others.[4])

Dewey thought philosophy was fundamental. And, he saw philosophy of education, not as a "poor relation" of general philosophy,[5] but as "ultimately the most significant phase of philosophy" (Dewey, 1964d, p. 16). And he was not negative or condescending toward the philosophical efforts of those in the field who may have lacked the time and resources, or even the intellectual acumen, to match his own depth and intricacy of thought. Even as a philosopher, he rejected the idea of "any inherent sacredness in what is called philosophy." He said "any effort to clarify the ends to be attained is, as far as it goes, philosophical," and called on administrators and teachers to "test and develop [ideas] in their actual work so that, through union of theory and practice, the philosophy of education will be a living, growing thing" (1964d, pp. 17–18).

Rationale-building as Growth

The emphasis on growth is critical, especially for those for whom rationale-building must be a part of a hectic and demanding teaching schedule. As Fred Newmann's chapter makes obvious, developing a rationale is a complex and demanding task. Not only is there a large number of variables involved,[6] but each taps what often seems like a myriad of beliefs, interrelated with one another. As one begins, for example, to explore his/her assumptions about learning (e.g., that, as Dewey postulated, students learn when they are dealing with problems real to them, not when they are given ready-made information), he/she is led into the question of the nature of knowledge (Is knowledge an end in itself, or does it have importance only as it is useful to the individual in comprehending and coping with his/her life?), and this may take him/her into the question of who, if anyone besides the learner, has the right or competency to say what knowledge or thinking skills are of most worth to individual prospective citizens. This may lead to questions about whether young people have the experience and cognitive (abstract thinking) ability to anticipate what will be useful to them in the future (or whether anyone else does either), which again brings one up against questions about how people learn, about motivation, about the role of concreteness in learning and the implications for the abstractness of textbooks.

---

[4] The implications of Dewey's thinking for rationale-building in social studies are discussed further in Shaver (1977b).

[5] At one point, he even defined philosophy as "the general theory of education" (Dewey, 1961, p. 328).

[6] Newmann (Chapter One) identifies seven "problem areas" or "elements" of a comprehensive rationale. In an earlier volume aimed at encouraging and engaging social studies teachers in rationale-building, Shaver and Berlak (1968) focused on four areas to be considered in building a sound rationale. Their categorization was not meant to be exhaustive (see p. 6). Conceptual organization is vital to constructive thinking (Dewey, 1933, pp. 84–5), and an essential part of rationale-building is the identification of problem areas to be dealt with. No one framework is *the* right one, however; and even Newmann's excellent schema should be used as a starting point for formulating a structure meaningful to you, not as an inflexible template for thinking.

Clearly, the task is immense. It may seem so overwhelming that people are discouraged from even beginning on it. But the unattainability of a completed rationale[7] should not discourage teachers from initiating the process of rationale-building. As Dewey was so aware, the critical examination of the frame of reference from which you teach, no matter the level of sophistication, is better than allowing unexamined beliefs to impact unconsciously your selections of content and technique.

Moreover, to strive for a rationale as a finished product would be as inappropriate as to strive for a completed education. Learning is a lifelong affair, and a rationale should be continuously open to and impacted by experience. Dewey referred to philosophy of education as a "living, growing thing" (1964d, p. 18), just as he made it clear that the suspension of judgment and intellectual search are critical to reflective thinking (Dewey, 1933, p. 16). It is essential that, whenever possible, inferences be tested; but recognizing the impossibility of final proof for all of the beliefs underlying one's teaching, and discriminating carefully between those beliefs that rest on adequate evidence and those that do not (Dewey, 1933, p. 97), are vital, too.

The analogy between education and rationale-building is a powerful point to be kept in mind. Education is not only a product, but "a process of development, of growth. And it is the *process* and not merely the result that is important" (Dewey, 1964c, p. 4, italics his). Or, put another way: "Education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience; . . . the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing" (Dewey, 1964b, p. 434).

A rationale, like an education, then, ought never be considered finished. A rationale will hopefully become more comprehensive, better substantiated, its parts more clearly formulated and the logical relations among them more clearly perceived, and its implications for teaching better understood; but it ought never be considered complete and final, for that would mean that the person has stopped thinking, stopped responding to and learning from experience. The desirable outcome of education is not a fixed and complete person, and the desired outcome of rationale-building is not a fixed and complete philosophy.

---

[7] Even the more sophisticated rationales are not completely comprehensive. For example, the work that Oliver and Shaver published in 1966 (Oliver & Shaver, 1974) focuses primarily on rationale-building from the perspective of the citizen as political decision-maker; and the curricular materials that were developed from the rationale (Oliver & Newmann, 1968–70; Shaver & Larkins, 1973–4) have been concerned with helping students make more rational political-ethical decisions. That extensive rationale does not deal explicitly with some of the elements that Newmann (Chapter One) suggests are essential to a rationale, or even that Shaver and Berlak (1968) suggested were relevant. Newmann (1975) made a very natural extension of the rationale into citizen participation.

Why Do It?

The task of rationale-building is, then, not only difficult, but neverending. Moreover, it can have serious implications for the tranquility of one's professional life, for the examination of the beliefs in one's frame of reference and of the implications for teaching will frequently lead even the most thoughtful (or, perhaps, especially the most thoughtful) to conclude that parts of what he or she is doing as a teacher cannot be justified, and so must be changed. It may be the textbook used, or the predominant use of any textbook; it may be the types of discussions in the classroom, the type of homework assignments or tests, the methods of maintaining "order," the tone of interactions with students in the hallway and the lunchroom. Some changes may be relatively easy; some may be difficult, especially those that call for reassessment of one's basic mode of interrelating with young people. Some may require careful self-analysis; some may be dependent on acquiring resources from the school administration; some may necessitate professional help, such as may be available in inservice courses dealing with different discussion techniques. But it is not likely that the genuine analysis involved in rationale-building will leave your professional life untouched. One truism among philosophers is that the unexamined life is not worth living; but the examined life is usually neither peaceful nor painless (Alexander, 1976).

Why do it then? I suppose that extensive justification for thinking carefully about the assumptions from which one teaches is probably not needed for the readers of this bulletin. But some teachers may have doubts; and the role of the supervisor often calls for bringing individual teachers to the realization that such examination is necessary and worthwhile. Fred Newmann (Chapter One) has emphasized the intellectual and moral responsibilities of educators for developing sound rationales. He also mentioned the practical assistance a rationale can provide in making teaching decisions. There are other reasons that bear mention.

One important consideration has already been mentioned: Personal growth. Rationale-building is not just a process *like* education; it *is* education. Growth is basic to our vitality, personally and professionally. Most of us would probably agree with Dewey (1964c, p. 4) that "A truly healthy person is not something fixed and completed." Economic growth for the society has, against the realities of scarce resources and quality of life, lost much of its appeal. But personal growth is still a widely accepted value—as long as the emphasis is on growth through the person's own attempts to understand and evolve, and not on impositions from outside or the rejection of self.

Personal growth is intimately attached to professional growth. Professionally, teachers who grapple with the tough problems involved in the rational justification of what they do can gain satisfaction from the knowledge that their behaviors are more rationally based and more likely to be productive, because they are less likely to be guided by "small, provincial, local, class, group, or personal prejudices" (Beard, 1934, p. 182) or "conducted blindly, under the control of customs and traditions that have not been examined or in response to immediate social pressures" (Dewey, 1964d, p. 17). Rationale-building will help to ensure that the school's role in preparing citizens will be more competently handled.

Personal autonomy, often an adjunct of personal growth, is also important. Examination of one's frame of reference to make instructional choices more conscious and rational can help to liberate one not only from bias and conventional wisdom, but from unthinking or irresolute reliance on the decisions of textbook writers and other curriculum developers and on the models of teaching one has experienced as a student.

Another bonus may come in the area of the "hidden curriculum"—the unintended school experiences from which students learn, with the outcomes often counter-productive in terms of the commonly stated goals of citizenship education. Examining assumptions and seeking insights into instruction are likely to impact the way one relates to students in the classroom. As you become more reflective about what you are doing, even the minute-by-minute classroom teaching decisions are likely to be made in a more open, thoughtful manner. Students are more likely to learn from example what it means to be reflective about what one does, as well as sense the feeling of human dignity that comes from being accepted as a legitimate participant in an inquiry process. Both outcomes are commonly stated as important goals of citizenship education.

Rationale-building can also be a very practical activity in building community relations and program support. There are signs (e.g., McGough, 1976, 1977a, 1977b) that parents—or, at least a vocal minority—are demanding more information about the social studies curriculum and more influence over its content. My own opinion is that their concern and their attempts to interject themselves into the curriculum decision-making process are legitimate. Parents have a legitimate interest in their children and in how school programs may influence their children's views of the world. Moreover, all taxpayers, parents or not, have a right to know how their money is being spent and to impact decisions about expenditures at the various formal (school board meetings, bond elections, textbook selection committees) and informal (calls to principals, conversations with teachers to raise questions and register protests about what is happening in the school) levels of decision-making. In fact, what model of citizenship education appropriate for a democracy could deny citizens the right to attempt to intervene in the decisions and practices of a public agency, the school? Clearly, the thrust by administrators and teachers should be toward encouraging involvement, even—or especially—among those who might object to school practices, rather than trying to discourage or avoid such participation, or promoting it on a superficial level among known school benefactors in order to generate a façade of support.

Perhaps even more important than the rights of parents to participate in their children's education and the rights of taxpayers to involvement in governmental decision-making are the perspectives that parents bring to the process of rationale-building. Interactions with parents about the ends and the materials and teaching techniques for citizenship education should not be viewed as the time to convince "outsiders" that your curriculum is the only correct one—although one should bring to the interchange the professional expertise that comes from thinking through carefully the justifications for the curriculum. Parents have valuable input because of their concerns for and knowledge of their children and because they, too, are experiencing what it means to be a citizen; and their inquiries can provide an excellent opportunity to test the validity of your rationale-at-its-present-state and stimulate you to the rethinking that is essential to the natural growth process.

Interaction with parents may be particularly helpful also in dealing with that part of your rationale which Newmann (Chapter One) discusses under Basic Curriculum Goals—Nature of Values. That is, what is to be your position on whether the curriculum (or the teacher) ought to try to influence students to support or reject certain values through political action? Certainly, this question is basic to citizenship education in a democratic society. (Note that it is a different question from whether one, as a social studies teacher, ought to try to inculcate commitment to the basic values of the society. The question here is whether teachers or curricular materials ought to express political views—opinions as to what policies and actions or political parties and candidates are preferable because of the values they support.) And it suggests that an important aspect of rationale-building is being clear about your own political preferences so that you do not unwittingly allow them to influence your teaching. If you have not thought through both questions (the extent to which you should try to influence students' political beliefs and your own political stance), parents may force you to do so. Having parents with a variety of political views, especially those that differ from yours, review your curriculum can be unsettling and instructive.

Fred Newmann's categorization of elements in a rationale for citizenship education (Chapter One) contains a category, "Schools and Other Social Agencies." He suggests that we should be careful to consider the limits of the school for citizenship education, and take into account in our rationale-building the extent to which out-of-school activities and nonschool institutions and agencies, such as the family, need to be relied on for authentic citizenship learning experiences. (And, of course, that is the topic of Chapter Three, by Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin, and less directly of Chapter Four, by Charles Curtis.) Newmann does not, however, emphasize the point being made here: That involvement of parents in your rationale-building may well be critical to the productiveness and validity of the venture.

Also, it is obvious, but worth mentioning, that a carefully thought out and valid rationale can help to build not only public but administrative support for citizenship education programs. Sound rationale-building efforts build an image of thoughtfulness and professionalism that will stand you in good stead when you decide that adequate citizenship education calls for departure from the traditional routine and structures of the typical school. Again, too, the groundwork that goes into rationale-building, and the conceptualization of a rationale as an organismic, growing cluster of ideas, provide an ideal basis for the interactions with administrators, as well as parents and other teachers, that will help you to analyze and revise the assumptions from which you teach.

Finally, as you go through the analysis, defense, and formulation of ideas in building a rationale, you will become more aware of the lack of rationale-building on the part of others. As a teacher, you may be able to encourage colleagues to examine their frames of reference—although, of course, if uninvited and/or not handled discreetly, such efforts may not make you the most popular person in the teachers' lounge. As a supervisor, your own rationale-building efforts will help to prepare you—especially if you remember Dewey's caveats about the importance of personally felt problems and not imposing intellectual structures on others—for your most important task: Helping teachers to build rationales. And, both you and the teachers will be more likely and able to take the extremely important action of challenging publishers to explain and defend the assumptions underlying their materials and programs against carefully formulated rationales for citizenship education.

Getting into It

Some teachers and supervisors examine their frames of reference as the basis for curricular decisions as an ongoing, "natural" type of activity. Some do so because they were introduced to "philosophical" thinking in regard to instructional decisions as part of their university education. Many teachers are not so reflective, but continue to teach in ways that have become comfortable, using materials that have intuitive appeal. And, of those for whom rationale-building is a vital part of their day-by-day activities, many wish that their efforts could be expanded and/or made more productive. For all, such inquiry is an extremely difficult and important task.

What follows is not a comprehensive set of guidelines to productive rationale-building. It is, rather, a brief list of suggestions, based on personal experience in rationale-building and as a consultant working with teachers and supervisors. In that latter role, I frequently find that I am asked to provide a group of teachers with my "wisdom" as to what social studies or a social studies course should be. Instead, I usually try to stimulate and guide the group to become involved in the inquiry that will allow them to make such decisions themselves; and sessions then often develop into a cooperative evaluation of my proposals for appropriate citizenship education. The following comments may be especially appropriate for supervisors, because their usual role definition as stimulators and facilitators of rational curriculum analysis and change should lead them inevitably into trying to interest and involve teachers in the explication and examination of their frames of reference, the formulation and validation of explicit positions on significant issues underlying their teaching behavior, and the search for consistency and coherence between and among beliefs and action.

Of course, an essential beginning point is the recognition that rationale-building cannot be imposed productively. Given a mandate to develop a rationale, a group of teachers may produce a document; but it will most likely be superficial, have little impact on their own instructional decision-making, and be a termination of activity rather than a step in an ongoing process of intellectual inquiry. Although the result can be disappointing, one must presume that the teachers with whom she/he is working desire to do the best possible job of teaching and are concerned with their own intellectual integrity. This presumption opens what is, in my experience, the best route to stimulating sincere involvement in rationale-building—analytic probing to create the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), the "felt need" (Archambault, 1964, p. xvi), the feeling of a problem real to the person,* that is the basic motivation for intellectual activity. Several points of analysis may serve the purpose.

Examining the consistency, or lack of it, between commonly accepted—broadly and by the teachers involved—goals of citizenship education and what is stated in the teachers' curriculum guide or what appears to be happening in their classes is one effective starting point. The probing must, obviously, be discreetly and humanely handled, and the teachers must be encouraged to do their own self-analysis to the extent possible.

---

*The term "problem" is a much overused and not carefully thought through bit of educational jargon. For a discussion of the underlying concept from a Deweyean point of view, instructive both for examining a common shallowness in problem-centered citizenship education curricula and for "problems" as the impetus for teachers' rationale-building activities, see Shermis and Barth (1977).

Another excellent point of departure is often the teachers' own expressions of frustration or discontent about what students appear not to be learning, about the lack of interest in assignments and discussions, about disruptions in the classroom. Citizenship education should be a vital, exciting subject for young people because it so intimately involves their own lives; and if students claim it is dull and irrelevant, and/or behave accordingly, productive avenues for analysis are opened up. Among the assumptions that will bear examination are those about how people learn. For example, are the students being involved in thinking as a basis for learning, or is the knowledge of the experts being imposed on them "so that they will be able to think about problems later"? Does the "urn" concept of education (fill up the urns, the students' heads, with information to be used later), one of the most prevalent dysfunctionalities in citizenship education, dominate instruction? (Isn't learning without meaningful thought a "turn off" for most people, adults as well as youngsters? How much do we retain of what is learned using the usual rote methods to pass tests? Most seriously, how frequently can persons recognize the relevance of knowledge and call it forth for use when "real" problems are encountered later?) Raising and probing such assumptions, even in terms of how the teachers themselves learn,[9] and their implications for the students' interest or lack of it, is not a matter for a few minutes of discussion. It is not only a starting point, but an essential aspect of rationale-building.

Another excellent starting place, because of the common academic backgrounds and commitments of social studies teachers, is with Charles Beard's discussion, in *The Nature of the Social Sciences* (1934, pp. 178–84), of the impact of one's frame of social knowledge on the selection and organization of content. Here, Beard applied to the problems of social studies curriculum development the conceptual approach he used in analyzing the influence of the framers' interests on the United States Constitution (presented in the book he and Mary

---

[9] Of course, a basic caution must be kept in mind: That is, there is a tendency for teachers to think on an abstract, formal operations level that allows them to appreciate and value the problems and conceptualizations of the academicians; and they often forget that students are likely to be at a concrete, practical level of thought that makes those same problems and conceptualizations meaningless. That is another area that bears probing (see Dewey, 1933, 1961; Newmann, 1967; Shaver & Oliver, 1968; Shaver, 1977a, 1977b).

Beard co-authored, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, which aroused the ire of "patriotic" historians when published). Beard's authenticity as a scholar, along with his application of concepts from historical analysis to the analysis of teaching behavior, often serve to engage social studies teachers. And, his emphasis on the inevitability of a frame of reference ("*Every* human being brought up in society *inevitably* has in mind a frame of social knowledge, ideas, and ideals . . ." italics mine) and its impact (". . . to this frame or pattern, his thought and action will be more or less consciously referred.") is a leveling notion. The message is not that "You are inadequate, so you should engage in rationale-building," but that everyone who teaches should be aware of the inevitability of the subtle as well as open influence of their beliefs on their teaching—and attempt to make the impact more rational.

Beard's declaration that "no one can profess to know everything or to believe nothing, to possess the whole truth or to exercise no preferences in the selection, arrangement, and presentation of materials for thought and instruction . . ." squares with the conceptualization of a rationale as constantly developing, never complete. It also suggests another tactic for those in supervisory (or consultant) roles who wish to involve teachers in the analytic behavior of rationale-building: Laying out the elements in your own at-present-rationale as an example, as an object for critiquing, and even as a potential point of departure for the formulation of other rationales. This tactic lays a heavy load on supervisors, but it is one they should be prepared to carry.

If individual or group rationale-building efforts are to be productive, the matters under consideration must be kept to a manageable scope. When too many problem areas are considered at once, it is easy to become overwhelmed and overly frustrated. Working on the assumptions underlying one course at a time, or even a unit, helps to limit the task to a manageable magnitude. Analyzing a set of sample materials, assignments, or tests of your own or of teachers in the group for the assumptions that are implied, including the assumed goals, can also be a manageable, productive tactic.

Or, the focus might be on one important goal, such as to help students become better decision-makers as adult citizens. The thorough exploration of the assumptions underlying one such goal (e.g., Is citizen decision-making to be considered in a largely political context? What type or types of problems are central to citizen decision-making in the agreed-upon context? What thinking skills and concepts—from the social sciences and from other fields—are relevant? How do values relate to citizen decision-making? What role does and ought emotive commitment play?) and the implications for classroom materials, discussions, assignments, and tests is not likely to be accomplished in an hour-long meeting, of course. But the focus on one goal rather than the totality of purposes in social studies education begins to limit the task to manageable proportions. And the consideration of a series of goals can provide an excellent structure for continuing dialogue about rationales, especially if the interrelations among the goals and their implications are explored along the way.

It should be clear, too, that rationale-building is not essentially a solitary pursuit. While individual contemplation is vital, feedback from others is also essential. New ideas for consideration, the critiquing of one's own formulations and those of others, the queries others ask that give one insights into his/her own assumptions, the casual exchanges of views that, despite the appearance of empty bull sessions, allow one to think things through without undue pressure—these and other benefits come from working with others, when coupled with time alone to read and think.

But the social context for rationale-building is important from other than an intellectual, stimulative view; a "community," even if it contains only two people, is necessary to provide the support that most of us need to engage in the exhilarating but often excruciating process of self-analysis and development. Shared commitments, the comfort from knowing that others are having the same difficulties as you in grappling with fundamental questions, the mutual reinforcement for rationale-building behavior are important community functions.

Teachers will sometimes be able to form and sustain the necessary provocative and supportive groups themselves. But often they lack the contacts and resources to do so. And, again, supervisors can make significant contributions: Stimulating individual teachers to be concerned about rationales; bringing them into contact with one another, organizing working groups and providing intellectual leadership; providing resources such as books, consultants, secretarial assistance; arranging for facilitating conditions such as involving two or more teachers from a school so that they can interact and reinforce one another during the school day, obtaining substitutes so that meetings can be held during the school day, arranging for extra reimbursement for meeting on late afternoons and Saturdays and for teachers to be paid to work on curriculum development during the summer months; and securing other reinforcers such as salary lane, recertification, and university course credit for participating teachers.

The supervisor's role is critical, but not easy. Other administrative functions also must be attended to. The supervisor is often in a vaguely defined staff, rather than line, position, and so must go through an intense political process to convince others to provide the resources to support teacher rationale-building activities. Stimulating, organizing, and maintaining the philosophical efforts of teachers also faced with many demands, professional and personal, on their limited time and energy is trying and fatiguing. But the stakes, and the potential satisfactions, are high.

Some Central Value-related Issues

It would make little sense to try to duplicate Fred Newmann's excellent enumeration of rationale-building issues in Chapter One. But values and ethical decision-making are so central to citizenship education, and of so great concern currently, that some comments to highlight a few relevant concerns seem an appropriate way to end this chapter, and the bulletin. An appropriate place to begin is with the classroom and the school as a context for citizenship education. Conrad and Hedin (Chapter Three) and Curtis (Chapter Four) have made the point well that citizenship education must extend beyond the school.[10] But a related query is also crucial: What ethical model should the classroom and the school exhibit?

Dewey (1964a, pp. 108, 116) pointed out years ago that the school must itself be a vital social institution if it is to perform its central role of citizenship education. Otherwise, attempts to teach citizenship in some meaningful sense as preparation for participation in the political-social life of the society will be like attempts to teach students to swim without water: Doomed to little success. Students must be involved in the school as a society, and the ethical principles of the school ought not be different from the ethical-legal principles of our democratic society.[11] A dictum of the U.S. Supreme Court in *West Virginia Board of Education* v. *Barnette* (1934) suggests the importance of this proposition:

> That [the schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.

The Court's declaration brings us to another critical issue: That is, what is the school's role in regard to the basic values of the society? Consideration of the nature of the society and the role of the school vis-à-vis the society raises basic questions of rationale. For example, if you concur with Yudof (1976) that large complex societies must formalize the cultural initiation process by creating specialized institutions, especially schools, for "bringing masses of children into the larger culture," including "socialization to particular values," what are the implications?[12]

---

[10] Has the potential role of parents in extending citizenship education beyond the school been considered adequately? Special educators (e.g., Kelly, 1973; Hofmeister & Reavis, 1974) have come to understand that parents must and can be utilized in the education of handicapped children. If citizenship efforts are to be effective, may we not have to discover ways to involve the home as part of the educational environment?

[11] The "Just Community School" with which Lawrence Kohlberg and associates are experimenting (Wasserman, 1976) is an outgrowth of Kohlberg's (e.g., 1970) restatement of Dewey's concern with the narrow concept of morality in the schools. Students can be helped to apply democratic principles to their concerns for their rights in the school setting (see, e.g., Knight, 1974).

What are the "particular values" that are to be part of the school's legitimate attempts at cultural transmission? Are there, for example, as the Supreme Court's statement in the Barnette Case implies, basic principles of a democratic government which it is the school's obligation to convey?[13] Should one distinguish between basic democratic values, such as equality of opportunity, and more personal values, such as cleanliness or honesty? (See, e.g., Shaver & Strong, 1976, Chapter Two.) Can conveying values be kept separate from imposing judgments based on those values? Can the enhancement (inculcation, if you will) of emotive commitment to the values in order to maintain societal cohesion and provide an emotive context for argumentation about appropriate public policy (Shaver, 1976) be carried out without subtly imposing cognitive definitions for the values, over which there is, and should be, continuous public debate? Is cultural transmission that makes the values "available" to the students sufficient, or must teachers attempt self-consciously to instill commitment? And, if the latter is true, how can this be squared with the democratic commitment to human dignity and intelligence? Does, or can, values transmission provide the context for critical thinking, or must it interfere with critical, creative thought? Can we, in Yudof's words, "arrange the communicative process . . . [so] that we transmit the basic culture essential to growth but not press our views so forcefully that individual judgment and growth become impossible" (1976, p. 406)?

Beard's (1934, p. 182) caution about the potential impact of the "small, provincial, local, class, group, or personal prejudices" from one's unexamined frame of reference is particularly appropriate to the teacher's consideration of her/his role in cultural transmission. It is probably unrealistic for a teacher to eschew completely any role in value transmission; but there are particular dangers if no distinction is made between those values that are basic to the culture and those that are important to you primarily because of the particular subculture or subcultures to which you belong. Transmitting the general cultural values while supporting the legitimate subcultural variations that are also valued in our pluralistic society is no easy task (see Banks, 1973; NCSS, 1976). And, if we need any reminder about the potential ill effects of unexamined cultural transmission, recent criticism of the school's reflection of society's sexism (Chapin & Branson, 1973; Hahn, 1975; Grambs, 1976) should serve that purpose.

---

[12] Lerner (1976, p. 78) claims that "In America . . . education has not cast itself in the role of a tool of the state, nor has the state asserted its rights to use such a tool." The distinction between the state and the society, and the legitimate expectations of each, is important in formulating educational aims and practices. Berlak (Chapter Two) raises questions about the "society" to whose wishes the school's citizenship education efforts should be addressed.

[13] Oliver and Shaver (1974), for example, argue that there are.

Discussion of the cultural transmission function of the school vis-à-vis values begins to touch on another important issue—the role of values in decision-making. If, for example, the central problems facing the citizen are considered to be ethical in nature, what are the implications for going beyond the empirically oriented methods of the social sciences to include valuing as part of decision-making (Oliver & Shaver, 1974; Newmann, 1967; Shaver, 1967)? Also, questions about the relation of personal values to public issues, such as what to do about drug use and whether to allow nontherapeutic abortions, and the implications for classroom teaching need to be explored (Shaver, 1976), as do questions about the nature of values and their use in justifying ethical decisions (Newmann, Chapter One).

Rationale-building should provide cushioning against the fads that periodically hit social studies education (Shaver, 1977a), and values/ethical education is at present a faddism area. The Values Clarification Approach (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966; Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972) is a current fad whose stated and unexplicated assumptions bear examination. Is the conception of values adequate? Is the orientation of Values Clarification basically therapeutic? Does Values Clarification present undue threats to the privacy of students and others? Is ethical relativism the dominant moral point of view of Values Clarification, and is that a justifiable stance? (See Lockwood, 1975, 1977; Shaver & Strong, 1976, pp. 117–122, 133–5.) What are the implications of the answers to such questions for the use of Values Clarification as part of citizenship education?

By the same token, the Cognitive Moral Development Approach of Lawrence Kohlberg (see, e.g., Kohlberg, 1970; Fenton, 1976a) has had a bandwagon effect that bears scrutiny. There are serious questions about the philosophical and research bases for the approach and about its applicability to the classroom (Fraenkel, 1976, 1977; Shaver & Strong, 1976, pp. 122–33), but strong counter-arguments are being made for its acceptability (Fenton, n.d., 1976a, 1977). One serious criticism is that the emphasis of the Cognitive Moral Development Approach on moral dilemma discussions as a means of raising students' cognitive levels of moral reasoning may lead teachers to overlook the important task of helping students to develop specific skills and concepts for ethical decision-making (Shaver, 1977a). Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Kuhmerker, 1976) is aware of the problem, and Fenton (n.d.) is attacking the need for intellectual skills in his curriculum work; but the issues are still very much alive for teachers and supervisors who must decide what role the Moral Cognitive Development Approach should play in their curricula.

Critical analysis of the assumptions and implications of proposed values or ethical educational programs is an essential part of rationale-building for citizenship education. But it is important to remember that synthesis is valuable, too. As Fenton has suggested (e.g., 1977, p. 60), viewing curricular programs only as subjects for analysis and as rivals with one another can be dysfunctional. We must also ask whether different approaches might complement one another in comprehensive citizenship education programs based on thoughtful rationales. Suggestions along those lines have been made by Fenton (1976b, n.d.), Newmann (Ch. One), and Shaver (1976).

Conclusion

Of course, if social studies programs are to be responsive to the needs of citizenship education in a democratic society, underlying assumptions about values and ethical decision-making are not the only ones that need to be explicated and examined. By the same token, considerations of the role of social studies in encouraging social criticism (Berlak, Chapter Two), the potential impact of community participation (Conrad & Hedin, Chapter Three), and the study of controversial community problems by slow learners (Curtis, Chapter Four) do not encompass the multitude of decisions that must be made, explicitly or by default, by those who wish to build effective citizenship education programs. Newmann's discussion of rationale-building issues in Chapter One is an excellent illustration of that point.

One reviewer of the manuscript for this bulletin commented that she/he was left with "the impression that the manuscript is comprised of vaguely related essays and [is] not a tightly conceptualized bulletin which addresses the status of citizenship education." That characterization, as you know by now if you have read the preceding pages, is apt—although we hope that the connection among the chapters in terms of the need to reconceptualize citizenship education is not so vague as to be unperceivable. The structure, or lack of it, did not occur by chance or oversight; it is believed to reflect the lack of any existing definitive conceptualization of citizenship education. The intent was to suggest the need for confronting the tough, continual process of building rationales (Shaver, Chapter Five) for the citizenship education-related experiences that students have under the auspices of the school and through the school's impacts on other agencies and institutions, and to suggest the vast array of issues that have not been addressed adequately to date. This is not to say that much good conceptual and program implementation work has not gone on, but to suggest that major efforts still lie ahead.

That the involvement of classroom teachers, as well as supervisors and university professors, in rationale-building efforts will have significant positive impacts on citizenship education is the faith underlying this bulletin. The assumption that those of us involved in the effort can tolerate the continuously unfinished nature of the business and continue in our efforts to work on chunks of the total while struggling to keep the total in mind may be of dubious validity. If so, the prospects for increasingly rational and effective citizenship education programs in our schools are not bright.

REFERENCES

Alexander, R. E. How to be considerate while teaching critically. In J. R. Meyer (Ed.), *Reflections on values education.* Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1976, 165–177.

Archambault, R. D. (Ed.). *John Dewey on education.* New York: Random House (The Modern Library), 1964.

Banks, J. A. (Ed.). *Teaching ethnic studies: Concepts and strategies* (43rd NCSS Yearbook). Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1973.

Beard, C. A. *The nature of the social sciences.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

Chapin, J. R. & Branson, M. S. *Women: The majority-minority.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

Dewey, J. *How we think.* Boston: D. C. Heath, 1933.

Dewey, J. *Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education.* New York: Macmillan, paperback edition, 1961 (first published by Macmillan, 1916).

Dewey, J. Ethical principles underlying education. In R. D. Archambault (Ed.), *John Dewey on education: Selected writings.* New York: Random House (The Modern Library), 1964, 108–38. (a)

Dewey, J. My pedagogic creed. In R. D. Archambault (Ed.), *John Dewey on education: Selected writings.* New York: Random House (The Modern Library), 427–39. (b)

Dewey, J. The need for a philosophy of education. In R. D. Archambault (Ed.), *John Dewey on education: Selected writings.* New York: Random House (The Modern Library), 3–14. (c)

Dewey, J. The relation of science and philosophy as the basis for education. In R. D. Archambault (Ed.), *John Dewey on education: Selected writings.* New York: Random House (The Modern Library), 15–19. (d)

Fenton, E. Moral education: The research findings. *Social Education*, 1976, *40*, 188–93. (a)

Fenton, E. *The relationship of citizenship education to values education* (Occasional Paper #2). Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools, 1976. (b)

Fenton, E. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education: A response to Jack R. Fraenkel. *Social Education*, 1977, *41*, 56, 58, 60–1.

Fenton, E. The implications of Lawrence Kohlberg's research for civic education. Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, unpublished paper, no date.

Festinger, L. *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, Il.: 1957.

Fraenkel, J. R. The Kohlberg bandwagon: Some reservations. *Social Education*, 1976, *40*, 216–222.

Fraenkel, J. R. The cognitive-developmental approach to education: A response to Edwin Fenton. *Social Education*, 1977, *41*, 57, 59, 61.

Grambs, J. D. (Ed.). *Teaching about women in social studies: Concepts, methods, and materials* (NCSS Bulletin #48). Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1976.

Hahn, C. L. (Ed.). Eliminating sexism from the schools: Implementing change. *Social Education*, 1975, *39*(3), 133–147.

Hofmeister, A. M. & Reavis, H. K. Learning packages for parent involvement. *Educational Technology*, 1974, *14* (7), 55–56.

Hunt, M. P. & Metcalf, L. E. *Teaching high school social studies* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Kelly, E. J. Parental roles in special educational programming—A brief for involvement. *Journal of Special Education*, 1973, *7*, 357–364.

Knight, R. S. *Students' rights: Issues in constitutional freedoms*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

Kohlberg, L. Education for justice: A modern statement of the Platonic view. In N. F. and T. R. Sizer (Eds.), *Moral Education*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Kohlberg, L. & Kuhmerker, L. Dialogue: Lawrence Kohlberg talks with Lisa Kuhmerker. *Moral Education Forum*, 1976, *1*(4), 3–6.

Lerner, M. *Values in education: Notes toward a values philosophy*. Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1976.

Lockwood, A. L. A critical view of values clarification. *Teachers College Record*, 1975, *77*.

Lockwood, A. L. What's wrong with values clarification. *Social Education*, 1977, *41* (5), 399–401.

McGough, K. One parent's gut reaction. *Social Education*, 1976, *40*(7), 607.

McGough, K. Academic freedom and parents' rights. *Social Education*, 1977, *41*(1), 76, 80. (a)

McGough, K. Putting your house in order. *Social Education*, 1977, *41*(2), 160, 159. (b)

Nash, R. J., Shiman, D. A., & Conrad, D. R. Can the foundations of education survive? Grappling with our death wish. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 1977, *28*(1), 4–7.

National Assessment of Educational Progress. *Education for citizenship: A bicentennial survey*. Citizenship/social studies report no. 07-CS-01. Denver: NAEP, 1976 (Nov.).

National Council for the Social Studies. *Curriculum guidelines for multiethnic education*. Washington, D.C.: NCSS, 1976.

Newmann, F. M. Questioning the place of social science disciplines in education. *Teachers College Record*, 1967, *69*, 69–74.

Newmann, F. M. *Education for citizen action: Challenge for secondary curriculum*. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1975.

Oliver, D. W. & Newmann, F. M. Public issues series. Middletown, Conn.: Xerox, 1968–1970.

Oliver, D. W. & Shaver, J. P. *Teaching public issues in the high school*. Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 1974 (first published by Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. B. *Values and teaching: Working with values in the classroom.* Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966.

Shaver, J. P. Social studies: The need for redefinition. *Social Education*, 1967, *31* (7), 588–596.

Shaver, J. P. A cognitive decision-making approach to ethics education: Focus on public issues. Paper prepared for a National Conference on Education and Citizenship: Responsibilities for the Common Good, sponsored by the Council of Chief State School Officers and the U.S. Office of Education, Kansas City, Missouri, September 21, 1976.

Shaver, J. P. A critical view of the social studies profession. *Social Education*, 1977, *41* (5), 300–307. (a)

Shaver, J. P. Needed: A Deweyean rationale for social studies. *The High School Journal*, 1977, *60*, 345–52. (b)

Shaver, J. P. & Berlak, H. (Eds.). *Democracy, pluralism and the social studies: Readings and commentary.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

Shaver, J. P. & Larkins, A. G. The analysis of public issues program. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973–1974.

Shaver, J. P. & Oliver, D. W. The structure of the social sciences and citizenship education. In J. P. Shaver & H. Berlak (Eds.), *Democracy, pluralism and the social studies: Readings and commentary.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968, 326–333.

Shaver, J. P. & Strong, W. *Facing value decisions: Rationale-building for teachers.* Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1976.

Shermis, S. S. & Barth, J. L. Everyone knows what a problem is, don't they? *Peabody Journal of Education*, 1977.

Silberman, C. E. *Crisis in the classroom.* New York: Random House, 1970.

Simon, S. B., Howe, L. W., & Kirschenbaum, H. *Values clarification; A handbook of practical strategies for teachers and students.* New York: Hart, 1972.

Wasserman, E. R. Implementing Kohlberg's "Just Community Concept" in an alternative high school. *Social Education*, 1976, *40*, 203–7.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. *Barnette*. U.S. 624, 63 S.G. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674 (1943).

Yudof, M. G. The dilemma of children's authority. *Policy Analysis*, 1976, *2*, 387–407.

General Index

Academic Disciplines, 4–5, 9, 34, 35, 37, 53, 59, 77.
Activism, *see* Society: social action.
Attitudes, 1–4, 12, 16, 36, 61, 68, 78, 97.
Authenticity, 11, 26–27.
Autonomy, 14, 15, 19, 29, 103.

Beard, Charles, 103, 107–08, 111.
Behaviorism, 7, 16, 19–22, 46, 97.
Bruner, Jerome, 50, 59, 77.

Censorship, 14–15.
Change, societal, 3, 16; personal, 19–22, 41, 42. *See* Continuity/Change Dilemma.
Choice, individual, 3, 6, 10, 78; critical, 17, 99.
Citizen, role of, 3, 8–9, 22–23, 26, 80; ideal, 6, 8–9, 56; good, 22, 50, 56, 75–76, 80–84, 91; young, 49, 53–54, 57–58, 72.
Citizenship, and social studies, 3, 5, 10, 12, 23, 35, 37–38, 72; goal of schools, 4, 8–9, 11, 23–24, 38–39, 97; referents for, 22, 23; as sense of responsibility to the community, 22, 51, 55, 62, 76, 91; as "membership," 23, 50.
Closed-mindedness, 88, 89, 91.
Cognitive Moral Developmental Approach, *see* Moral Development; *see also* Developmental Theory.
Community, definition of, 11, 22–23, 55; and self-analysis, 109.
Community Involvement, 4, 7, 9, 34, 51, 65–67, 70–72, 86, 103, 113. *See also* Citizenship, Participation, and Youth Participation.
Community Resource People, 81, 85, 88–90.
Community Service Projects, 65–67, 70.
Consciousness, 35–39, 46, 103.
Consciousness Raising, 6, 8, 16, 38–41.
Content, 8, 16–17, 72, 77, 81–82; selection of, 17, 91, 101, 103, 108.
Continuity/Change Dilemma, 34–35, 38–39.
Critical Thinking, 6, 9, 23, 42, 59, 86; and civic education, 4, 6, 34; skills of, 12, 16, 82–84, 86, 88–89, 91, 100–01, 108, 111; and youth participation, 52, 61.
Cultural Transmission, 14, 16, 28, 100–12.
Curriculum, 4, 10, 12, 85, 90, 93, 103; development of, 8–11, 22, 29, 36, 38, 99, 103, 109; theory and practice in, 38, 45–46, 75.
Curriculum Goals, 11–19, 104.

Data, collection of, 60, 88, 89.
Decision-making, 61, 98–99, 102–04, 106, 110, 112–13; rational, 15, 53, 79; skills of, 30, 52–53, 76, 108–09; in community, 63, 78, 103.
Democratization of the Schools, 8, 26.
Developmental Theory, 7, 10, 19–22, 40, 57–59.
Dewey, John, 50–51, 58, 72, 98–102, 105, 110.
Dialectical Synergism, 19, 21–22, 46, 58, 102–03.
Dilemmas, 6–7, 34–35, 38–39, 42, 45, 112.
Discipline, 5, 35, 75, 96, 102.
Disillusionment, 1–4, 10, 26, 27.
Diversity, 11, 16, 27–29, 49.

Education, 1, 8, 24, 30, 35, 38, 48, 97, 107; goals of, 3–9, 12–13, 19, 24, 28, 35, 42, 45; organismic, 10, 19–22, 34, 98, 101, 105, 113–14.
Empathy, goal of, 42, 43–44.
Ethics, 10, 14, 20, 30–31, 52, 59, 110–13.
Experiential Learning, 8, 18, 24, 27, 39, 46, 48, 52, 58–60, 70–72, 98, 105.
Extra-school Learning. *See* Out-of-School Learning.

Fenton, Edwin, 112, 113.
Field Studies, 70–71, 81, 85, 89–90.
Frame of Reference, personal, 97–98, 101–03, 105–06, 108.
Framework, 87; for rationale-building, 19, 29–31.

Generalization, 4, 17, 44, 60, 81–82, 98.
Growth, 21–22, 100–04.

Ideology, 7, 10.
Inculcation of values, 15, 77, 104.
Indoctrination of values, 14–15, 25, 77, 104, 111.
Inquiry, 23, 30, 77, 87, 103, 106; skills of, 6, 17; open, 14, 15, 27; rational, 18, 38, 98.
Integration, 3–4, 9, 75.
Interdependence, 13, 22, 51.
Internships, 68–69.

Justice, 5, 7, 14–15, 23, 31, 60, 68.
Justification, 9, 13–19, 24, 29–31, 39–41, 102–04.

Knowledge, 10, 12–13, 18, 37, 53, 59, 61, 76; nature of, 9–10, 13, 17–19, 100, 108; acquisition of, 17–18, 23, 59–60.
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 7, 20, 46, 58, 112.

Laissez-faire Indoctrination, 14–15.
Law-related Education, 4, 5, 34, 59.
Learning, styles of, 7, 19–22, 43–44, 80–83, 107; theories of, 10, 21; of social concepts, 42, 44–45; modes of, 58–62, 77, 81–82, 102.
Learning Requires Action, 49, 53, 59–61.

Maturity, 8, 21.
Modeling, behavioral, 20, 22, 59, 60, 75; ideational, 29, 38, 70–72, 86–87, 103–04, 110.
Moral Development, 9–10, 20–21, 35, 38, 52, 58, 112; and civic education, 4, 7, 34. *See also* Developmental Theory.

National Assessment of Educational Progress, 58, 97.
Needs, 16, 24, 52, 54, 90.

Openness, 15, 25–27, 101.
Open-mindedness, 76, 88.
Organismic Developmental Theory. *See* Developmental Theory.
Out-of-School Learning, 24–25, 27, 105. *See also* Experiential Learning.

Parents, 104, 105.
Participation, skills of, 7, 12, 25, 76, 81; public, 15–16, 59, 113; social, 49, 65, 110; effectiveness, 59, 83; as ideal, 76, 78, 104.
Participatory Democracy, 59, 76, 78.
Participatory Education, 7, 51, 63, 65.
Pedagogy, 1, 15, 34, 41, 43, 45, 83–87.
Philosophy, 1, 4, 17, 37, 46, 62, 98–99, 101; of citizenship, 7–8, 10–11, 50; efforts at, 97, 100, 105–06, 109.
Piaget, Jean, 20, 22, 46, 58.
Political Action, *see* Society: social action.
Political Education, 35–37, 42; justified, 39, 41.
Power, 2, 8, 30–31, 40, 55.
Priorities, 9, 13, 24.
Problems, 17, 35, 41–42, 97, 106; controversial/community/contemporary, 4, 6–7, 45, 65–66, 80, 83–88, 90–92, 113; social, 4–6, 9–10, 16, 21, 34, 51, 56, 59, 78, 84, 90; societal, 16, 41, 79, 83, 85.

Rationality, 14–18, 53, 79, 84, 103, 108; of persuasion, 15, 50; of analysis, 30, 106; of decisions, 78–79, 83.
Reading Skills, 60, 75, 83–84, 87–89, 91.
Reality, social, 8–10, 13, 15–17, 43; nature of, 15–17, 19, 60, 85; political, 34, 43.
Reflection, 7, 46, 53, 58, 101, 103, 106.
Reform, educational, 3–4, 8, 37–38, 54.
Responsibility, 8, 23, 53–56, 63, 66, 69, 76–77, 80–81, 85, 102; and youth participation, 7, 52, 90.
Role Play, 43, 81.

Schools, public, 3–4, 10, 25, 91, 96; goal of, 5, 23–24, 35–36, 97; as institutions, 8, 22, 25–26, 31, 36–37, 56, 110; role of, 10, 25, 35, 37, 55, 110; and other social agencies, 11, 22, 24–26, 62, 68, 105.
Self-concept, 18, 28, 55, 75, 83, 88–89, 91, 109. *See also* Frame of Reference.
Slow Learner, 74–92, 113.
Social Studies, 67, 81, 85, 99; reform of, 10, 37; and citizenship, 11–12, 50, 113. *See* Citizenship; Reform.
Society: social action, 6, 25, 39–41, 49–72, 97, 104; social issues, 12, 16, 21, 25, 35, 51, 68, 79, 110; social change, 16, 36; social criticism, 25, 35–37, 113; social education, 37, 58; social awareness, 39, 76, 85; social development, 58; social welfare, 63–67, 70.
Special Education, 81–87, 91.
Special Interest Groups, 28, 37, 89.
Student Action Typologies, 63–69.

Teachers, 11; role of, 11, 14–15; 30, 34, 36, 38, 45, 56, 97, 99–100, 102; as philosophers, 97–102.
Thinking, 18, 21, 96, 101–02, 107; systematic, 10, 29; skills of, 12, 16, 53; abstract, 21, 28, 49, 100, 107. *See also* Critical Thinking.
Truth, 14, 18, 23, 27, 49, 50.

Understanding, 5, 12, 42, 44.

Value-free Position, 13, 14–15.
Values, 6, 23, 30, 39, 74, 91, 111, 113; democratic, 2–3, 7, 10, 26, 51, 59, 80, 83–84, 110–11; nature of, 9–10, 13–15, 19, 104, 110–12; role of, 23, 110, 112. *See also* Indoctrination.
Values Clarification, 35, 112; and civic education, 4, 6–7, 34.
Values Education, 13–15, 38, 113; and slow learners, 77, 91.
Values Transmission, 111.
Volunteer Service, 7, 52–53, 61; and social welfare, 63–67, 70.

Youth, 8, 27, 55–56, 64–66; need to participate, 49, 53, 57–59.
Youth Participation, 49, 51–72.

Index prepared by Mary W. Matthews
Typography by Byrd PrePress
Printing and binding by Waverly Press
Cover design by Bill Caldwell
Book design and production by Joseph Perez